Opinion
File No. 2:01-CV-14.
August 10, 2001
OPINION
This action for declaratory judgment comes before the Court on Defendant Progressive Northern Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the reasons stated more fully below, Progressive Northern Insurance Company's motion will be granted.
I.
When personal jurisdiction is challenged, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that it does exist. Third National Bank in Nashville v. Wedge Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir. 1986). Where, as here, the Court considers the issue without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, the burden is relatively slight; a prima facie showing is sufficient. Id.
Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she is a resident of Marinette, Wisconsin. She is an employee of Emerson Electric of Menominee, Michigan, and a participant in the Emerson Electric Health and Welfare Benefit Plan ("the Plan"), a plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (Complaint ¶¶ 1-2). From April 28, 2000, through October 28, 2000, Plaintiff was covered under an automobile insurance policy issued by Progressive Northern Insurance Company ("Progressive Northern"), a Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio. (Complaint ¶¶ 3 11).
Plaintiff was in an automobile accident in Michigan on July 5, 2000, as a result of which she sustained serious bodily injuries which required extensive medical treatment. (Complaint ¶¶ 15-16). Defendant Plan has made and continues to make payments for said treatment which now exceed $30,000. (Complaint ¶ 17). On January 26, 2001, Plaintiff filed this action for declaratory judgment against the Plan, Progressive Northern, and Progressive Insurance Company. In this action Plaintiff requests this Court to issue its judgment with respect to the rights and liabilities each party may have with respect to the Plan and the automobile insurance policy. (Complaint ¶¶ 25-27).
Progressive Northern filed this motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis that it is not incorporated in Michigan, does not do business in Michigan, and is not licensed to provide motor vehicle insurance in Michigan. Plaintiff does not deny these asserted facts. In fact, most of these facts are alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff contends, however, that this Court has jurisdiction either under ERISA's national service of process provision, and/or under traditional personal jurisdiction analysis.
II.
Plaintiff's primary contention is that ERISA's nationwide service of process provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), allows for personal jurisdiction over a defendant with minimum personal contacts with any of the fifty United States. In Medical Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567-68 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth Circuit held that § 1132(e)(2) confers nationwide personal jurisdiction:
Where an action under this subchapter is brought in a district court of the United States, it may be brought in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be found, and process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides or may he found.29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
Because of the national service of process provision, the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was not "extra-territorial but rather nationwide," and therefore, the "minimum contacts analysis, as a limitation on state extra-territorial power, [was] simply inapposite." Haile 657 F.2d at 826 [Haile v. Henderson National Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981)]. Instead, in such cases we would apply a minimum contacts with the United States analysis. See United Liberty, 985 F.2d at 1330 [United Liberty Life Insurance Co. v. Ryan, 985 F.2d 1320 (6th Cir. 1993)]. . . . Consequently, we reaffirm our holding that Congress has the power to confer nationwide personal jurisdiction; and we hold that it conferred such jurisdiction under § 1132(e)(2) on the district court where the plan is administered.Medical Mut., 245 F.3d at 567.
The Sixth Circuit's conclusion that § 1132(e)(2) confers nationwide personal jurisdiction does not mean, however, that all defendants named in actions which invoke ERISA automatically come within this nationwide service of process provision. "Personal jurisdiction under § 1132(e)(2) depends upon subject matter jurisdiction under § 1132(a)(3)." NGS American, Inc. v. Jefferson, 218 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2000). Application of § 1132(e)(2)'s nationwide service of process provision only applies if the action is truly brought under ERISA. Id. at n. 5.
In this action Plaintiff has sued both her Plan and her auto insurer for declaratory judgment. She contends this action is brought pursuant to section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), because it is an action by a participant to obtain appropriate equitable relief, to enforce certain material provisions of ERISA and the Plan, and to redress certain violations of ERISA and the terms of the Plan. (Complaint ¶ 5). As relief, Plaintiff requests the Court to declare that pursuant to her insurance policy with Progressive Northern, she is entitled to Personal Injury Protection benefits under the Michigan No-Fault Law for the accident which occurred in the State of Michigan. (Complaint ¶ 25). She seeks a declaration that the automobile insurance policy is primary and that the Plan is entitled to reimbursement under its coordination of benefits provision for all expenditures it has made on Plaintiff's behalf with respect to injuries suffered in the accident. (Complaint ¶ 26).
Whatever the merits of Plaintiff's claim that her suit against the Plan is an action under ERISA, Plaintiff's claim against Progressive Northern, her auto insurer, cannot be interpreted as a claim under ERISA. It is not a suit to recover benefits or enforce the terms of a plan; it is not a suit against a fiduciary to the plan; and it is not a suit against an administrator for failure to provide information. Plaintiff's action against Progressive Northern is nothing more than an action against an auto insurer for no-fault benefits under Michigan insurance law. As such, her action against Progressive Northern is an action under state law, not an action under ERISA. Moreover, it duplicates a parallel action filed by the auto insurer in Wisconsin, seeking a declaration that it does not owe no-fault benefits.
It is questionable whether Plaintiff even has an ERISA action against her Plan. She does not deny that she has received benefits from her Plan, and she does not complain that the benefits received do not conform to the terms of the Plan. This issue, however, is not currently before the Court.
The Court is satisfied that the ERISA nationwide service of process provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2), does not apply to Plaintiff's action for a declaratory judgment for no-fault benefits against a non-ERISA auto insurer.
III.
Because the nationwide service of process provision does not apply, the Court must consider Plaintiff's alternative argument that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Progressive Northern under traditional personal jurisdiction analysis.
In diversity cases, federal courts apply the law of the forum state to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists. LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enterprises, 885 F.2d 1293, 1298 (6th Cir. 1989). To establish personal jurisdiction the plaintiff must satisfy a two-pronged test: the defendant must be amenable to suit under the forum state's long-arm statute and the exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the due process requirements of the Constitution. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation, 23 F.3d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir. 1994).
Under Michigan law, long-arm personal jurisdiction may be exercised over corporations under either the general personal jurisdiction statute, MCLA § 600.711, or the limited personal jurisdiction statute, MCLA § 600.715.
General personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporations may be exercised where the corporation has any of the following relationship with the state: 1) incorporation under the laws of the state; 2) consent to jurisdiction; or 3) the carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state. MCLA § 600.711.
Limited personal jurisdiction over non-resident corporations may be exercised where the action arises out of an act or acts which create any of the following relationships between the corporation and the state: 1) the transaction of any business within the state; 2) the doing or causing any act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort; 3) the ownership, use, or possession of any real or tangible personal property situated within the state; 4) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting; or 5) entering into a contract for services to be performed or for materials to be furnished in the state by the defendant. MCLA § 600.715.
Plaintiff does not contend that any of the general jurisdiction tests apply. Instead she contends that this Court has limited personal jurisdiction over Progressive Northern by virtue of the out-of-state coverage provision in the insurance policy issued by Progressive Northern to Plaintiff. The policy provides coverage for out-of-state accidents when such coverages are made compulsory upon non-residents operating their motor vehicles in any state other than the state in which the insured's motor vehicle is principally garaged. Plaintiff is presumably asserting personal jurisdiction under the statutory provision for limited personal jurisdiction over corporations where the action arises out of the corporation's contracting to insure any person or risk located within the state at the time of contracting. MCLA 600.715(4).
This long-arm provision does not apply under the facts of this case. There is no evidence or allegation that Progressive Northern's Out-of-State-Coverage provision insured against a specific risk in Michigan. Neither does Plaintiff assert that she purchased a special Michigan no-fault rider. It would not be consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), to make all automobile insurers subject to personal jurisdiction in all fifty states merely because they have an out-of-state coverage provision.
Plaintiff has failed to sustain her burden of making a prima facie showing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Progressive Northern. Accordingly, Plaintiff's action against Progressive Northern must be dismissed.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
In accordance with the opinion entered this date,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Progressive Northern Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Docket # 3) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant Progressive Northern Insurance Company is DISMISSED.