Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2843-14T3
04-14-2016
RAMONA FRIDAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT, Defendant-Respondent.
Laufer, Dalena, Cadicina, Jensen & Boyd, LLC, attorneys for appellant (James C. Jensen, of counsel and on the brief). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicole E. Adams, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Espinosa. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-8758-14. Laufer, Dalena, Cadicina, Jensen & Boyd, LLC, attorneys for appellant (James C. Jensen, of counsel and on the brief). Robert Lougy, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Nicole E. Adams, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Ramona Friday alleges she was injured as a result of slipping on an icy walkway at the Brick Church Train Station in East Orange on December 14, 2013. Even though she then knew she was injured because of some perceived act or omission of New Jersey Transit, appellant failed to serve a notice of claim within ninety days as required by N.J.S.A. 59:8-8(a). Instead, on December 11, 2014, almost one year after the accrual of the action, appellant moved in the trial court for leave to file a late notice of claim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9, which states:
A claimant who fails to file notice of his claim within 90 days as provided in [N.J.S.A. 59:8-8], may, in the discretion of a judge of the Superior Court, be permitted to file such notice at any time within one year after the accrual of his claim provided that the public entity or the public employee has not been substantially prejudiced thereby. Application to the court for permission to file a late notice of claim shall be made upon motion supported by affidavits based upon personal knowledge of the affiant showing sufficient reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances for his failure to file notice of claim within the period of time prescribed by [N. J.S.A. 59:8-8] or to file a motion seeking leave to file a late notice of claim within a reasonable time thereafter . . . .To excuse her failure to file a notice of claim within ninety days of the action's accrual, appellant was required to demonstrate "sufficient reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances." Ibid.
In moving for relief in the trial court, appellant asserted only that she was unaware of the legal requirement to file a notice of claim and that she was "focused on [her] medical treatment," citing a torn rotator cuff and an asthmatic condition. Although the existence of extraordinary circumstances is often fact-sensitive, the record is clear that appellant was aware of the cause of action on the date of her fall, even though she may not have been aware of the Tort Claim Act's requirements, and there is nothing about her ailments that would suggest an inability to take the simple step of filing a notice of claim.
When, in 1994, the Legislature added the "extraordinary circumstances" language to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9, its intent was to replace a "fairly permissive standard" with a "more demanding" one. Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 625 (1999); see also Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 118 (2000). Appellant's reasons for not timely filing a notice of claim are not sufficient to overcome the Act's demanding standard. The judge correctly denied the motion.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION