G. L. v. S. D

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Cahill

    443 A.2d 497 (Del. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    Thus, we examine the statutory posture of this case. In 1974, the legislature enacted the Desertion and Support Act, 59 Del. Laws, Ch. 567 (1974), 13 Del. C. § 501 et seq. The 1974 Act repealed what was known as the Bastardy Act, former 13 Del. C. § 1321-1335, and constitutes a complete restatement of the Delaware law as to desertion and support. G. L. v. S. D., Del.Supr., 403 A.2d 1121, 1125 (1979). Under the 1974 Act, a non-support action can be asserted against a putative father either as a civil, 13 Del. C. § 511-516, or as a criminal action, 13 Del. C. § 521-524.

  2. Division of Child Support Enf. v. Myrks

    606 A.2d 748 (Del. 1992)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that "the [Delaware Parentage Act] is not the exclusive means of establishing paternity"

    Moreover, this Court has held that proof of paternity is required in an action for child support. See G.L. v. S.D., Del.Supr., 403 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1979). Thus, the issue of paternity was necessarily considered and determined in the original suit.

  3. Patricia M. D. v. Alexis I. D

    442 A.2d 952 (Del. 1982)   Cited 4 times

    We hold that the limitation is provided by analogy to the companion criminal Statute in child non-support matters. Failure of a parent to provide support for a necessitous child is a criminal offense under 13 Del. C. § 521.G. L. v. S. D., Del.Supr., 403 A.2d 1121 (1979). The maximum penalty established therein ($500.

  4. State v. Howe

    44 Wn. App. 559 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 16 times
    Construing Meacham's hearing requirement, found that hearing with submission of affidavits and arguments of counsel, which established reasonable possibility or prima facie case of requisite sexual intercourse, sufficient to order blood testing

    10 Am.Jur.2d Bastards § 107 (2d ed. 1963). See, e.g., Walsh v. Palma, 154 Cal.App.3d 290, 201 Cal.Rptr. 142, 145 (1984) (standard is preponderance even though case is brought by district attorney); Shaw v. Seward, 689 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (court analyzing the burden of proof issue under due process, concluding that due process only requires a preponderance of the evidence in paternity cases); Minnich v. Rivera, 509 Pa. 188, 506 A.2d 879, 882-83 (1986) (due process only requires a preponderance of the evidence in paternity cases); Domigan v. Gillette, 17 Ohio App.3d 228, 479 N.E.2d 291 (1984) (since Legislature characterized the action as civil, burden is preponderance); Keener v. State, 347 So.2d 398, 401 (Ala. 1977) (though the State brings the action, a paternity proceeding is civil in nature and burden of proof is the same as in any civil case); G.L. v. S.D., 403 A.2d 1121, 1126-27 (Del. 1979); Department of Health v. Smith, 459 So.2d 146, 150 (La. Ct. App. 1984). Therefore, given our Legislature's clear characterization of these proceedings as civil, the appropriate burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.

  5. Husband B. v. Wife H

    451 A.2d 1165 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982)   Cited 6 times

    13 Del. C. § 501(c): "The duty to support a child under 18 years of age . . . shall rest equally on both parents." See G.L. v. S.D., Del.Supr., 403 A.2d 1121 (1979). The effect of this statutory change on the parties' agreement is not at issue here.

  6. Cahill v. State

    411 A.2d 317 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980)   Cited 4 times
    In Cahill v. State, Del.Super., 411 A.2d 317 (1980), the Superior Court, in a scholarly opinion, denied the Bureau's motion to dismiss and held that Art. I, § 4 of Delaware's Constitution of 1897, which provides "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore", gives putative fathers the constitutional right to a trial by jury in a civil non-support action on the factual issue of paternity on appeal from an adverse Family Court determination.

    The Supreme Court has recently held that the normal civil burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence applies in these proceedings. G. L. v. S. D., Del.Supr., 403 A.2d 1121 (1979). Two issues are raised here: (1) whether the appeals should go directly to the Supreme Court and (2) whether there is a constitutional right to a jury trial of the issue of paternity.