Opinion
[No. 427, September Term, 1966.]
Decided June 26, 1967.
ZONING — Montgomery County — Rezoning From R-60 To C-2 Zone — Denial of Rezoning By County Council Would Not Be Overturned Where Action Of Council Not Shown To Be Discriminatory, Arbitrary, Or Capricious. p. 201
ZONING — Montgomery County — Denial Of Rezoning To Commercial Zone Not Arbitrary Where Technical Staff Recommended Denial, Reclassification Would Not Be In Accord With Master Zoning Plan, And Requested Reclassification Would Extend Commercial Zoning Beyond Point To Which It Had Been Limited On The Opposite Side Of The Street On Which The Property Fronted. p. 202
ZONING — Judicial Review — Testimony Presented To Trial Court And Not To County Council — Not Necessary To Decide Whether Testimony Was Properly Admitted On The Basis That It Was Limited To Conditions As They Existed At The Time Of Proceedings Before The Council — Testimony Would Not Aid Appellants In Any Event. p. 202
ZONING — Denial Of Rezoning From Residential To Commercial — Confiscation — Unfeasibility Of Use Of Property For Single-Family Dwellings Did Not Render Denial Of Reclassification Confiscatory Where Appellants Failed To Establish That Property Could Not Be Used For Other Presently Permitted Uses, Such As Professional Offices. In support of their claim that denial of reclassification from residential to commercial use was confiscatory, appellants adduced before the Circuit Court (but not the County Council) the testimony of two expert witnesses. The president of a building and loan association testified that the property could not reasonably be developed for single-family housing. The other witness, a real estate broker and appraiser, testified that he would not recommend single-family residential financing of a construction nature or a permanent nature for the property. The Court of Appeals held that this evidence was insufficient to render the County Council's refusal to rezone from R-60 (one-family detached residential) zoning confiscatory. The report of the Technical Staff stated that under the existing classification the property could be utilized not only for single-family dwellings but also for doctors' or dentists' offices in homes, and for a scientific society headquarters. The appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that all permitted uses were unfeasible, and hence, the denial of rezoning could not be deemed confiscatory. p. 202
ZONING — Denial Of Rezoning — Confiscation — To Establish Unconstitutionality Of Existing Zoning Because Of Denial Of All Reasonable Use Of The Subject Property, The Owner Must Establish That The Property Cannot Reasonably Be Used For Any Of The Permitted Uses In The Existing Zone. pp. 202-203
G.W.L.
Decided June 26, 1967.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (ANDERSON, J.).
Harry D. Friedman and ten other persons, owners of four adjacent lots, filed an application for reclassification of a tract of land from residential to commercial use with the Montgomery County Council. From a judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirming the Council's denial of the requested reclassification, the applicants appeal.
Order affirmed, costs to be paid by appellants.
The cause was argued before HAMMOND, C.J., and MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER, BARNES and McWILLIAMS, JJ.
Robert L. Burchett and James R. Miller, Jr., with whom were Miller, Miller Canby on the brief for appellants.
Douglas H. Moore, Jr., Deputy County Attorney, with whom was David L. Cahoon, County Attorney, on the brief for appellee.
The appellants asked the Montgomery County Council to rezone their property in Bethesda, consisting of some 26,000 square feet, from its existing R-60 zone (one-family Detached Residential) to the C-2 zone (General Commercial). The technical staff of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission recommended denial of the application; the Montgomery County Planning Board, in a three to two decision, disagreed with the technical staff and recommended approval; the Montgomery County Council (sitting as a District Council for that portion of the Maryland-Washington Regional District located in Montgomery County) denied the request for the rezoning. The appellants appealed to the Circuit Court, and Judge Anderson affirmed the Council's decision. In this appeal, the appellants contend that the Council's action was discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious, and resulted in an unconstitutional confiscation of the appellants' property.
The subject property is located on the southeast corner of the intersection of Wisconsin Avenue and Chelsea Lane. The nature of the surrounding land uses are set forth in the report of the technical staff as follows:
"The subject property has frontage along both Wisconsin Avenue and South Chelsea Lane. The property is undeveloped and partially wooded. The property is bounded to the east by well maintained brick single-family residences which front along South Chelsea Lane. Further to the east there is continued single-family development. To the north, across North and South Chelsea Lane, there are two single-family residences and Glenbrook Parkway. To the west and northwest across Wisconsin Avenue there is a large tract of land, the National Institutes of Health. To the southwest across Wisconsin Avenue is the Governor's House Motor Hotel and accompanying parking facilities. The subject property is bounded to the south by a two story brick and frame single-family residence, a single-family structure which has been converted for use as a real estate office and an antique shop and a well maintained two story single-family residence, a portion of which has been converted for use as a doctor's office. To the south across Chestnut Street is a private parking lot and a restaurant. The property immediately south of this application is zoned C-2. The northern boundary of this C-2 Zone is precisely opposite the northern boundary of commercial zoning on the west side of Wisconsin Avenue."
The technical staff pointed out that the requested reclassification is not in conformance with the Zoning Plan adopted in 1956, and stated:
"The land involved in this application and the land north to Jones Bridge Road could be utilized by single-family dwellings or for doctor's or dentist's offices in their homes, and also this is an excellent location for a scientific society headquarters. Single family dwellings have been established in this area for some time and there has been no change in the character of development which would justify the requested change."
The majority of the Planning Board was of the opinion that the abutting C-2 property to the south had set the pattern for commercial development as to the subject property.
At the hearing before the Council, the appellants produced testimony as to the commercial changes in the neighborhood and the unfeasibility of developing the property of single-family residences. Area residents, speaking in opposition, testified that the extension of commercial zoning in the neighborhood would create a serious traffic problem and pave the way for still more commercial reclassifications. The Council in its opinion denying the reclassification found that the commercial reclassification of the existing property to the south did not constitute sufficient change in the character of the neighborhood to justify the requested rezoning and that to grant the application "would be out of character with the adjacent residential community."
In his well-considered opinion affirming the action of the Council, Judge Anderson referred to the testimony as to the nature of the residential community which had existed adjacent to the subject property for many years, the adverse effect upon that community which the commercial rezoning would entail, and the reasonableness of the action of the Council in terminating the commercial rezoning of the property to the south at a point just opposite the northern boundary of the commercial property on the other side of Wisconsin Avenue. He found, on all the testimony, that the action of the Council was not discriminatory, arbitrary or capricious, but that, on the contrary, the matter was fairly debatable. We agree. Park Construction Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 245 Md. 597, 604, 227 A.2d 15 (1967), and cases therein cited. In zoning and rezoning, the line must be drawn somewhere, County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450, 463 (1967), and cases therein cited, and there was substantial evidence to show the reasonableness of the drawing of the line in this case.
To support their contention that the denial of the requested classification was confiscatory, at the court trial of the case, the appellants adduced the testimony of two expert witnesses who had not testified before the Council. Objection was duly made to this testimony, but it was admitted. The testimony of the experts was limited to conditions as they existed at the time of the proceedings before the Council and the witnesses' conclusions therefrom. One witness, president of a building and loan association, was of the opinion that the appellants' property could not reasonably be developed for single-family housing. The other witness, a real estate broker and appraiser, testified that he would not recommend single-family residential financing of a construction nature or a permanent nature for the property.
We do not reach the question of whether this testimony was properly admitted. Cf. Suburban Properties, Inc. v. Rockville Council, 241 Md. 1, 5, 215 A.2d 200 (1965), and Poe v. Baltimore City, 241 Md. 303, 311, 216 A.2d 707 (1966). Assuming, arguendo, that the admission was proper, we agree with Judge Anderson that the appellants have not met the burden of showing that the denial of the reclassification precludes the use of their property for any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted. As the judge noted, the report of the technical staff stated that under the existing classification the property can be utilized not only for single-family dwellings but also for doctor's or dentist's offices in their homes, and for a scientific society headquarters.
What Judge Barnes, for the Court, said in Tauber v. Montgomery County Council, 244 Md. 332, 223 A.2d 615 (1966), is not only pertinent; it is determinative:
"The appellants also contended below and before us that they were denied all reasonable use of the subject property by the existing R-60 zoning and were thus deprived of their property without due process of law or the payment of just compensation. In the R-60 zone, in addition to one-family detached dwellings, various institutional uses are permitted, including churches and other places of worship, libraries, museums and publicly owned buildings. Although there was evidence indicating that the subject property could not be reasonably used for one-family detached dwellings, it is clear from our decisions that to establish unconstitutionality of existing zoning because of a denial of all reasonable use of the subject property, the owner must establish that the property cannot reasonably be used for any of the permitted uses in the existing zone. Mayor and C.C. of Baltimore City v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 624, 212 A.2d 508, 515 (1965). This the applicants failed to do." 244 Md. at 337.Order affirmed; costs to be paid by appellants.