Opinion
No. 1D13–5452.
07-16-2014
FT. MYERS REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Division of Pari–Mutuel Wagering, Appellee.
David S. Romanik of David S. Romanik, P.A., Oxford, for Appellant. Layne Smith, General Counsel, and Garnett W. Chisenhall, Chief Appellate Counsel, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
David S. Romanik of David S. Romanik, P.A., Oxford, for Appellant.
Layne Smith, General Counsel, and Garnett W. Chisenhall, Chief Appellate Counsel, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
WOLF, J. and MONACO, TOBY S., Associate Judge, Concur; WETHERELL, J., Concurs with Opinion.
WETHERELL, J., concurring.
I agree with the learned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that some of the actions taken by the Division of Pari-mutuel Wagering on Appellant's permit application “do[ ] not pass the smell test,” but I nevertheless concur in the decision to affirm the Division's final order denying the application because this court has no authority to second-guess the ALJ's determination that Appellant did not meet its burden of proof on the dispositive issue in this case.
This is the second appeal in this court—and fourth case —related to the application Appellant filed in August 2009 for a quarter horse racing permit in Miami–Dade County. In the first appeal, we reversed the dismissal of Appellant's amended petition challenging the denial of its permit application and remanded for a hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. See 53 So.3d at 1160. After summarizing the issue for the hearing on remand, we acknowledged the Division's argument that the issue was moot as a result of statutory amendments effective July 1, 2010, that subjected quarter horse racing permits to the proximity restrictions applicable to other pari-mutuel facilities. Id. at 1162–63 (citing ch.2010–29, § 5, at 295, Laws of Fla.). However, we explained that the “record on appeal [was] inadequate to address this issue appropriately in light of Appellant's contention that there are circumstances that would preclude the Division from applying the statutory changes to Appellant's permit application.” Id. at 1163 (citing Lavernia v. Dep't. of Prof. Reg., 616 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) ). We concluded by observing that “[t]he parties will have an opportunity to develop a record on all of these issues at the administrative hearing on remand.” Id.
The three prior cases are: Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Dep't. of Bus. & Prof'l. Reg., 88 So.3d 949 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (table) (dismissing appeal of the “final order” resulting from the ALJ's first recommended order); Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Dep't. of Bus. & Prof'l. Reg., 53 So.3d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (reversing order dismissing Appellant's amended petition challenging the denial of its permit application); Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Dep't. of Bus. & Prof'l. Reg., 44 So.3d 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (table) (denying petition for writ of mandamus to compel the Division to issue permit to Appellant).
The proceedings on remand focused on whether there were any exceptions to the general rule in Lavernia that would preclude the Division from applying the 2010 law to Appellant's permit application because it was undisputed that the application could not be approved if the 2010 law applied. The proceedings were somewhat disjointed, but they clearly afforded Appellant its proverbial “day in court” as contemplated by our opinion in the first appeal. The proceedings included three days of hearing and resulted in two recommended orders (and two “final orders”) containing extensive factual findings to support the ALJ's conclusion that that the 2010 law applied to Appellant's permit application. The proceedings culminated in a final order denying the application because the proposed facility did not meet the proximity restrictions in the 2010 law.
“Florida follows the general rule that a change in a licensure statute that occurs during the pendency of an application for licensure is operative as to the application, so that the law as changed, rather than as it existed at the time the application was filed, determines whether the license should be granted.” 616 So.2d at 53–54.
In this appeal, Appellant contends that the Division erred in applying the 2010 law to its permit application because the record establishes that the Division's review of the application was rife with irregularities and ineptitude from within the Division and improper influence from politically-connected interested parties outside of the Division. This argument is not without support in the record and the factual findings made by the ALJ; however, that does not necessarily mean that reversal is required because the issue the ALJ had to determine was whether the evidence of irregularities, ineptitude, and improper outside influence was sufficient to justify an exception to the general rule in Lavernia . This was a factual issue on which Appellant had the burden of proof.
