Opinion
ID Nos. 0201009898, 0110015255
Submitted: October 4, 2002
Decided: December 30, 2002
Upon Appeal from a Decision of the Court of Common Pleas AFFIRMED
John H. McDonald, Esq., Dover, Delaware, for Appellant.
Jason C. Cohee, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for Appellee.
OPINION
Antonio Fuentes was convicted by a jury in the Court of Common Pleas of Driving While Suspended or Revoked, 21 Del. C. § 2756(a), which carries a minimum mandatory prison sentence of 60 days for second and subsequent offenses; Driving After Judgment Prohibited, 21 Del. C. § 2810, which carries a mandatory 90 day prison sentence; and Failure to Have Insurance Identification in Possession in violation of 21 Del. C. § 2118(p). Prior to trial, Appellant's motion to suppress his statements to the investigating officer on the basis of the omission of Miranda rights was denied. Fuentes was sentenced to the mandatory 60 and 90 day terms of imprisonment in addition to fines and ordered to serve these prison terms consecutively.
Fuentes appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and also the consecutive nature of the sentences, arguing that the sentences should have been merged. For the reasons stated below, the ruling of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
Antonio Fuentes was involved in a motorcycle accident on October 20, 2001 in which the motorcycle on which he was riding was forced off the road by a car. A Dover Police officer responded to the scene and completed the accident investigation, eventually concluding that the accident was not Fuentes' fault. During the course of the accident investigation, the officer determined that Fuentes did not have a valid license and could not produce proof of insurance; there was no other individual present who claimed to be the driver of the motorcycle. The officer testified that Fuentes never informed him that someone else was driving the motorcycle. Fuentes was taken to the hospital for treatment at the time of the accident, but was later charged by information with the violations as listed above.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review by the Superior Court for an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas is the same standard applied by the Delaware Supreme Court when reviewing an appeal from a decision of the Superior Court. By statute, an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas is "reviewed on the record and shall not be tried de novo." In such appeals, the Superior Court "is limited to correcting errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence exists to support factual findings." The test is not whether the Appellant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there is sufficient evidence to support findings of the trial court. The Delaware Supreme Court has summarized this role as follows:
Bailey v. State, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 25 at *2 (Del.Super.Ct.), citing Baker v. Connell, 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Del. 1985).
Robert J. Smith Cos., Inc. v. Thomas, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 502 at *5 (Del.Super.Ct.), citing Shahan v. Landing, 643 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Del. 1994).
Lynch v. State, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 654 at *3 (Del.Super.Ct.).
The Superior Court has the duty to review the sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the findings below. If such findings are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, the Superior Court must accept them.
State v. Cagle, 332 A.2d 140, 142 (Del. 1974).
Only when the findings below are clearly wrong is this Court free to make contradictory findings of fact.
Bailey, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 25 at *2, citing Levitt v. Bouvier, 287 A.2d 671, 673 (Del. 1972).
B. Suppression
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in not suppressing Fuentes' statements to the officer who investigated the accident, which he argues were custodial interrogations. Appellant contends that the statements were custodial in nature because: (1) there was a police presence at the scene of the accident and (2) Fuentes was required to stay at the scene until the police report was completed. Appellant further contends that the custodial quality of the interrogation triggered the need for Miranda warnings at the outset of the officer's interview with Appellant.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a person temporarily detained for an ordinary traffic stop is not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda. In so holding, the Court noted that a routine traffic stop is usually temporary and brief, is usually in a public place, and usually involves only one or two officers, making it less police dominated than typical custodial situations. In Delaware, questioning during a routine traffic stop, even when the defendant was placed in the back seat of the patrol car, was held to be non-custodial for the purposes of Miranda warnings. This is consistent with the Delaware and United States Supreme Courts' jurisprudence, which concludes that Miranda warnings are not required in the "routine, initial, on-scene investigation by the police" at a crime scene. The protections afforded by Miranda are only applicable when the investigation reaches the controlling stages of accusation or custodial interrogation.
State v. Bonner, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 393 at *4 (Del.Super.Ct.), citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
Id. at *4-5.
Bonner, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 393 at *6,*9.
Laury v. State, 260 A.2d 907, 908 (Del. 1969), citing Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
Id. at 909.
Investigation at the scene immediately following an accident is considered routine, initial investigation, even where questioning occurs at the hospital. In Hammond v. State, an appeal following a conviction of vehicular homicide, the Delaware Supreme Court held that statements made by a hospitalized defendant to police who were primarily concerned with identifying the victims were not custodial in nature.
569 A.2d 81 (Del. 1989).
See id. at 93-4; but see State v. Coyle, 567 A.2d 870 (Del.Super.Ct. 1989). In Coyle, defendant, later charged with driving under the influence and vehicular homicide, was initially briefly questioned upon the police officer's arrival at the scene of the accident, then told to wait by his vehicle. The officer testified that he was considering an arrest for driving under the influence following that initial contact. Fifteen minutes later, after learning the other driver might be fatally injured, the officer returned to the defendant and asked him questions about his drinking and the cause of the accident. In suppressing the defendant's statements, the Court held that the officer's questioning of defendant was not an "ordinary traffic stop" because the defendant had waited at the command of the officer, the officer knew the victim's injuries were serious at the outset, and the officer had in fact considered an arrest for driving under the influence after the first interview.
In this case, Fuentes was involved in a minor traffic accident. The Dover Police officer was conducting a routine investigation at the site of the accident. Clearly, the stages of accusation or custodial interrogation were not reached during this initial interview; in fact, the officer did not issue citations to Fuentes on that date but called an ambulance to transport him to the hospital following the on-scene investigation. Fuentes was not in custody when he made statements to the officer during the initial investigation, therefore, Miranda does not apply.
C. Merger of Sentences
Fuentes next contends that the Court of Common Pleas erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. He argues this violates due process because the habitual offender statute does not create a separate offense but only provides for an enhanced penalty for the offense of Driving While Suspended or Revoked.
This argument is unpersuasive. Delaware follows the Blockburger test to determine whether the same act constitutes two offenses and therefore permits punishment for each offense cumulatively. If each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, conviction and punishment under one statute does not preclude conviction and punishment under the second statute. Fuentes has been convicted of Driving While Suspended or Revoked in violation of 21 Del. C. § 2756(a), which requires proof that (1) his driving privileges were suspended or revoked, (2) that the revocation was legal, and (3) he drove a motor vehicle on the highways of the State during the period of suspension or revocation. Fuentes has also been convicted of Driving After Judgment Prohibited in violation of 21 Del. C. § 2810, which requires proof that (1) he be adjudged an habitual offender pursuant to the procedures specified in 21 Del. C. § 2802-2808, and (2) he operated a motor vehicle in the state while the judgment of the Court prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle remains in effect. Conviction of Driving After Judgment Prohibited requires proof that the appellant has been declared an habitual offender, while Driving While Suspended or Revoked does not. Because the Blockburger test is met, the Driving After Judgment Prohibited is subject to separate punishment from Driving While Suspended or Revoked.
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
Burton v. State, 426 A.2d 829, 836 (Del. 1981).
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
21 Del. C. § 2756(a), State v. Moore, 269 A.2d 242 (Del.Super.Ct. 1970).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.