Opinion
CASE NO. 20-CV-21860-COOKE/GOODMAN
08-31-2020
Rosa FUNEZ, Plaintiff, v. CMI LEISURE MANAGEMENT, INC., et al., Defendants.
Robert D. Peltz, The Peltz Law Firm, Louis Anthony Vucci, Louis A. Vucci, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. William F. Clair, Annalisa Gutierrez, Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendants.
Robert D. Peltz, The Peltz Law Firm, Louis Anthony Vucci, Louis A. Vucci, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
William F. Clair, Annalisa Gutierrez, Hamilton, Miller & Birthisel, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONDUCT JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
Jonathan Goodman, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Rosa Funez filed a motion to conduct jurisdictional discovery on Defendant Institute for Shipboard Education, Inc. ("ISE"). [ECF No. 31]. Defendant ISE filed a response in opposition and Plaintiff filed a reply. [ECF Nos. 37; 40]. United States District Judge Marcia G. Cooke referred the motion to the Undersigned. [ECF No. 41]. For the reasons discussed below, the Undersigned grants Plaintiff's motion to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery on ISE.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed suit against CMI Leisure Management, Inc. (a Florida corporation), CMI Leisure, Ltd. (a Bahamian company), and ISE (a corporation headquartered in Colorado). [ECF No. 34]. Plaintiff alleges that she suffered injuries while she was a crewmember aboard the M/V World Odyssey (which is part of a semester at sea program). Specifically, she states that she was injured when she was forced to carry heavy loads of laundry up the stairs because the elevator was broken. According to Plaintiff, her "sole claim against IFSE ... is limited to its status as the owner of the vessel, is based on unseaworthiness arising from the malfunctioning elevator, which was not repaired for at least two weeks." [ECF Nos. 31, p. 3; 34, pp. 22-23].
Plaintiff alleges that there is personal jurisdiction over ISE under Florida's long arm statute, Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a). [ECF No. 34, pp. 22-23]. Section 48.193 provides the following:
(1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts:
1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.
...
Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a) (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that CMI, Inc. (a Florida corporation) is ISE's agent and has carried out sufficient activities in Florida to satisfy § 48.193(1)(a). [ECF No. 34, p. 24]. Plaintiff points to the fact that ISE, which is an education provider, is not a cruse carrier in the sense of a typical cruise line and thus it has "partnered" with CMI, Inc. to actually operate and manage its vessel out of its Miami headquarters. Id. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in her amended complaint that:
As IFSE explains on its web page:
Semester at Sea partners with industry experts at Cruise Management International (CMI) to oversee all vessel operations, crew hiring and training, itinerary planning and implementation. Through this partnership, Semester at Sea is in compliance with all regulations set forth by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Maritime Labor Convention, the
ship's flag-state regulations and insurance provider requirements.
(emphasis added). See https://www.semesteratsea.org/safety/. In this description, there is an embedded link which opens directly to CMI, Inc.’s web page at https://www.cmishipmanagement.com/....
IFSE's above cited description on its web page of its relationship with CMI as a "partnership" to oversee and manage vessel operations is not a mere single reference, but a description that is repeated throughout its web site. In the section dealing with its strategy for managing the risks inherent in ocean travel, IFSE represents that it relies upon its "partners," who are "experts in ship-based travel [who] oversee all policies, regulations, ... trainings, ... and general vessel operations." (emphasis added). See https://www.semesteratsea.org/safety/strategies/....
Similarly, on IFSE's web page describing the vessel, under the heading "Shipboard Management," IFSE states,
ISE partners with maritime management company, Cruise Management International (CMI) and Cruise Management International Leisure (CMI-L), [to] provide the officers and crew to manage the program's vessel.
(emphasis added). See https://www.semesteratsea.org/life-at-sea/our-ship/. In this description, there are again embedded links which open directly to the web pages of both CMI Leisure Management, Inc. and Cruise Management International at https://www.cmishipmanagement.com/ and https://www.cmi-leisure.com/...
Again in its FAQ section, IFSE states
We do not hire for crew positions. We utilize the services of an international ship management company called CMI to staff our crew positions. You may visit their website (link below) if you are interested. http://www.cmishipmanagement.com/contact-us/careers.
See https://www.semesteratsea.org/employment/faq/....
