Opinion
C. A. 7:24-cv-00179-TMC-KFM
03-04-2024
Deandre Lashun Fuller, Plaintiff, v. Spartanburg County Detention Center, Spartanburg County, Sheriff Chuck Wright, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kevin F. McDonald United States Magistrate Judge
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), filed this action seeking damages from the defendants (doc. 1). Of note, some of the plaintiff's allegations appear to involve the plaintiff's pending charges for two counts of murder and one count of armed robbery in the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court. See Spartanburg County Public Index, https://publicindex. sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A4210100345, 2021A4210100346, 2021A4210100347) (last visited February 7, 2024). The plaintiff had three additional charges from the same arrest date that were not indicted: unlawful sale of a pistol, unlawful possession of a gun, and armed robbery. See Spartanburg County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A4210100348, 2021A4210100349, 2021A4210100350) (last visited February 7, 2024).
Phillips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record.”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
The plaintiff alleges violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights (doc. 1 at 4). He contends that his rights are being violated because the Detention Center is overcrowded and four detainees are held in one cell (id. at 5-6, 8). The plaintiff also alleges that he has been denied the ability to “assist” the attorney representing him in his pending criminal charges (id. at 8). He further contends that he was “arbitrarily” charged with a “no bond” crime after he successfully got some of his charges dismissed at a preliminary hearing (id. at 8-9, 10). He contends that his rights were also violated because he was denied bond for almost three years (id. at 9, 10).
The plaintiff's injuries include denial of his right to a criminal trial in accordance with state and federal law (id. at 11). For relief, the plaintiff seeks an order requiring that he be allowed access to the court, better attorney representation in his pending criminal proceedings, and money damages (id.).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Younger Abstention
To the extent the plaintiff's complaint can be construed as requesting that this court interfere in his pending criminal matters in the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court, this court should abstain from interfering with it because a federal court may not award injunctive relief that would affect pending state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances. In Youngerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881,903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate). From Younger and its progeny, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “(1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
Here, the first criterion is met, as the plaintiff is involved in ongoing state criminal proceedings. As for the second criterion, the Supreme Court has stated that the “States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The Court also addressed the third criterion in noting “‘that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.'” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 904 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)). Here, the plaintiff has the opportunity to assert his claims regarding delayed bond, ineffective counsel, or inadequate evidence in the Spartanburg County General Sessions. As such, the plaintiff has not made a showing of “extraordinary circumstances” justifying federal interference with the state proceedings. See Robinson v. Thomas, 855 F.3d 278, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A federal court may disregard Younger's mandate to abstain from interfering with ongoing state proceedings only where ‘extraordinary circumstances' exist that present the possibility of irreparable harm.”). Therefore, to the extent the plaintiff seeks an order from this court interfering with his criminal prosecution in the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court, this court should abstain from hearing this action.
To the extent the plaintiff's claims could be construed as seeking money damages, federal courts typically stay rather than dismiss claims for money damages during the pendency of the state court proceedings. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988). Nevertheless, dismissal rather than a stay is appropriate when the plaintiff's damages claims are “plainly barred” for other reasons. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2006). Here, as set forth in detail below, even liberally construing the plaintiff's complaint as seeking money damages, the instant matter is barred for other reasons; thus, it is subject to summary dismissal.
Failure to State a Claim
As noted above, the court should abstain from interfering with the plaintiff's pending criminal proceedings in the Spartanburg County General Sessions Court under Younger. However, even aside from the claims subject to Younger abstention, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Spartanburg County Detention Center
The Detention Center is subject to dismissal because it is not a “person” as defined by § 1983. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law; thus, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” As noted, this defendant is not a person; hence, it is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983). Accordingly, the Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal.
Spartanburg County
The plaintiff has named Spartanburg County as a defendant in this action -although it is unclear what his allegations against it are. As an initial matter, Spartanburg County is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781,781-82 (1978); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (noting that the State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal court); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1979) (holding that congress has not abrogated the state's sovereign immunity in § 1983 actions). Additionally, Spartanburg County is not a person; hence, it is not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178; see also Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that “neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”). Accordingly, Spartanburg County is also entitled to summary dismissal.
No Personal Allegations
The plaintiff's claims against the individual defendant, Sheriff Wright, are subject to dismissal because the plaintiff's complaint makes no personal allegations of wrongdoing against him. Indeed, it is unclear in what capacity Sheriff Wright was involved in the plaintiff's alleged constitutional deprivations. Although the plaintiff's allegations must be liberally construed, the plaintiff must provide more than general and conclusory statements to allege a plausible claim for relief. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that liability under § 1983 “requires personal involvement”). Moreover, as recently reiterated by the Fourth Circuit, general, conclusory, and collective allegations against groups of defendants fail to allege a plausible claim. See Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 125 (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2023) (recognizing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to meet the plausibility standard when it did not set forth who the defendants were beyond being employees where he was incarcerated or in what capacity the defendants interacted with the plaintiff).
