Opinion
No. CIV 99-1427 PHX RCB.
October 17, 2006
ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant James A. Monroe's expedited motion to quash a Writ of General Execution issued on August 25, 2006. That Writ was issued to satisfy a nearly $1.7 million dollar judgment rendered in plaintiff James L. Gagan's favor and against defendant Monroe, among others. Pursuant to that Writ, on September 25, 2006, the U.S. Marshal issued a "Notice of . . . Sale" for real property located in Maricopa County, defendant Monroe's home. See Doc. 315, exh. A thereto. Primarily because the public auction of this property is scheduled for October 26, 2006, at 10:00 a.m., the court granted defendants' request for an expedited hearing, which was held on October 13, 2006. Doc. 316.
Introduction
This motion to quash is the latest in a long series of attempts by defendant Monroe to thwart plaintiff's efforts to enforce the judgment which plaintiff obtained against Monroe in 1994. Although defendant frames his arguments in terms of collateral estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this most recent motion to quash is essentially a rehash of an argument which this court has rejected at least twice before. Namely, defendant is once again arguing that this court's 2005 rulings that the judgment was timely renewed, and thus enforceable, is at odds with what he believes the state court decided, i.e. that the judgment is not enforceable. For the reasons set forth below, defendant's arguments gain nothing by recasting them in terms of the collateral estoppel and Rooker-Feldman doctrines.
Background
This action is not unfamiliar to this court. In fact, prior to filing the present motion to quash, defendant Monroe filed at least two remarkably similar motions, both of which the court denied. See Doc. 317, exhs. 1 and 2 thereto.
Plaintiff obtained the judgment which is the subject of this motion in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana on November 23, 1994. On March 1, 1995, plaintiff recorded that judgment in Maricopa County. Less than a month later, on March 28, 1995, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1963, plaintiff registered the Indiana judgment by filing a certified copy of that judgment in this district court. Section 1963 provides in relevant part that "[a] judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like manner." Several days later, on March 31, 1995, plaintiff re-recorded the judgment in Maricopa County. Then, on June 9, 2002, plaintiff "re-filed the Indiana judgment . . . in th[is] District Court[.]" Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto at 2.
I. Arizona Superior Court Action
In 1999, defendant Monroe's wife commenced an action in Arizona Superior Court seeking a declaration that the "Gagan Judgment created by filing the Indiana Judgment in the District Court of Arizona and recording on March 31, 1995 [was] a `wrongful lien[.]'" Doc. 318, exh. AA thereto at 2. Eventually, the state court dismissed Ms. Monroe's action.
As part of that wrongful lien action, defendant Monroe filed a counterclaim seeking "a declaration that the judgment and judgment lien [we]re unenforceable under Arizona law[.]" Id. at 3, ¶ A. Addressing that counterclaim, in a minute entry, the Superior Court found "invalid" plaintiff's "real property lien arising out of the November 23, 1994 [Indiana] judgment[.] Doc. 313, exh. A thereto at 1 (emphasis added). In reaching that conclusion, the Superior Court explained that in accordance with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-964(A) (West 2000), upon recording, the judgment "bec[a]me a lien for a period of five years from the date it [wa]s given," i.e. until November 23, 1999. Id. Immediately thereafter the Superior Court noted, "[t]he record is undisputed that the judgment was not renewed until June 9, 2000, nearly . . . 7 . . . months after it expired." Id. Because "the record d[id] not indicate that the judgment itself was renewed following its . . . 5 year expiration[,]" the Superior Court opined that plaintiff's "effort to renew the lien" by refiling the judgment in this District Court on June 9, 2000, was "of no moment." See id. (citations omitted). The court concluded by explicitly finding "that [plaintiff's] real property lien arising out of the November 23, 1994 judgment from the Northern District Court of Indiana is invalid." Id. (emphasis added).
