Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0498-14T1
08-31-2016
FWDSL & ASSOCIATES, L.P., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GEORGETOWN TERRACE, LLC, Defendant-Appellant, and AT&T EMPLOYEES FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, JNH FUNDING CORP., EDISON TAX SERVICES, LLC, JUNE DENNIS, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Defendants.
June Dennis, attorney for appellant.1 Pellegrino & Feldstein, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Michael G. Pellegrino, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Carroll and Sumners. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Union County, Docket No. F-003774-14. June Dennis, attorney for appellant. Pellegrino & Feldstein, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Michael G. Pellegrino, on the brief). PER CURIAM
There is some confusion in the record as to whether defendant June Dennis is an appellant. However, the Notice of Appeal only lists Georgetown Terrace, LLC as "the party taking the appeal." R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(A).
Defendant Georgetown Terrace, LLC appeals from the August 14, 2014 Chancery Division order denying its motion to vacate judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The record reveals the following facts. On December 6, 2011, plaintiff FWDSL & Associates, L.P. purchased a City of Plainfield tax lien certificate at a public tax sale auction for property owned by Georgetown Terrace. The lien was recorded on December 28.
Two years later, on December 31, 2013, plaintiff mailed a letter to all named defendants that provided thirty days notice of plaintiff's intent to foreclose on the property. On January 31, 2014, plaintiff filed a tax lien foreclosure complaint.
On March 7, defendant June Dennis, a New Jersey attorney, filed an answer on behalf of herself and Georgetown Terrace, contending that the tax lien was invalid because the taxes had been paid and plaintiff failed to serve a notice of intention to foreclose in compliance with the Fair Foreclosure Act (FFA), N.J.S.A. 2A:50-53 to -68. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing that Georgetown Terrace and Dennis did not raise a valid defense to the foreclosure complaint. After argument from Dennis and plaintiff's counsel, the court entered an order and statement of reasons on April 15, striking the answers of Georgetown Terrace and Dennis on the basis that they had not pled sufficient facts to dispute the legitimacy of the tax lien, and finding that the FFA did not apply to tax certificates. The court further found that pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-52, the subject tax certificate was presumptively valid and that the two-year statute of limitations to rebut the presumption had lapsed.
Defendants Georgetown Terrace and Dennis are the only defendants who answered the complaint.
On June 12, Dennis filed a motion to: vacate "the [f]oreclosure [j]udgment and any subsequent order(s)," dismiss the "[f]oreclosure complaint filed January 2014[,]" and require "the joinder of related actions." Dennis contended that plaintiff's failure to serve proper notice to Georgetown Terrace amounted to a denial of due process, and therefore "any judgment or order . . . [is] void against the defendant(s)." She also contended that plaintiff's failure to seek joinder of a 2013 cause of action, "Georgetown Terrace, LLC [v.] City of Plainfield," for equitable resolution violated the entire controversy doctrine. The record does not include a copy of the pleadings or provide the status of that litigation. Thus, it is unclear what the dispute involved.
The motion was improperly captioned, "Notice of Motion For Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order(s)," a reference to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The record is not clear whether the motion was filed on behalf of both Georgetown Terrace and Dennis. However, we will consider the motion as pertaining to both defendants.
On August 14, the court issued an order and statement of reasons denying the motion. The court recognized that the motion was filed before default judgment was entered on June 16, but addressed the merits of the motion. Applying Rule 4:50-1, the court found that there was no showing that service of the complaint was not made and no meritorious defense to the foreclosure. The court reasoned that an answer was filed on behalf of Georgetown Terrace and Dennis, and Dennis's appearance at the summary judgment motion argument evinced knowledge of the action. The court further found that the FFA did not apply to tax foreclosures, thus any arguments concerning the notice requirement of the FFA were irrelevant. Moreover, the court was satisfied that the notice requirement for tax foreclosures under N.J.S.A. 54:5-62 was followed by plaintiff. This appeal ensued.
The final judgment of foreclosure was not entered until January 20, 2015.
Georgetown Terrace reiterates the arguments made to the trial court. It argues that it was denied due process because the court lacked jurisdiction due to plaintiff's failure to serve the complaint and provide written notice of the intent to foreclose and the amount necessary to redeem the tax sale certificate pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-97.1. Georgetown Terrace also contends that the tax lien is invalid because the taxes were paid. Lastly, Georgetown Terrace argues that the entire controversy doctrine required joinder of the action with a related pending matter. We are unpersuaded.