Even construing the plaintiff's claims against Sheriff Wright as based upon supervisory liability, his claims are still subject to summary dismissal because the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); PolkCnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that “Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, to allege a plausible claim requires a showing that the supervisor (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that his/her subordinates engaged in conduct posing a pervasive or unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor's response to the knowledge was “so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices;” and (3) an affirmative causal link between the inaction by the supervisor and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Green v. Beck, 539 Fed.Appx. 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013). Here, beyond conclusory allegations that Sheriff Wright is responsible for the plaintiff's complained-of conditions as the “warden” of the Detention Center, the plaintiff has not alleged how Sheriff Wright is responsible for matters in his pending criminal charges or was aware of the complained-of conditions (see doc. 1 at 5). The plaintiff has also failed to allege a causal link between knowledge Sheriff Wright may have of the complained-of conditions and the plaintiff's unspecified injuries. As such, the plaintiff's complaint also fails to state a supervisory liability claim against Sheriff Wright, the individual defendant. See Ford v. Stirling, C/A No. 2:17-02390-MGL, 2017 WL 4803648, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2017); London v. Maier, C/A No. 0:10-00434-RBH, 2010 WL 1428832, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 7, 2010).
False Arrest Claim
To the extent that the plaintiff's complaint can be construed as asserting that he was falsely arrested based on the dismissal of three of his six pending criminal charges, such a claim is subject to summary dismissal. Section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution, false arrest, and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
However, “an indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. South Carolina, et al., C/A No. 6:07-cv-001094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of indictment). This Court, as noted above, has taken judicial notice of the plaintiff's state criminal proceedings, including grand jury indictments related to the arrest challenged in this case for two counts of murder and one count of armed robbery. See Spartanburg County Public Index (enter the plaintiff's name and 2021A4210100345, 2021A4210100346, 2021A4210100347) (last visited February 7, 2024). The indictments act as a bar to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment false arrest claim; as such, it is subject to summary dismissal.
As noted above, charges for unlawful sale of a pistol, unlawful possession of a gun, and one count of armed robbery were dismissed and not indicted (Case Numbers 2021A4210100348, 2021A4210100349, 2021A4210100350); however, the lack of a grand jury indictment on these charges does not affect the plaintiff's false arrest claim because probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest has been established by the remaining charges, all of which were indicted. See Holloman v. City of Myrtle Beach, C/A No. 4:04-cv-01868, 2006 WL 4869353, at *7 (D.S.C. June 8, 2006) (noting that “where an arrestee is charged with multiple offenses, ‘if there was probable cause for any of the charges made then the arrest was supported by probable cause'” (internal citation and alterations omitted)), aff'd 235 Fed.Appx. 159 (4th Cir. 2007).
Denial of Access to the Courts Claim
The plaintiff's assertion that his rights have been violated because he has not been able to adequately assist his defense attorney in his pending criminal charges (and thus has been denied access to the courts) are also subject to summary dismissal. As an initial matter, pretrial detainees, temporarily held in a county facility while awaiting trial, do not have a constitutional right to a law library, as the Constitution guarantees a right to reasonable access to the courts, not to legal research or a law library. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Additionally, a claim for denial of access to the courts must be pled with specificity. Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996). Further, in order to state a constitutional claim for denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must show actual injury. Id.; see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349. The actual injury requirement can be satisfied by demonstrating that a non-frivolous legal claim was frustrated or impeded by some actual deprivation of access to the court. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 352-53. Here, the plaintiff's conclusory allegation that he has been denied the ability to help his attorney prepare a defense in his pending criminal proceedings, even liberally construed, fails to “demonstrate” actual injury or state a claim for relief. Similarly, the plaintiff's filings in two cases in this court belie the plaintiff's claim that he lacks access to the court. See Fuller v. Spartanburg Cnty., et al, C/A No. 6:24-cv-00451-TMC-KFM (D.S.C.) (pending). As such, the plaintiff's denial of access to the courts claim is also subject to summary dismissal.
Conditions of Confinement Claim
The plaintiff's conditions of confinement claim is also subject to summary dismissal. The plaintiff's complained-of condition is that he has been held in a cell with three other detainees (doc. 1 at 5-6, 8). At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee; thus, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment (which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement claims for individuals convicted of crimes). See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983). In any event, “[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). Recently, the Fourth Circuit held in a published decision that pretrial detainees could state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm on a purely objective basis that the challenged action is not related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose or is excessive in relation to that purpose. Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)).
Here, the plaintiff's complained-of condition, being jailed with three other detainees (doc. 1 at 5-6, 8), does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298) (noting that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only deprivations which deny the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to provide the basis of a § 1983 claim); Thompson v. Brown, C/A No. 3:11-cv-318-TMC-JRM, 2011 WL 6012592, at *1-2 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting conditions of confinement claim where the plaintiff claimed “his mattress and blanket were confiscated for six days, he was not allowed to have any toilet tissue for six days, his clothes were taken away from him for six days, his cell was cold, he had no running water in his cell, and he was forced to sleep on a steel cot for six days”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6012550 (D.S.C. Dec. 2, 2011). Further, the plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations that he has been housed with three other detainees fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation because being housed in a cell with two or three other inmates is not per se unconstitutional. See Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380-81 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding not cognizable constitutional deprivation for double bunking absent proof of unsanitary or dangerous conditions which cause deprivation of an identifiable human need). The plaintiff has also failed to allege an injury with respect to being celled with three other detainees. As such, the plaintiff's condition of confinement claim is also subject to summary dismissal.
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending the complaint. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process. See Britt v. DeJoy, 49 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (published) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend . . . the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). The attention of the parties is directed to the important notice on the next page.
The plaintiff is warned that if the United States District Judge assigned to this matter adopts this report and recommendation, the dismissal of this action for failure to state a claim could later be deemed a strike under the three-strikes rule. See Pitts v. South Carolina, 65 F.4th 141 (4th Cir. 2023).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committees note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Room 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).