Although the record contains evidence from which the ALJ could have found that the Division intentionally and unreasonably delayed the application review process to ensure that Appellant's permit application would be subject to the 2010 law pursuant to which the Division knew the application could not be approved, there was also evidence that Appellant contributed to the delay in the application process by changing the location of its proposed facility and by failing to adequately address deficiencies identified by the Division in its permit application. The ALJ—who was responsible for weighing and balancing the evidence—apparently did not find Appellant's evidence sufficiently persuasive because, despite several extremely critical findings of the Division's actions, the ALJ determined that Appellant did not meet its burden of proof. Specifically, in the first recommended order, the ALJ explained:
For example, the ALJ observed that “the action taken on [Appellant's] amended [petition], dismissing it on clearly fallacious reasoning, does not pass the smell test.” This observation is consistent with the fact that the Division's defense of that action in the first appeal resulted in an award of attorney's fees against the Division. See 53 So.3d at 1162 n. 4.
There is ... insufficient evidence to conclude that the original Petition, if it had not been rejected, would have been ruled upon and a final order entered prior to July 1, 2010, the effective date of the changes to section 550.334. Thus, there can be no finding that the rejection of [Appellant's] petitions for hearing was done for the purpose of delaying their conclusion beyond the effective date of the new statute.
The conspiracy theory espoused by [Appellant] ... did not prove the existence of intentional actions by the Division against [Appellant] for the purpose of delaying the review of the Application. It is not possible, from the evidence presented, to understand fully why the Division took some of the actions it did regarding how [Appellant's] Application was reviewed. However, there is not sufficient evidence that the Division's actions were improper or directed toward the end of ultimately denying [Appellant's] Application.
Likewise, in the second recommended order, the ALJ explained:
[Appellant's] own actions in seeking delays in the processing of its application militate against the suggestion that the Division delayed the process in order to allow for a Legislative enactment to become law. [Appellant] asked that action on its application be delayed at one point, and it changed the proposed location of its facility from one coast of Florida to the other, necessitating additional review by the Division. Neither the Division nor [Appellant] could predict when the proposed changes would take effect—or whether they would take effect at all. Thus, no matter what the Division's rationale or motivation concerning the handling of [Appellant's] application, the evidence does not show that there was a bad faith [ ] purpose based on an intention to assure the new law would apply.
The case proceeded below on the assumption that “bad faith” is an entirely separate exception from the “unreasonable delay” exception mentioned in Lavernia. The legal basis for this assumption is not entirely clear to me; however, any error on this issue was invited by Appellant.
The determination as to whether a party met its burden of proof is a factual finding, but because such a finding cannot be reviewed for competent, substantial evidence, the legitimacy of the finding depends upon a proper interpretation of the law by the fact-finder. Beckett v. Dep't. of Fin. Servs., 982 So.2d 94, 102 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Here, the recommended orders—which were adopted in toto by the Division in its final order—reflect that the ALJ properly construed Lavernia to require the Division to apply the 2010 law to Appellant's permit application unless there was sufficient evidence to show that the Division unreasonably and unjustifiably delayed the application review process.
See Fitzgerald v. Osceola County Sch. Bd., 974 So.2d 1161, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“A decision in favor of the party without the burden of proof need not be supported by competent, substantial evidence.”); Mitchell v. XO Communications, 966 So.2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (same).
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The portions of the recommended orders quoted above clearly articulate that the ALJ found the evidence to be insufficient to justify an exception to the general rule in Lavernia. This court has no authority to second-guess this determination because it is solely the function of the ALJ to assess the persuasiveness of the evidence as a whole. See Young v. Dep't. of Educ., 943 So.2d 901, 902 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[I]t is the responsibility of the administrative law judge to evaluate and weigh the testimony and other evidence submitted at the hearing to resolve factual conflicts, and to arrive at findings of fact. It is not the role of the appellate court to reweigh the evidence anew.”); Heifetz v. Dep't. of Bus. Reg., 475 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“It is the hearing officer's function to consider all of the evidence presented, resolve conflicts, judge credibility of witnesses, draw permissible inferences from the evidence, and reach ultimate findings of fact based on competent, substantial evidence.”). Accordingly, even if we disagreed with the ALJ's determination that the evidence was insufficient to meet Appellant's burden of proof, we simply have no basis to overturn the ALJ's determination or the resulting final order denying Appellant's permit application.