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Frumusa v. P. J. Weyer Construction, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Dec 15, 1997
245 A.D.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)

Opinion

December 15, 1997

Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Seidell, J.)


Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondents are awarded one bill of costs.

The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action ( see, Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).

The plaintiffs' contention that the Supreme Court erroneously failed to charge the jury under Labor Law § 200 with respect to the defendants' general contractor P. J. Weyer Construction, Inc. (hereinafter P. J. Weyer) and its subcontractor R.J.C. Ceiling, Inc. (hereinafter R.J.C. Ceiling) is unpreserved for appellate review because the plaintiffs failed to request a charge in that regard or take exception to the charge as delivered ( see, CPLR 4110-b; De Long v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296; Morrissey v. City of New York, 221 A.D.2d 607; Rossetti v. Campanella, 118 A.D.2d 552). In any event, since Labor Law § 200 is a codification of common-law negligence principles concerning the duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide workers with a safe work environment ( see, Comes v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876), it was not applicable to R.J.C. Ceiling, the subcontractor. Furthermore, the court's lengthy charge on negligence in this case was adequate to encompass P. J. Weyer's liability under Labor Law § 200 ( see, Osnato v. New York City Tr. Auth., 172 A.D.2d 597).

The court correctly denied the plaintiffs' motion to set aside the verdict under CPLR 4404. The record reveals that the jury could have reached its determination upon a fair interpretation of the evidence presented with consideration given to the credibility of the witnesses and the drawing of reasonable inferences ( see, Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129; Pomaro v. McKeon, 228 A.D.2d 572; Harris v. Armstrong, 97 A.D.2d 947, affd 64 N.Y.2d 700).

The plaintiffs' remaining contentions, raised for the first time on appeal, are not properly before this Court.

Bracken, J. P., O'Brien, Thompson and Altman, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Frumusa v. P. J. Weyer Construction, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Dec 15, 1997
245 A.D.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
Case details for

Frumusa v. P. J. Weyer Construction, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:JOSEPH FRUMUSA et al., Appellants, v. P. J. WEYER CONSTRUCTION, INC., et…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Dec 15, 1997

Citations

245 A.D.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)
666 N.Y.S.2d 210

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