Opinion
Civil Action No. CCB-04-1137.
November 10, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Lynn Fulmore, Jerome Harris, and Darlene Lindsey instituted this "hybrid action" against their former employer and union in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Maryland on March 9, 2004. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged a breach of the duty of fair representation against their union, Federation of Police, Security and Correction Officers ("FOPSCO"), and wrongful termination against their employer, U.S. Protect, under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. On April 12, 2004, FOPSCO removed the action to this court with the approval of U.S. Protect. FOPSCO and U.S. Protect moved to dismiss the claims against them on May 14, 2004 and June 25, 2004 respectively. Fulmore, Harris, and Lindsey prayed that the court deny the motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment or grant the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Because materials in the form of affidavits and exhibits thereto have been submitted by both sides, the motions will be treated as motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); 12(c). This matter has been fully briefed and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated below, the court will grant summary judgment to FOPSCO and U.S. Protect.
While the plaintiffs filed their complaint pro se and made no specific mention of the "duty of fair representation" and the abovementioned statute, the defendant's notice of removal fairly characterized their complaint as such. (Def. FOPSCO's Notice of Removal at 2, ¶ 5.)
Plaintiffs filed a motion for default judgment as to both defendants. The court denies their request.
BACKGROUND
On June 25, 2002, U.S. Protect, a company that provides security services, began to provide security for the main complex of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") in Woodlawn, Maryland. FOPSCO, a union representing security officers, was selected in November 2002 to be the union representing the officers in that complex. Despite five negotiation meetings and two mediation sessions with a federal mediator, no collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") was reached. (Def. FOPSCO's Notice of Removal, at Exhibit 1.) All security guards were invited to attend a ratification vote on April 26, 2003 and were informed in writing, "[i]t's very important that each guard make every effect [sic] to be present, and take time out to listen, be heard and to VOTE." (Id. at Exhibit 10.) At the vote on April 26, 2003, FOPSCO submitted ten subjects to the members of the union. All the members at the meeting voted "No" to each subject. No draft of the CBA was shown at that meeting. Subsquently, rumors circulated that Recco El-Amin, the FOPSCO vice-president of SSA's main complex, executed the contract on April 30, 2003, contrary to the vote and without informing FOPSCO members. (Pls.' Resp. Mem. at 2, ¶ 2; at Ex. 4, Jones Aff.)
Plaintiffs allege that after the CBA was executed, both FOPSCO and U.S. Protect concealed its existence from union members. Plaintiffs maintain that the defendants evaded their inquiries as to the status of the contract. They claim they were told negotiations were ongoing. Harris, a chief shop steward who had been heavily involved in negotiations, was not invited to the meeting on April 30, 2003. Some other union members assert they were not aware that a CBA had been signed until late September or early October 2003 when U.S. Protect commenced several disciplinary actions pursuant to the new agreement. (Pls.' Resp. Mem. to FOPSCO's Mot. to Dismiss, at Ex. 5-8, 10-12.)
In August 2003, plaintiffs were terminated for violating various provisions of the CBA. (Def. FOPSCO's Notice of Removal, at Ex. 3-5; Def. U.S. Protect's Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) FOPSCO grieved plaintiffs' terminations in September 2003 and represented plaintiffs at an arbitration hearing. Simultaneously, plaintiffs corresponded with both defendants about the enforceability of the unratified agreement. When no resolution was reached, plaintiffs filed their complaint with the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
ANALYSIS
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion:
By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment `may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,' but rather must `set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The court must "view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness' credibility," Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002), but the court also must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)).
In their motions, defendants argue that plaintiffs' claims are time-barred by the six-month statute of limitations provided in Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). See Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-2 (1983); Bruce v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 7 F.Supp.2d 609, 614 (D. Md. 1998), aff'd 182 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs agree Section 10(b)'s six month limitation applies to their § 301/fair representation claims. The parties disagree as to when the statute of limitations began to run.
Generally, "a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know that a violation of his rights has occurred." Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1975). In a hybrid § 301 case specifically, a claim arises "when the claimant discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged violation." Bruce, 7 F. Supp.2d at 609 (quoting McCreedy v. Local Union No. 971, 809 F.2d 1232, 1236 (6th Cir. 1987).
Defendants argue that the CBA was executed on April 30, 2003 and the plaintiffs knew or should have known soon thereafter, because: (1) they knew the old one expired on May 31, 2003 (Pls.' Resp. Mem. at 5); (2) rumors had circulated that an agreement had been signed in April 2003 (Id. at Ex. 4, 5, 7, 12); (3) Harris was excluded from the meeting on April 30, 2003 and had never been excluded previously; (Id. at Ex.2, Harris Aff. at ¶ 3) (4) Harris had seen an initialed agreement in June 2003 (Id., at Ex.2, Harris Aff. at ¶ 4); and (5) the plaintiffs were informed in August they were being terminated for violations of the CBA. (FOPSCO Notice of Removal at Ex.3, 4, 5, termination letters.) Defendants contend that under these circumstances the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice that the CBA had been executed and, thus, could have discovered their claim within the six-month statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs maintain that they filed their action within the limitations period, because they did not "definitively" know that the CBA had been executed until the end of September or mid-October 2003. In their affidavits, they explain that the "new" "signed" contract was not "presented" by FOPSCO until September or October 2003, but never allege that they requested a copy from either FOPSCO or U.S. Protect before that date. (Pls.' Resp. at Ex. 1-3.)
Alternatively, plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied to this action because "the defendant[s] ha[ve] wrongfully deceived or misled the plaintiff[s] in order to conceal the existence of a cause of action." English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987). In addition to showing they were wrongfully deceived, plaintiffs must establish that they "reasonably relied on the misrepresentation by neglecting to file a timely charge." Id.
This court finds that plaintiffs filed their action beyond the limitations period and do not have adequate support for an equitable tolling claim. Plaintiffs were on inquiry notice at least by the end of August when their termination letters specifically referred to violations of the CBA. They then had a duty to obtain or read the CBA. Plaintiffs provide no evidence that they requested a copy of the CBA and were refused. Nor is there any evidence that plaintiffs neglected to file a timely claim because they reasonably relied on any misrepresentations made by defendants. Because plaintiffs claims are time-barred by the six-month limitations period and the court finds no reason to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to this action, FOPSCO's and U.S. Protect's motions for summary judgment will be granted.
Plaintiffs may have been on inquiry notice as early as April 30, 2003 when Harris was excluded from the meeting, soon after that when rumors circulated about a signed agreement, or in June when Harris saw an initialed agreement.
A separate Order follows.