The extensive nature of the activities performed on behalf of IFSE in managing and operating the M/V World Odyssey by CMI, Inc. from its headquarters in Miami is evidenced by CMI, Inc.’s web page, which states:
CMI Leisure provides turnkey management and concessions services to some of the most uniquely demanding cruise line and adventure travel companies in the world.
It then goes on to identify the MV World Odyssey as one of "our ships." See https://www.cmi-leisure.com/about-us/our-clients.
[ECF No. 34, pp. 24-28].
ISE filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction over ISE because ISE did not personally engage in activities in Florida. [ECF No. 38]. ISE states that Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to bring this action against ISE under Florida's long-arm statute. Id. at p. 1.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has filed this motion to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiff states that, without discovery, she cannot determine whether the relationship between ISE and CMI is a formal legal partnership or a less-formal agency relationship. Further, she states that she needs limited discovery to flesh out CMI's role in carrying out the activities described in ISE's webpage, including the nature, scope, and purpose of these activities and their relationship to Plaintiff's injuries.
ISE's response in opposition argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged general jurisdiction over ISE. [ECF No. 37, p. 2]. Further, with regard to specific jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, ISE argues that (as its forthcoming motion to dismiss will show) it is not in a partnership with CMI such that the Court has specific jurisdiction over it. Id. at p. 7. Further, ISE argues that "because ISE was not conducting business in Florida through CMI or Vikand, it cannot be reasonably expected to be hailed into court in Florida." Id. at p. 8.
II. Analysis
"The right to jurisdictional discovery is a qualified one, available when a court's jurisdiction is genuinely in dispute." Wolf v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. , 683 F. App'x 786, 792 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted); see also Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc. , 692 F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Blanco v. Carigulf Lines , 632 F.2d 656, 658 (5th Cir. 1980) ) ("Plaintiff must be given an opportunity to develop facts sufficient to support a determination on the issue of jurisdiction. As we said in Blanco , ‘the rules entitle a plaintiff to elicit material through discovery before a claim may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.’ ").
Here, ISE addresses the ultimate question of whether there is general and specific jurisdiction, as opposed to whether there are genuine jurisdictional facts in dispute requiring discovery. ISE may be correct that Plaintiff may not be able to ultimately show a sufficient nexus between the actions of ISE through its alleged agent, CMI, and Plaintiff's claimed injuries. However, there appear to be jurisdictional facts in dispute between the parties relating to this issue of specific jurisdiction, including whether CMI acted in Florida as ISE's agent in operating, managing, and maintaining the M/V World Odyssey.
In effect, ISE is asking that Plaintiff be required to accept at face value, without obtaining any discovery, its conclusory statements about its relationship with CMI.
Further, as pointed out by the Plaintiff [ECF No. 40, pp. 2-5], this is not a scenario where Plaintiff included a conclusory request for discovery without any explanation as to how the information sought was relevant to jurisdiction. And therefore, Plaintiff's request is unlike the requests made in many of the cases pointed to by ISE where discovery was denied. See, e.g. , Wolf , 683 F. App'x at 792 ("Mr. Wolf's general request for jurisdictional discovery— ... buried within his response to OCT's motion to dismiss—did not specify what information he sought or how that information would bolster his allegations. The district court therefore did not improperly deny jurisdictional discovery."); Thompson v. Carnival Corp. , 174 F. Supp. 3d 1327, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (internal citation omitted) ("Despite not submitting any evidence or affidavits supporting his jurisdictional allegations, Thompson contends he is entitled to jurisdictional discovery to test the veracity of the statements made in the Excursion Entities affidavit."); Brown v. Carnival Corp. , 202 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (Plaintiff requests that she be permitted to engage in jurisdictional discovery in order to contest the veracity of Windfeather's contentions. Plaintiff fails to set forth any evidence in support of her Response.").
Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff is entitled to limited jurisdictional discovery on the issue of whether CMI acted in Florida as ISE's agent in operating, managing, and maintaining the M/V World Odyssey. Plaintiff has 45 days from the date of this Order to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiff's document requests (limited to jurisdictional discovery) can require a response in 21 days, rather than 30 days. All depositions concerning the limited topic of jurisdiction must be taken within 45 days. The parties shall cooperate in discovery and the scheduling of depositions, and any disputes are subject to the Undersigned's Discovery Procedures Order [ECF No. 4, pp. 10-15]. Plaintiff shall not seek discovery beyond the limited purpose of obtaining information relevant to this specific jurisdictional issue.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Undersigned grants Plaintiff's motion to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, in Miami, Florida, on August 31, 2020.