In the Declaratory Judgment embodying that minute entry, the Superior Court unequivocally "f[ou]nd that [plaintiff] Gagan's "real property lien of March 1, 1995 and June 9, 2000[,] arising out of the recording of [his] November 23, 1994 [Indiana] judgment against [defendant] Monroe . . . was not timely renewed in accordance with the requirements of A.R.S. § 12-1611, et seq., and is therefore invalid." Id., exh. B thereto at 2 (emphasis added) Consequently, the Superior Court "grant[ed] Monroe Declaratory Judgment that [plaintiff's] lien arising out of the recording of the November 23, 1994 [Indiana] judgment . . . is invalid and unenforceable as a matter of law." Id. (emphasis added).
II. Arizona Court of Appeals Decision
Plaintiff Gagan appealed. Consistent with the Superior Court's Declaratory Judgment, as the Court of Appeals framed it, the issue on appeal was whether plaintiff's "judgment lien against [defendant] Monroe was invalid for failure to renew it pursuant to . . . A.R.S. section 12-1611[.]" Doc. 313, exh. C thereto at ¶ 1 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals addressed two narrow issues: (1) whether there was a justiciable issue as to the validity of the lien before the trial court; and (2) the validity of the "re-recorded" lien. See id. at 9. As to the former, the Court rejected plaintiff's argument that "a justiciable issue as to the validity of the lien did not exist and that the trial court erred by ruling that the re-recorded lien was invalid."Id. at 5, ¶ 10.
This statute allows for renewal of judgments "by action thereon at any time within five years after the date of the judgment." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1611 (West 2003).
Insofar as the "validity of the re-recorded lien" was concerned, the Court of Appeals recognized that plaintiff was not arguing "that the original lien remained valid[.]" Id. at 9, ¶ 18. "[N]or d[id] he argue that he properly renewed the lien by re-recording it." Id. Instead, on appeal plaintiff "argue[d] that he created an entirely new valid lien by re-recording the original judgment, which he asserts remained valid under Indiana law and A.R.S. § 12-549 [governing foreign judgments.]"Id. (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals also rejected this argument "conclud[ing] that [plaintiff's] re-recording of the original judgment did not create a new valid lien under Arizona law." Id. at 14, ¶ 25 (emphasis added). Thus the Court affirmed the Superior Court's Declaratory Judgment. See id. III. District Court Motions to Quash
On September 13, 2004, defendant moved in this court to quash the second writ of garnishment and summons, to quash the filing of the foreign judgment, and to have this court take judicial notice of the Arizona Court of Appeals Decision. Doc. 217. Approximately seven months later, on April 6, 2005, defendant Monroe filed a "Motion to Quash the Writ of Garnishment Non-Earnings) and Second Motion to Quash Filing of Foreign Judgment[.]" Doc. 236 at 1 (emphasis added). Again, Monroe asked this court to take judicial notice of that 2003 Arizona Court of Appeals decision. See id. at 2.
On July 25, 2006, this court denied both of those motions to quash. (Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto). In so doing, the court explicitly denied Monroe's request to take judicial notice of the January 21, 2003, Arizona Court of Appeals decision. Id. at 3. Monroe had asked this court to take judicial notice of that decision based upon his belief that the state court had found plaintiff's judgment to be unenforceable. This court gave two reasons for denying Monroe's request to take judicial notice. First, it faulted Monroe for not identifying the specific facts of which he wanted the court to take judicial notice. Second, distinguishing between a judgment and a judgment lien, this court found that the Arizona Court of Appeals held that plaintiff's "judgment lien was unenforceable, not the judgment itself."Id. at 3 (emphasis added). In this regard, the court pointed out that the Court of Appeals specifically noted that plaintiff did "not argue that he renewed the judgment." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In light of the foregoing, this court found plaintiff's "interpretation" of the Court of Appeals decision "misplaced." Id. at 3-4.
Having declined to take judicial notice of the Court of Appeals decision, this court went on to address defendant Monroes's argument that plaintiff "did not effectively renew the judgment in accordance with Arizona law," thus rendering "the judgment unenforceable." Id. at 4 (citations omitted). Under Arizona law, there are two ways to renew a judgment. The first is "by action thereon at any time within five years after the date of the judgment." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1611 (West 2003). The second way to renew a judgment is by affidavit. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1612 (West 2003). Plaintiff admitted that he did not file a renewal affidavit. Instead, he argued that "he renewed the judgment by bringing `an action[,]'" as section 12-1611 allows. Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto at 4 (citations omitted). The lack of a statutorily or judicially created definition of "action" required this court to wrestle with the issue of how to define "action" for section 12-1611 purposes. Not surprisingly, plaintiff argued for a broad definition, whereas defendant argued that an "action" under section 12-1611 refers strictly to the filing of a lawsuit.
