Opinion
B158987.
7-10-2003
CHARLES GADDA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HERBERT KELEVEN JAMES et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Leonard D. Nasatir, for Defendants and Appellants. R.P. Reddingius and Howard Posner, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Charles Gadda (Gadda) and Edwin Hale (Hale) appeal the trial courts order denying their petition to vacate a $ 20,000 arbitration award against them in favor of Herbert Keleven James (James). Janice Fortier (Fortier) cross-appeals the trial courts order vacating her separate $ 10,000 award against Gadda, Hale, and Stuart Bird-Wilson (Bird-Wilson). We conclude that both trial court orders are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
James cross-appeals a purported court order to vacate his $ 20,000 award against Bird-Wilson. However, because the record does not reflect that the trial court entered any such order, we have no jurisdiction over this matter. We have no choice but to dismiss Jamess cross-appeal.
FACTS
1. The joint venture agreement.
Gadda and Hale entered into a joint venture agreement (the agreement) with two developers, James and Aron H. Sato (Sato), to renovate and sell a parcel of real property (the property) located in the City of Los Angeles. The agreement provides the following: Gadda and Hale own the property, which was originally appraised at $ 195,000 and is encumbered with a $ 143,000 first mortgage. They agree to place their interest into the joint venture and apply for a second mortgage to obtain necessary funds. The clearing of debris and the renovation shall be completed pursuant to the contract schedule. Upon completion of the renovation, at least part of the property shall be leased, with the condition that James and Sato have the first right to enter into a lease for a year term. Then, the property shall be sold on the open market. Gadda and Hale have a right to recover their initial $ 50,000 investment in the property. As well, James and Sato have a right to be reimbursed for any funds they might expend. The remaining proceeds shall be split equally.
The agreement contained an arbitration provision that provided:
"1. The Parties will meet promptly and attempt to resolve any dispute forthwith. [P] 2. If, after thirty (30) calendar days [following] such meeting, any dispute remain unresolved, Parties will submit to mediation. . . . [P] 3. If, after thirty (30) calendar days from the appointment of a mediator, Parties shall not in good faith have resolved any dispute, the dispute will be forthwith placed in arbitration in accordance with the rules of the State of California, and any judgment rendered by the Arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction[.]"
2. The superior court action.
James, Sato, and Eric James (Eric) sued Gadda and Hale, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, specific performance, fraud, and injunctive relief. According to the complaint: The parties amended the agreement to provide that Gadda and Hale would receive $ 30,000 and quitclaim title in the property to James and Sato to permit them to market the property or sell it to Eric. Gadda and Hale were to receive $ 20,000 after the sale. Unbeknownst to James and Sato, Gadda and Hale never intended to abide by their promises. In reliance, James and Sato invested over $ 10,000 to clean up and renovate the property. Also, they obtained a $ 75,000 loan. James moved in, believing he had purchased the property. However, Gadda and Hale breached the contract by failing to convey title. James, Sato, and Eric prayed for compensatory damages in the amount of $ 120,000, punitive damages, attorneys fees, an order requiring Gadda and Hale to sell the property to Eric, and an injunction prohibiting Gadda and Hale from evicting James and Eric from the property.
Subsequently, representing himself in pro per, James filed a first amended complaint adding Bird-Wilson as a defendant. Aside from revamping the existing causes of action, James alleged that Bird-Wilson conspired with Gadda and Hale to falsely promise to convey title to the property, and that Bird-Wilson, Gadda, and Hale committed various crimes in violation of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and extortion in violation of the California Penal Code.
Gadda and Hale gave Bird-Wilson power of attorney to act as their local representative in connection with the property.
James is not a lawyer. He improperly filed the first amended complaint on behalf of Sato and Eric as well as himself. James signed the first amended complaint, but Sato and Eric did not. Attorney Andrew E. Smyth was the attorney of record who filed the original complaint.
Despite Gadda and Hales request to arbitrate pursuant to the terms of the agreement, James refused. As a result, Gadda and Hale petitioned to compel arbitration and stay the superior court proceedings. James did not file a written opposition, but he appeared at the hearing. Sato, however, did not appear. The trial court granted the petition, dismissed the superior court action, and retained jurisdiction over postarbitration matters.
Gadda and Hales petition to compel arbitration was directed at James and Sato. Their petition states that their attorney discussed arbitration with James. There is no mention of Sato. Although Sato and Eric were named plaintiffs, and although Sato was a party to the agreement, the record suggests that they never actually participated in the superior court proceedings.
