Opinion
Nos. 98A-01-010-WTQ, 98A-03-004-WTQ.
Submitted: March 3, 2000.
Decided: March 22, 2000.
Letter Opinion and Order on Motion for Reargument
MOTION DENIED
Ronald L. Stoner, Esquire 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1130 P.O. Box 89, Wilmington, DE. 19899.
Stuart B. Drowos, Esquire Department of Justice Carvel State Office Building, 820 N. French Street, Wilmington, DE. 19801.
James J. Hanley, Esquire Department of Justice Carvel State Office Building, 820 N. French Street Wilmington, DE. 19801.
Gentlemen:
The Employee/Appellant, Richard Frunzi, has filed a Motion for Reargument. Neither the Employer, Division of State Police, Department of Safety, nor the agency, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, have responded. See Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) and Rule 6(b). The Court, in inviting the Motion in its Opinion of February 23, 2000, suggested that the argument would have "to be persuasive showing some possible expectation of a different result on the evidence."
Frunzi makes two arguments in support of reargument. First, he says, contrary to the statement in the Court's Opinion, that he did alternatively request in his reply brief filed December 10, 1999 "that the decision of February 4, 1998 be vacated due to error and a new hearing ordered."
Second, on the issue of substantial evidence, Frunzi suggests that a new hearing would not have a preordained result because "the interaction between Frunzi and the pedophile occurred only over an 18 month to 2 year period (1995-1997)" and "consisted solely of 3 job referrals that [the pedophile] made to Frunzi and 3 job referrals that Frunzi made to [the pedophile] over a period of about 18 months." Frunzi further argues that he did not know "of the true information about the pedophile" until April 1997 and the parole office permitted the tree removal occupation at residential and commercial properties.
As to the first point, Frunzi is obviously correct; there was an alternative prayer included in the "Employee-Appellant Responsive Brief" filed December 10, 1999. But, as to the second point, the Court does not feel Frunzi has shown any possible expectation of a different result on the proffered evidence. "Being in a home-visiting business with a pedophile on parole still strikes this Judge as sufficient justification for the termination of a State Police Officer" and in full context, including the proffered evidence, still a proverbial smoking gun. It is clearly conduct unbecoming an officer (Delaware State Police Rule and Regulation 4) and personal and business contact with a person of criminal and immoral behavior (Delaware State Police Rule and Regulation 31). Moreover, if Frunzi had obeyed Rule and Regulation 34, and asked for permission to engage in this business relationship, there is a good chance any lack of detail in his knowledge of his pedophile business associate would have been supplied; this is true even though not getting authority was not the basis for termination.
Notwithstanding the Court's previously expressed views on preferred procedural matters, the Court sees no point in a remand which will inevitably have the same result for this former State Policeman. The Court is also satisfied that this record, with all its inadequacies, is sufficient to support the result. Being in a home-visiting business with a pedophile on parole is sufficient justification for the termination of a State Police Officer.
The Motion for Reargument is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sincerely, ___________________ William T. Quillen
WTQ/c aj oc: Prothonotary