Noting that the purpose of section 12-1611 is "to give notice to the judgment debtor and other interested parties of the identity of the judgment to be renewed[,]" this court held that "any action upon a judgment" which gives such notice "and is within five years of the date of the judgment was entered, may effectuate a renewal of the judgment." Id. at 6. Thus, because plaintiff had "filed numerous applications for writs of garnishment and motions in this matter within five years of the date the judgment was entered, the Court f[ound] that the judgment ha[d] been appropriately renewed and is enforceable."Id. at 607. Further, this court found that because "such renewal actions ha[d] occurred within the five years prior to the contested writs of garnishment and motions," those "writs and motions had the effect of timely renewal of the judgment." Id. at 7. On the basis of the foregoing, the court denied defendant's motions to quash.
Following those denials, plaintiff "filed a request for entry of the contested judgement against [a] garnishee[.]" Id., exh. 2 thereto at 2 (citations omitted). Defendant responded by filing a motion for a stay pending appeal and for waiver of the discretionary bond. Defendant took the position that he could meet the first criteria for the granting of a stay pending appeal, i.e., a showing of "likelihood of success on the merits of the appeal[,]" because Arizona courts had decided that the judgment was not enforceable under Arizona law. Id. at 3. As it had in connection with his motions to quash, this court rejected that argument, reiterating its view that "the Arizona Court of Appeals . . . determined [plaintiff's] judgment lien to be unenforceable, not the judgment itself." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court added that in any event its order denying defendant's motion to quash the writs of garnishment was not an appealable order. Id. at 4.
Summary of Arguments
As defendant reads the Superior Court's minute entry, it "made a specific finding that plaintiff's Indiana judgment is no longer enforceable in Arizona[,]" a finding which defendant contends the Court of Appeals did not disturb on appeal. Doc. 313 at 3 and 10 (emphasis added). Invoking collateral estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman doctrines, defendant contends that this court "is precluded from determining that the Indiana Judgment is enforceable, and more specifically that th[at] . . . Judgment was timely renewed[.]" Id. at 10. "Collateral estoppel, or, . . . issue preclusion, means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rooker/Feldman "stands for the proposition that a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court," Manufactured Home Communities v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is so because "[o]nly the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to review `[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.'" In re Sasson, 424 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2890 (2006). In addition to challenging the applicability of the collateral estoppel and Rooker-Feldman doctrines, plaintiff responds that "res judicata has been established in this [federal] court by way of th[is] [court's] two [2005] Orders . . . regarding judgment renewal and enforceability." Doc. 317 at 6. Thus plaintiff reasons, if any preclusive effect should be given here, it is with respect to this court's prior determination that the judgment is enforceable. Almost as an afterthought, plaintiff adds that defendant cannot rely upon the Superior Court's minute entry to disturb this court's prior 2005 orders because those orders are "the law of th[e] case." Id.
Discussion
The court will first address the Rooker-Feldman argument because unlike the preclusion doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, Rooker-Feldman is jurisdictional. See Sasson, 424 F.3d at 872; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (citation omitted) ("Preclusion, of course, is not a jurisdictional matter."). Therefore, if defendant Monroe prevails on his Rooker-Feldman argument, this court would be divested of subject matter jurisdiction.I. Rooker-Feldman
As noted above, "under what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments." Lance, 126 S.Ct. at 1201 (footnote added). In Lance, the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on Rooker-Feldman, the Court reiterated its view that that doctrine is a "narrow" one, "confined to `cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Id. (quoting Exxon, 544 U.S. at 283). More succinctly, the Supreme Court in Lance stressed that theRooker-Feldman doctrine "applies only in limited circumstances, . . ., where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court." Id. at 1202 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine takes its name from the only two cases in which [the Supreme Court] ha[s] applied this rule to find that a federal district court lacked jurisdiction." Lance v. Dennis, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1201 (2006).