3. The arbitration.
The arbitration was held on December 20, 2001, at the home of the arbitrator. On that date, James submitted his first amended complaint and Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson submitted a pleading entitled "Defendants Cross-Complaint" which provided an answer to the first amended complaint and set forth causes of action for fraud, malicious prosecution, breach of contract, defamation, damage to property value, petty theft, and theft of U.S. mail. That pleading did not request damages or any other relief. It did, however, identify Fortier as a party for the first time by labeling her as a plaintiff.
At the outset, the arbitrator mistakenly informed the parties that the proceeding was nonbinding.
Gadda, Hale, Bird-Wilson, James, and Fortier testified. Fortier, in particular, testified about the gardening services she provided. As well, various other people who were in attendance made statements. In the end, the arbitration lasted only an hour.
Fortier was a cohabitant with James at the property. According to Fortier, she cleared and hauled away unwanted vegetation and trash from the property, planted new plants and flowers, and built a rock garden. Hale, in contrast, contends that Fortier did very little, i.e., she left the garden full of weeds and failed to prune or properly prune the trees. We note that terms of Fortiers employment are not in the record. James, in a declaration submitted in opposition to the petition to vacate, stated the he "informed the arbitrator that both [Fortier] and [he] were making claims against all three of the petitioners for labor, materials and funds expended by both of [them] at the request of petitioner [sic] on the real property referred to in the [agreement] and pursuant to the terms and purposes of that [agreement]." We cannot glean from this what Fortier was supposed to be paid.
The arbitrator awarded $ 20,000 to James and $ 10,000 to Fortier against Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson. In his written decision, the arbitrator indicated: "This is a binding arbitration."
4. The petition to vacate and petition to confirm.
Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson petitioned to vacate James and Fortiers arbitration awards under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1286.2(a) and 473. James filed a petition to confirm.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
At the hearing, the trial court stated: "As to the 10,000 awarded to [Fortier] . . ., it would appear that, and the court found that the arbitrator did exceed his authority there by taking an award against also [Bird-Wilson], who never signed the contract, or agreed, and [Fortier] didnt sign the contract, or agree to the arbitration. So certainly that $ 10,000 award is improper in that case. [P] Confirming — the award of 20,000 to [James] is confirmed." The trial courts subsequent minute order and written order confirms the award to James and vacates the award as to Fortier. There was no ruling on Bird-Wilsons petition to vacate.
This timely appeal and cross-appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. The appeal.
a. Standard of review.
"The decision to confirm or vacate an arbitration award lies with the trial court. [Citations.] [P] Our function as an appellate court is to review the trial court proceedings. In this regard, the applicable standards of appellate review of a judgment based on affidavits or declarations are the same as for a judgment following oral testimony: We must accept the trial courts resolution of disputed facts when supported by substantial evidence; we must presume the court found every fact and drew every permissible inference necessary to support its judgment, and defer to its determination of credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. [Citation.]" (Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 919, 923.)
When applying the substantial evidence test, we review the record to determine "whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination." (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal. App. 3d 870, 873-874, 197 Cal. Rptr. 925.) If we conclude that a challenged order is supported by substantial evidence, then "it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion. [Citations.]" (Ibid.)
Gadda and Hale urge us to employ a de novo standard of review. However, the citation they rely on, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9, 885 P.2d 994, is not on point. In that case, our Supreme Court approved a de novo standard of review with respect to a trial courts ruling as to whether an arbitrators remedy exceeded his powers. Specifically, regarding any remedy based on a breach of contract claim, the court stated: "The award will be upheld so long as it was even arguably based on the contract; it may be vacated only if the reviewing court is compelled to infer the award was based on an extrinsic source. [Citation.] In close cases the arbitrators decision must stand. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 381.) Gadda and Hale do not challenge the arbitration remedy.
b. The trial courts order denying Gadda and Hales petition to vacate Jamess award is supported by substantial evidence.
In arguing that the trial court erred in denying the relief they requested below, Gadda and Hale posit that Jamess award against them should be vacated because they were substantially prejudiced when (1) the arbitrator misled them by falsely representing that the arbitration was not binding, (2) he failed to continue the arbitration, and (3) he failed to consider evidence.
We disagree.
Gadda and Hale rely on section 1286.2, subdivision (a). That statute provides that an arbitration award shall be vacated if "(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means. [P] . . . [P] (3) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator. [P] . . . [P] (5) The rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title." However, detrimental to their position, they failed to provide adequate citations to the record and proper legal argument to demonstrate that their petition should have been granted.
It is apparent that Gadda and Hale did not heed the following rule: "The reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment. It is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Accordingly every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration." (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1050, 213 Cal. Rptr. 69.)
To begin, Gadda and Hale failed to establish that the award was procured by undue means or that they were misled and prejudiced such that the award should therefore be vacated under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(1) or (3). Instead of citing to relevant evidence submitted below and analogizing to cases in which arbitration awards were vacated, Gadda and Hale do no more than make a passing reference to statements in declarations from Hale and Bird-Wilson that James falsely claimed to be the owner of the property, and that he failed to account for $ 22,000. Then they posit the following: Due to the arbitrators misrepresentation of the binding nature of the arbitration, Gadda and Hale "took a less aggressive approach to presenting their case." "The arbitrators conduct here amounts to undue means and misconduct of a neutral arbitrator." They invite us to imagine that the arbitrator intentionally misled the parties about the nature of the arbitration. Then they state: "No one would question that the right [sic] of the party were substantially prejudiced by his misconduct, and that a court would have to vacate his award under [section] 1286[, subdivision (a)(3). There would be little question that the award had been procured by undue means. There is no reason why the result should be any different simply because the arbitrator says he did not know what he was doing." Stating it plainly, such unsubstantiated argument is insufficient to carry the day.
In any event, the trial courts decision to not vacate Jamess award pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivisions (a)(1) and (3) is supported by substantial evidence.
Gadda and Hale entered into an agreement that provided for binding arbitration. Presumably, then, they understood the nature of the proceeding. Further, the evidence submitted to the trial court supports a finding that they presented an unfettered defense at the arbitration and were not prejudiced in any way. They prepared their trial brief prior to the arbitrators mischaracterization of the nature of the proceedings. Also, the declarations Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson filed with the trial court did not identify any relevant argument or specific evidence that they failed to offer in support of their defense. Below, in essence, they contended that they never amended the agreement and did not owe James a quitclaim deed, James could not be the owner of the property because he had been evicted twice, James breached the agreement by failing to meet the agreed upon schedule for the completion of the renovation, and James and Sato misappropriated $ 22,000. But this evidence was before the arbitrator. Gadda and Hales position was merely that the arbitrator "ignored" and "did not in any way take into account" such facts. Moreover, according to James, Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson testified at length. James then stated: "The arbitrator did not refuse to hear testimony from [Hale], [Gadda], or [Bird-Wilson] and they did testify. [Hales] testimony was the longest of any witness present. At the conclusion of the hearing and before the arbitrator declared it closed he asked if there was anything further anyone wanted to say. No one, including [Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson], asked to say anything further." Based on the foregoing, there is ample support for the trial courts implied finding that Gadda and Hale were not misled or prejudiced by the arbitrators misstatement.
Gaddas statement in his declaration submitted below that the arbitration was conducted unfairly is a mere conclusion that is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. But even if it did demonstrate prejudice, it would do no more than create a conflict in the evidence. When applying the substantial evidence test, we must resolve all conflicts in favor of a challenged order. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
Next, Gadda and Hale contend that the arbitrator prejudiced them by refusing to postpone the hearing and hear evidence. But substantial evidence supports the trial courts implied finding to the contrary. James, Fortier, Sato, Elizabeth Vasin, and Damon Holland all declared that no one requested a postponement during the arbitration. Jamess declaration, as set forth above, establishes that the arbitrator never refused to hear evidence. Due to the standard of review, we are required to ignore contrary evidence. In any event, as indicated above, Gadda and Hale failed to demonstrate prejudice.
c. Section 473 does not apply.
Relying on MJM, Inc. v. Tootoo (1985) 173 Cal. App. 3d 598, 219 Cal. Rptr. 100 (MJM), Gadda and Hale argue that they were entitled to relief pursuant to section 473. While MJM does say that section 473 is available when a party opposes a petition to confirm an arbitration award, that decision predates our Supreme Courts decision in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 33, 832 P.2d 899 (Moncharsh). Moncharsh stated: "We conclude that an award reached by an arbitrator pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate is not subject to judicial review except on the grounds set forth in sections 1286.2 (to vacate) and 1286.6 (for correction)." (Moncharsh, at p. 33.) Given the clear statement of law in Moncharsh, we decline to follow the holding in MJM. In our view, then, section 473 is inapplicable. But if we were to consider the section 473 argument, we would nonetheless conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
In part, section 473, subdivision (b) provides that "the court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . ."
