Opinion
No. 04-08-00541-CV
Delivered and Filed: January 14, 2009.
Appealed from the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 2008-CI-10198, Honorable Barbara Nellermoe, Judge Presiding.
AFFIRMED.
Sitting: CATHERINE STONE, Chief Justice, SANDEE BRYAN MARION, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of a temporary injunction sought by appellant G D Furniture LLC ("G D") for the purpose of stopping the non-judicial foreclosure of its real property by appellee, SFD Enterprises, Inc. ("SFD"). We affirm.
We have previously issued a temporary injunction in order to preserve ourjurisdiction, restraining the trustee's sale pending appellate review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to deny a temporary injunction. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). We review the denial of a temporary injunction for a clear abuse of discretion without addressing the merits of the underlying case. Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993). An appellate court will uphold the trial court's order unless the trial court's action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, even if we would have reached a contrary conclusion. Id. at 211. Rather, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor, and determine whether the order was so arbitrary as to exceed the bounds of reasonable discretion. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). When, as here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law are requested or filed, we will imply all necessary findings in support of the trial court's order, and review the record to determine if the order of the court must be upheld under any legal theory supported in the record. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992); Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978). If some evidence reasonably supports the trial court's decision, the trial court does not abuse its discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211.
DISCUSSION
To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; City of San Antonio v. Vakey, 123 S.W.3d 497, 501 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.). Probable right to relief and probable injury must be established by competent evidence adduced at a hearing. Goldthorn v. Goldthorn, 242 S.W.3d 797, 798 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, no pet.). An injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. Because we believe G D's failure to establish probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim is dispositive of this appeal, we narrow our discussion to that element.
On appeal, G D contends that, because all real property is unique, being deprived of its property through a trustee's sale establishes injury as a matter of law. We disagree. We recognize that, as a general rule, every piece of real estate is unique, and that this is a factor to be considered in deciding whether there may be irreparable damage. See Home Sav. of America, F.A. v. Van Cleave Dev., 737 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ). However, to be "irreparable," the injury must be such that it cannot be adequately compensated in damages or cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. At the injunction hearing, no evidence was presented about the land's use. However, the trial court heard uncontroverted testimony that there were no improvements on the land and G D had a buyer for the property and needed until June to complete the sale of the property. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that G D could be adequately compensated in damages for any injury suffered by it. Because the record supports an implied finding that G D did not establish one of the elements required to entitle it to a temporary injunction, we cannot conclude the trial court's denial of G D's request for a temporary injunction was so arbitrary as to exceed the bounds of reasonable discretion.
CONCLUSION
We overrule G D's issue on appeal and affirm the trial court's order denying G D's request for a temporary injunction.