Defendant interprets the Superior Court's minute entry as holding that plaintiff's judgment is unenforceable. From there defendant goes on to argue that because that was a ruling "adverse" to plaintiff, and plaintiff did not "pursue appellate review" of that issue, Rooker-Feldman "bar[s] [plaintiff] from seeking a review" of that ruling in this district court. See Doc. 313 at 10. Plaintiff counters that this Rooker-Feldman argument "misses the point" because he is not "`appeal[ing]' the State Court ruling in this Court." Doc. 317 at 6. The court agrees.
On the face of it, clearly plaintiff Gagan is not seeking a review of the Arizona Superior Court's decision. Rather, by registering the Indiana judgment in this court, which is how this proceeding began, and eventually obtaining a writ of general execution, plaintiff is seeking to enforce a judgment which this court has previously held is "enforceable" — nothing more.See Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto at 7.
Defendant Monroe tries to bring this case within the ambit ofRooker-Feldman by asserting that under that doctrine this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the issue of the validity of the lien and the issue of the enforceability of the judgment are "inextricably intertwined." To be sure, theRooker-Feldman doctrine" prohibits a federal district court from . . . adjudicat[ing] claims that are `inextricably intertwined' with the merits of a judgment rendered in a state court proceeding." G.C. and K.B. Investments, Inc. v. Wilson, 326 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16). This prohibition against hearing an "inextricably intertwined" claim arises out of a concern that "the District Court is in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.'" Id.
Here, defendant Monroe asserts that the issues of the validity of the lien and the enforceability of the judgment are "inextricably intertwined" because if this court "allows [plaintiff] to enforce the Indiana judgment by refusing to quash the Writ of General Execution and Notice of Levy, it must effectively overrule [the Superior Court's] un-appealed and unambiguous decision which found the very same Indiana judgment to be unenforceable in the State of Arizona." Dco. 313 at 10. To support this argument defendant relies upon Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), and Fontana Empire Center, LLC v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2002).
What defendant Monroe fails to take into account is that in 2003 the Ninth Circuit "clarifie[d] the narrow scope and application" of Rooker-Feldman, Manufactured Home Communities, 420 F.3d at 1029, "and in so doing significantly limited [its] reach" in terms of the "inextricably intertwined" element of that doctrine. See Lahey v. Contra Costa County Department of Children and Family Services, No. C01-1075, 2004 WL 2055716, at *9 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 2, 2004). More specifically, inNoel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he `inextricably intertwined analysis of Feldman applies to defeat federal district court subject matter jurisdiction only when a plaintiff's suit in federal district court is at least in part a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judgment, and an issue in that federal suit is `inextricably intertwined' with an issue resolved by the state court judicial decision from which the forbidden de facto appeal is taken." Id. at 1165 (emphasis added). In so holding, theNoel Court emphasized that it has "never held that when there are simultaneous suits in state and federal court, in which related or `inextricably intertwined' claims are being litigated, the federal suit must be dismissed under Rooker-Feldman." Id. "Indeed," the Court explained, it "could not so hold without violating the rule that permits simultaneous state and federal suits involving not only inextricably intertwined, but even identical, claims."Id. The Noel Court concluded its "inextricably intertwined" discussion by pointing out that "[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that simultaneous state and federal litigation of overlapping, and even identical, issues is an important feature of our federal system," and it would "not interpret the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to destroy that feature." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
As the foregoing demonstrates, after Noel "[t]he premise for the operation of the `inextricably intertwined' test . . . is that the federal plaintiff is seeking to bring a forbidden de facto appeal." Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A federal plaintiff brings a "forbidden de facto appeal . . . when he . . . complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court." Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. Plainly, the relief which plaintiff Gagan is seeking (execution of a writ to enforce a foreign judgment) does not constitute a "forbidden de facto appeal" because he "is not alleging as a legal wrong an erroneous decision from the state court." See Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 950 (citation omitted). Instead, as noted earlier, plaintiff Gagan is attempting to enforce a judgment which this court has previously held is enforceable. Thus, despite defendant Monroe's assertion to the contrary, "the `inextricably intertwined' test does not come into play here" because "the premise" for its "operation," a "forbidden de facto appeal," is missing. See id.
The court finds defendant's Rooker-Feldman doctrine unpersuasive for several other reasons. First of all, thePennzoil language upon which defendant is relying is in a concurrence by Justice Marshall and did not control the outcome there. Second, Pennzoil does not advance defendant'sRooker-Feldman argument any because there, in an action challenging Texas procedures for enforcement of judgments, the Supreme Court held that rather than dismissing underRooker-Feldman, the district court should have abstained underYounger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 6-10. Both of these factors significantly undermine defendant Monroe's reliance upon Pennzoil.
Nor does Fontana, another case which defendant cites, mandate a different result here. In fact, recognizing that the "Fontana case can be misleading[,]" subsequently the Ninth Circuit inMaldonado essentially cautioned litigants about readingFontana "out of context." See Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 950. Yet that is precisely what defendant Monroe did. For these reasons, defendant's reliance upon Pennzoil and Fontana is misplaced.
In Lance, decided just last term, the Supreme Court repeated its "warn[ing] that the lower courts have at times extendedRooker-Feldman `far beyond the contours of the Rooker andFeldman cases, overriding Congress' conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.'" Lance, 126 S.Ct. at 1201 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283). Adopting defendant Monroe's argument would be just such an impermissible extension of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil recognized, "neither Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related question while the case remains sub judice in federal court." Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292. Applying that reasoning to the present case, the Court of Appeal's judgment on the "related question" of the validity of the lien does not deprive this court of subject matter jurisdiction to decide the judgment enforceability issue.
Finally, this court declines to find that Rooker-Feldman is a bar to this enforcement proceeding because even if "plaintiff presents some independent claims, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party . . ., then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion." Id. at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia, Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-64). In other words, "[e]ven though a favorable decision in federal court [ may] undermine the credibility of the state court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as recently explained by the Ninth Circuit in Noel, does not bar jurisdiction in this case." See Lahey, 2004 WL 2055716, at *9. In short, because plaintiff Gagan does not allege any legal errors by the Arizona state court as a basis for relief herein, Rooker-Feldman does not bar this action. Accordingly, the court DENIES defendant's motion to quash the Writ of General Execution and Notice of Levy issued on August 25, 2006 (Doc. 306), insofar as it is premised upon theRooker-Feldman doctrine.
II. Collateral Estoppel
Having determined that Rooker-Feldman does not apply here, the issue becomes whether, as defendant urges, under Arizona collateral estoppel law the "Court must honor [the Superior court's] determination and must find that the Indiana Judgment is unenforceable and must quash [plaintiff's] pending Writ of General Execution and Notice of Levy." Doc. 313 at 8.
Under the Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the court must "give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered." See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Thus, to determine the preclusive effect, if any, of the state court decision this court must look to Arizona collateral estoppel law. To establish collateral estoppel under Arizona law, the following five elements must be shown:
"[T]he issue [wa]s actually litigated in the previous proceeding, there [wa]s a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, resolution of such issue [wa]s essential to the decision, there [wa]s a valid and final decision on the merits, and there is a common identity of the parties.Matter of Lockard, 884 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
As defendant reads the Superior Court's decision, "it determined that [the Indiana judgment] was not timely renewed and that it is not enforceable." Doc. 313 at 5. Premised upon that reading, defendant contends that each of the elements of collateral estoppel is "undeniably satisfied" here. Id. at 6. Hence, defendant contends that collateral estoppel "preclude[s] [this court] from determining that the Indiana Judgment is enforceable, and more specifically that th[a]t . . . Judgment was timely renewed[.]" Id. at 5.
Plaintiff counters that there is no need to address each of the five collateral estoppel elements because defendant cannot satisfy the first element given that "the issue in question" here, enforceability of the judgment, was not "actually litigated" in state court. Doc. 317 at 5. Defendant cannot make such a showing because, as plaintiff reads the state court's decisions, the issue which was "actually litigated" there was whether plaintiff properly renewed his judgment lien — not whether the judgment itself was enforceable.
The court agrees with plaintiff that there is no need to analyze each of the five collateral estoppel elements. The court has a different reason than does plaintiff for finding such an analysis unnecessary, however. Both parties overlook the fact that under Arizona collateral estoppel law the issue which a party is seeking to have relitigated must be the " same[,]"Pima County v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 127 P.3d 64, 69 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2006) (citation omitted), "precisely the same[,]"State v. Whelan, 91 P.3d 1011, 1015 (Az.Ct.App. 2004) (citingState v. Stauffer, 536 P.2d 1044, 1047(Ariz. 1975)), or " identical[,]" Better Homes Construction, Inc. v. Goldwater, 53 P.3d 1139, 1143 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added), to the issue actually addressed in the previous litigation.
Here, the issue which defendant is seeking to preclude, the enforceability of the judgment, is not the "same," "precisely the same," or "identical" to the issue actually litigated in state court. Rather, as this court has explicitly found on two prior occasions, the issue which was "actually litigated" in state court was whether the judgment lien was timely renewed, and not, as in this federal action, "whether the judgment was appropriately and timely renewed under Arizona law." See Doc. 317, exh. 1 thereto at 3 (citation omitted) ("[I]n the Court of Appeals['] opinion . . ., the Arizona court concluded that [plaintiff's] judgment lien was unenforceable, not the judgment itself."); and Doc. 317, exh. 2 thereto at 3 (same).
The court continues to have a fundamental disagreement with defendant's reading of the state court decisions. The Declaratory Judgment could not have been more clear: The issue which was "actually litigated" was the validity of the lien, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that plaintiff's "re-recording of the original judgment did not create a new valid lien under Arizona law." See Doc. 313, exh. C thereto at 14. Distinguishing between a judgment and a judgment lien, is compatible with the notion that "judgment liens are a separate and independent creditor's remedy[.]" See Boone v. Grier, 688 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1984). Thus, "there is no legal requirement that there be a judgment lien prior to execution [of a judgment] pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1553(1)." Id. Of course, "[t]he judgment creditor who attempts to execute against real property without a lien, . . ., is open to potential loss of his rights to a bona fide purchaser by failing to record his interests in such property." Id. (citation omitted). But the fact remains that such a creditor may still seek to execute his judgment against real property even in the absence of a judgment lien. For these reasons, the court finds no merit to defendant's collateral estoppel argument and thus DENIES his motion to quash the Writ of General Execution and Notice of Levy (Doc. 306) on that basis.
That statute reads as follows:
The party in whose favor a judgment is given, at any time within five years after entry of the judgment and within five years after any renewal of the judgment either by affidavit or by an action brought on it, may have a writ of execution or other process issued for its enforcement.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1551(A) (West Supp. 2005).
Because the court is denying defendant's motion to quash, and in turn refusing to revisit the issue of the Indiana judgment's enforceability, there is no need to address plaintiff's counter-arguments that res judicata and the law of the case doctrines bar this court from reconsidering that issue.
III. Sanctions, Attorney's Fees and Costs
Although, arguably, there may be some merit in the request by plaintiff to make an application for an award of sanctions, attorney's fees and costs, the court will deny that request at this time. Any future effort to re-litigate these issues will result in a different ruling.
Conclusion
IT IS ORDERED that defendant James A. Monroe's motion to quash the Writ of General Execution and Notice of Levy (Doc. 313) is denied. Rooker-Feldman is an extremely narrow jurisdictional doctrine, which courts rarely invoke, and defendant has failed to adequately support his argument that this court should rely upon that doctrine and find that it has no subject matter jurisdiction. Further, defendant is improperly relying upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel to establish the preclusive effect of the state court decisions because he cannot show that the identical issue of the enforceability of the judgment was "actually litigated" in state court — an element essential to establish preclusive effect under Arizona law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff James L. Gagan's request to make an application for an award of sanctions, attorney's fees and costs is denied, without prejudice.