II. The Cross-Appeal
a. Standard of Review
Factual findings relating to a trial court order vacating an arbitration award are subject to substantial evidence review. (Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 925, 933). "We review the trial courts decision concerning whether an arbitrator exceeded his powers de novo. . . ." (Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority v. CC Partners
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 635, 641.) This double standard of review is consistent with the general rule applicable when an appellate court is confronted with mixed questions of law and fact. " Questions of fact concern the establishment of historical or physical facts; their resolution is reviewed under the substantial-evidence test. Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their resolution is reviewed independently. Mixed questions of law and fact concern the application of the rule to the facts and the consequent determination whether the rule is satisfied." (Kellogg v. Garcia (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 796, 802.)
b. Fortiers award against Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson.
Fortier contends the trial court incorrectly vacated her arbitration award because: (1) she voluntarily joined the arbitration and was a party; (2) Gadda and Hale are estopped from claiming she was a nonparty; and (3) the arbitrator made an implied finding that she was a party, and neither a trial court nor an appellate court can review that implied finding.
These contentions lack merit.
Section 1280, subdivision (e) provides: "Party to the arbitration means a party to the arbitration agreement: [P] (1) Who seeks to arbitrate a controversy pursuant to the agreement; [P] (2) Against whom such arbitration is sought pursuant to the agreement; or [P] (3) Who is made a party to such arbitration by order of the neutral arbitrator upon such partys application, upon the application of any other party to the arbitration or upon the neutral arbitrators own determination." The cases cited by Fortier, Lovret v. Seyfarth (1972) 22 Cal. App. 3d 841, 859, 101 Cal. Rptr. 143 (Lovret) and Kustom Kraft Homes v. Leivenstein (1971) 14 Cal. App. 3d 805, 809, 92 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Kustom Kraft), recognize that a party may voluntarily join an arbitration pursuant to section 1280. However, they also recognize that only a court can compel an unwilling party to arbitrate. (Kustom Kraft, at p. 809.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial courts implied finding that Fortier was not a voluntary party. Fortier, a nonsignatory to the agreement, was not a party to the superior court action, she was not mentioned in the petition to compel arbitration, and she was not a party to the first amended complaint. She never filed any written claims against Gadda, Hale, or Bird-Wilson. In his declaration, Hale stated that Fortier was not a party and that her presence at the arbitration was questionable. Significantly, Fortier did not present any evidence that Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson affirmatively agreed to arbitrate her claims, or in any other way manifested such an agreement. We note that "[arbitration] is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit. [Citation.]" (Unimart v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal. App. 3d 1039, 1045, 82 Cal. Rptr. 249 (Unimart).) Therefore, a finding that a person is a voluntary party means two things: the voluntary party willingly subjected herself to arbitration, and the adverse parties consented to the addition of a new party and new claims. Here, in the absence of a separate written, oral, or implied agreement to arbitrate between Fortier and Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson, Fortiers claims were not arbitrable.
Fortier places great weight on Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson naming her as a plaintiff in their pleading, Jamess declaration that he told the arbitrator that Fortier was asserting a claim, and the implication from the arbitration award that the arbitrator joined her as a party. Why Fortier was identified as a plaintiff is unclear. But Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson sought no recovery against her, and it does not amount to an implied contract to arbitrate her claims. Jamess declaration is no more than conflicting evidence which, in any event, does not establish that Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson ever agreed to arbitrate against Fortier. Finally, whether the arbitrator purported to join Fortier is irrelevant because only a trial court could have compelled Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson to arbitrate Fortiers claims against their will.
Next, we turn to Fortiers estoppel argument. "The existence of an estoppel is generally a question of fact for the trial court whose determination is conclusive on appeal unless the opposite conclusion is the only one that can be reasonably drawn from the evidence. [Citation.] When the evidence is not in conflict and is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, the existence of an estoppel is a question of law. [Citation.] [Citation.]" (Gyerman v. United States Lines Co. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 488, 499, 102 Cal. Rptr. 795, 498 P.2d 1043.) Because the facts in this case are in dispute, estoppel was a question of fact for the trial court and our inquiry is substantial evidence review.
Fortier relies on Lovret and Kustom Kraft, but neither aid her cause.
In Lovret, the appellant argued that she was joined to an arbitration over her objection. However, she admitted in pleadings that she was a party to the contract with the arbitration clause, she submitted cross-claims in arbitration and lost, and through judicial proceedings to correct and confirm the arbitration award she received releases or waivers of a lien on her property. The court concluded that the appellant was estopped from claiming she was a party to the arbitration. (Lovret, supra, 22 Cal. App. 3d at p. 862.) The court stated: "One also may lose his right to a determination of whether he is a party to an arbitration by waiver or estoppel. [Citation.] . . . The basic rationale is that [a] claimant may not voluntarily submit his claim to arbitration, await the outcome, and, if the decision is unfavorable, then challenge the authority of the arbitrators to act. [Citation.] Ordinarily a party cannot accept the benefits of a judgment, in whole or in part, and then attack it by appeal. [Citation.] We think the same principle may be applied to one who would challenge arbitration procedures through which one has benefited." (Id. at pp. 859-860.)
In Kustom Kraft, the appellant obtained an order abating a court action pending arbitration. (Kustom Kraft, supra, 14 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 807-808.) Thereafter, she refused to attend the arbitration. When the arbitrator issued an award against appellant and the award was confirmed, she appealed. She contended that the plaintiff was not a signatory to the agreement and was not a proper party to the arbitration. The court stated: "Defendant having caused the abatement of plaintiffs complaint on the basis that the contract required arbitration is now estopped to deny plaintiffs standing in the arbitration proceedings." (Id. at pp. 809-810.)
Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilson did not petition to compel Fortier to arbitrate her claims, they did not seek relief against Fortier, and they did not obtain a benefit from arbitration against her. Further, as we previously discussed, Hale declared that Fortier was not a party. In light of these facts, the trial courts implied finding that estoppel did not bar Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilsons petition to vacate is supported by substantial evidence. Fortier being listed as a plaintiff in Gadda, Hale, and Bird-Wilsons pleading does not change our analysis. That fact did not cause her detriment or provide them with a benefit. Finally, that their pleading generically alleged that the plaintiffs (which would include Fortier) signed the agreement is of no moment. The agreement was not signed by Fortier.
Finally, we reject Fortiers argument that the arbitrators implied finding that she was a party is unreviewable. She cites American Builders Assn. v. Au-Yang (1990) 226 Cal. App. 3d 170, 276 Cal. Rptr. 262 (American Builders). However, American Builders stated: "Notwithstanding an arbitrators broad authority to resolve questions presented by a controversy, an arbitrator has no power to determine the rights and obligations of one who is not a party to the arbitration agreement. [Citation.] The question of whether a nonsignatory is a party to an arbitration agreement is one for the trial court in the first instance. [P] If an arbitrator, rather than a trial court, were to determine whether an arbitration provision were operative against a nonsignatory, a stranger to the agreement might be subjected to and be bound by an arbitration to which such stranger had not consented and would be without effective review." (Id. at p. 179, fn. omitted.) Despite the above quote, Fortier referred us to the following sentence: "Thus, if Builders were to bring a motion to vacate the award asserting the arbitrator had exceeded his powers in ordering joinder due to insufficient evidence to support a finding that Bonita was the Au-Yangs principal, the trial court, constrained by the limited grounds set forth in section 1286.2, would decline to review the arbitrators factual finding." (Id. at pp. 179-180.) She contends that this sentence is a statement of the law. However, the purpose of this sentence was merely to highlight the unacceptable consequence of allowing an arbitrator to decide the issue, i.e., if an arbitrator was permitted to decide the issue, then his decision would be unreviewable because courts may not examine the sufficiency of evidence supporting arbitration awards. American Builders does not supplant a trial court or appellate courts duty to apply section 1286.2.
Viewing the facts as demonstrating that Fortier was not a party to the arbitration, we independently review the trial courts application of law to those facts. We conclude that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by issuing a $ 10,000 award in favor of Fortier. Therefore, the trial court did not err.
c. Jamess award against Bird-Wilson.
James brief does not address appealability as required by the California Rules of Court, rule 14(a)(2)(B), which provides that an appellants opening brief must "state that the judgment appealed from is final, or explain why the order appealed from is appealable." Because James failed to demonstrate he is appealing an appealable order, he has waived his cross-appeal.
In any event, we conclude that the trial court never entered a final order vacating Jamess award. It is fundamental that an appeal may be taken only from an appealable judgment or order. (Old Republic Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 631, 638-639.) Absent an appealable judgment or order, this court is without jurisdiction. (Rossi v. Caire (1922) 189 Cal. 507, 508, 209 P. 374; Lavrischeff v. Blumer (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 406, 410, 143 Cal. Rptr. 567.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial courts orders denying Gadda and Hales petition to vacate Jamess $ 20,000 arbitration award and vacating Fortiers $ 10,000 arbitration award. We dismiss Jamess cross-appeal.
The parties shall bear their costs on appeal.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., and NOTT, J.