Opinion
No. 04-05-00283-CV
Delivered and Filed: April 5, 2006.
Appeal from the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2004-CI-11035, Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Sandee Bryan MARION, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Daniel L. Gabehart, Roger Dovalina, Relvis Ziegler, Larry Beard, Guadalupe Saldana, Mark Thomas, Michael Filoteo, and Eugene G. Sanchez, Detention Supervisors, Bexar County Deputy Sheriffs (the "Supervisors") appeal the district court's order granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Bexar County Sheriff's Civil Service Commission, Bexar County, and Sheriff Ralph Lopez (collectively the "County). The Supervisors contend that the district court erred because: (1) the Commission's decision resulted in a demotion and the district court considered evidence outside the Commission record; and (2) the Supervisors had an independent claim for a declaratory judgment. Because the issues in this appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we affirm the district court's order in this memorandum opinion.
The Supervisors filed a grievance complaining that the pay scale implemented by the Bexar County Commissioner's Court in 1999 resulted in detention supervisors being paid less than law enforcement supervisors. The grievance requested the immediate implementation of an "equated supervisor pay scale." Sheriff Ralph Lopez denied the grievance noting that the Commission did not have the authority to set salaries. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 158.035 (Vernon 1999) (setting forth powers of Commission). On appeal to the Commission, the Commission concluded it did "not have jurisdiction in this matter" and denied the appeal. The Supervisors then appealed the Commission's order to the district court which granted the County's plea to the jurisdiction.
We review a district court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. State Dep't of Highways Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. 2002). Chapter 158 of the Texas Local Government Code limits the decisions of the Commission that may be appealed to a district court. Specifically, section 158.037 only permits an appeal from a final decision by the Commission that results in an employee being "demoted, suspended, or removed from a position." Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 158.037 (Vernon 1999). The Commission's rules define a demotion as "a reduction of an employee from a higher position to a lower position to be accompanied by a decrease in pay consistent with County Policy as a result of: (A) the inability of the employee to fulfill the functions of the job; (B) the employee's request for such a change; or (C) disciplinary action." Black's Law Dictionary defines "demote" as "[t]o lower (a person) in rank, position, or pay." Black's Law Dictionary 465 (8th ed. 2004).
In their petition, the Supervisors contend that the adoption of the pay scale by the commissioner's court was a demotion; however, the Supervisors' attorney conceded at the hearing before the district court that the adoption of the pay scale did not result in a decrease in anyone's pay. See Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (holding evidentiary statements by attorney constituted some evidence where no objection was made to statements). Instead, the County's attorney explained that everyone received an increase in pay under the pay scale, but the law enforcement supervisors' salaries increased by a greater amount than the detention supervisors' salaries. Because the adoption of the pay scale by the commissioner's court, which is the crux of the underlying grievance, did not result in an employee being demoted from a position as a matter of law, the Commission's denial of the Supervisors' grievance appeal on jurisdictional grounds was not appealable under section 158.037. Accordingly, the district court properly granted the plea to the jurisdiction.
At the time the pay scale was adopted, the Bexar County Commissioner's Court had the statutory authority under section 152.071 of the Local Government Code to "classify all positions in its sheriff's department and [to] specify the duties and prescribe the salary for each classification." See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 152.071 (Vernon 1999). In addition, section 152.072 provided a procedure whereby voters could petition to increase the minimum salary of each member of the sheriff's department. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 152.072 (Vernon 1999). District courts have appellate jurisdiction and general supervisory control over commissioner's courts, authorizing them to review any allegedly improper acts by commissioner's court via a lawsuit, mandamus, or like proceeding. Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Commissioners Court of Titus County v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Tex. 1997); Tabor v. Hogan, 955 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1997, no pet.). For example, if a commissioner's court abuses its discretion by failing to set a reasonable salary, the proper method for a district court to compel performance of that duty is by a writ of mandamus. Vondy v. Commissioners Court of Uvalde County, 620 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Tex. 1981); Ware v. Miller, 82 S.W.3d 795, 800 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. denied).
A declaratory judgment action cannot create jurisdiction but is merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court's jurisdiction. See Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996). "[A] suit for declaratory judgment does not allow a district court to review an agency action not otherwise reviewable." City of Houston v. Williams, 99 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (distinguishing Nuchia v. Woodruff, 956 S.W.2d 612, 615-16 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied)); see also Texas Comm'n of Licensing Regulation v. Model Search America, Inc., 953 S.W.2d 289, 291-92 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no pet.); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n of Texas, 735 S.W.2d 663, 667-68, (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, no writ). Because the Supervisors do not contend that the Commission's decision was ultra vires or beyond its statutorily conferred power, see Nueces County v. Nueces County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 909 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no pet.); see also Texas Comm'n of Licensing Regulation, 953 S.W.2d at 292, the district court properly dismissed the declaratory judgment claim.
The trial court's order is affirmed.