We begin by clarifying our standard of review. When considering a trial court's application of Rule 4:50-1, we give substantial deference to the trial court's determination, which "should not be reversed unless it results in a clear abuse of discretion." U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). An abuse of discretion occurs "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis.'" Ibid. (citation omitted).
Rule 4:50-1 provides various avenues for relief from a judgment or order. In relevant part, it reads "on motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: . . . (d) the judgment or order is void[.]" Ibid.
Georgetown Terrace's argument that it was not served with the complaint is belied by its answer to the complaint and its appearance through counsel, Dennis, at the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In doing so, Georgetown Terrace subjected itself to the court's jurisdiction. See First Nat'l State Bank of N.J. v. Gray, 232 N.J. Super. 368, 371 (Law Div. 1989) (finding that a defendant who appears in court has placed himself "under the control of the court"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cruse, 275 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 1994).
Moreover, there is no factual support in the record for Georgetown Terrace's contention that it was not provided written notice of the intent to foreclose and the amount necessary to redeem the tax sale certificate pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-97.1. As noted, plaintiff satisfied this requirement in its December 31, 2013 letter.
There is also no factual support in the record that the tax lien is invalid because the taxes were paid. The City of Plainfield's Tax Collector certified that the taxes were not paid at the time the tax lien foreclosure complaint was filed on January 31, 2014. Furthermore, as the trial court found, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:5-52, the two-year statute of limitations to rebut the presumption that the tax sale certificate was valid had lapsed.
The statute reads in part: "The certificate of sale shall be presumptive evidence . . . of the truth of the statements therein . . . . After two years from the record of the certificate of sale, no evidence shall be admitted in any court to rebut the presumption [absent] fraud . . . ." N.J.S.A. 54:5-52. --------
Finally, we address defendant's argument that plaintiff's complaint should have been barred by the entire controversy doctrine. Although the trial court's August 14, 2014 order merely provides that this argument was denied and its accompanying statement of reasons did not set forth conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 1:7-4, to avoid unnecessary litigation delay by remanding the matter to address this issue, we conclude it was appropriate to reject the entire controversy doctrine argument. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2016) (citing Leeds v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 331 N.J. Super. 416, 420-21 (App. Div. 2000) (affirming summary judgment even though order merely stated "denied")).
Here, resolution of the issue is clear. The entire controversy doctrine "'embodies the principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court; accordingly, all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy.'" Wadeer v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 605 (2015) (citations omitted). The purposes of the doctrine are "'(1) the need for complete and final disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the reduction of delay.'" Ibid. (citations omitted). Thus, the entire controversy doctrine imposes on a litigant the duty to present "'all aspects of a controversy in one legal proceeding.'" Hobart Bros. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 354 N.J. Super. 229, 240 (App. Div.) (citation omitted), certif. denied, 175 N.J. 170 (2002). In determining what constitutes a single controversy, courts "look at the core set of facts that provides the link between distinct claims against the same or different parties." Id. at 244 (citing Oliver v. Ambrose, 152 N.J. 383, 394 (1998)). Application of the entire controversy doctrine is "'left to judicial discretion based on the factual circumstances of individual cases.'" Oliver, supra, 152 N.J. at 395 (quoting Brennan v. Orban, 145 N.J. 282, 291 (1996)).
Our review of Georgetown Terrace's brief submitted in support of its motion to vacate judgment, repeated verbatim in its appeal brief, reveals nothing beyond a vague reference to a "cause of action, Georgetown Terrace, LLC[] [v.] City of Plainfield et al, which has a commonality of facts and issues, and relates to a disputed interest in the same property, filed November 2013[,]" that requires "a joinder." A copy of the pleadings in the related matter, which might explain the specifics of the alleged commonality, is not part of the record. Moreover, Georgetown Terrace's argument contradicts the certification counsel provided in its answer to the foreclosure complaint that "[t]he matter in controversy is not the subject of any other action pending in any other New Jersey court." Accordingly, defendant's contention that the entire controversy doctrine bars plaintiff's action lacks factual support.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION