Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00CV867
July 12, 2001
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the court on referral from the district court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636 on the Defendants' separate but related motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs George W. and Paulette D. Friday, husband and wife, named the Commonwealth of Virginia and Prince George County, a locality in Virginia, as defendants. A liberal analysis of the prose Complaint, as amended, reveals, however, that the claims are directed against two state court judges who made rulings unfavorable to the Plaintiffs based on alleged racial discrimination in violation of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 6104, and 12203, as well as Title 29 U.S.C. § 626, and the Virginia Constitution, Article IV, Section 17. (Pls.' Compl. unnumbered section entitled "Jurisdiction"). The Plaintiffs also allege in related pleadings that they were denied the equal protection of the law in some unspecified manner. (Apply to Mot. for Dismissal [sic], filed Apr. 9, 2001, ¶ 1; Facts Supporting Why The Case Should Not Be Dismiss Apply to Motion For Dismissal [sic], filed Apr. 18, 2001, Count Eight). The Plaintiffs seek both compensatory and punitive damages and demand declaratory relief in order to reverse the state court decisions that are the bases of their challenges.
It is not clear from the record whether the original or amended complaint was served on the Defendants, but the essential allegations are the same in each pleading and the court, in any event, has construed any difference between the pleadings in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs.
Pro se allegations and arguments must be liberally construed by a court. See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345, 1347 (4th Cir. 1978).
Both Defendants have provided the pro se Plaintiffs with a completeRoseboro v. Garrison, notification of their right and responsibility to respond to the pending motions to dismiss and the Plaintiffs have not only responded in writing but they have also participated in oral argument so that no Roseboro issues remain. Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).
Relevant Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6) is a challenge on the face of the pleadings to the effect that — even accepting as true all non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party — the plaintiff cannot prevail as a matter of law. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1216 (4th Cir. 1982); Puerto Rico ex rel. Quiros v. Alfred L. Snapp Sons. Inc., 632 F.2d 365, 367 (4th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354 355 (4th Cir. 1969); MacKethan v. Peat. Marwick. Mitchell Co., 439 F. Supp. 1090, 1094 (E.D. Va. 1977). Conclusory allegations that are unsupported by factual assertions are not sufficient to withstand dismissal. See e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'd, 460 U.S. 325 (1983); Breeden v. Richmond Community College, 171 F.R.D. 189, 195 (M.D.N.C. 1997). The Defendants do not rely on any "matters outside the pleadings" and do not otherwise request summary judgment relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The court therefore analyzes the relevant issues raised by the Defendants' motions — whether the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(1)) and whether the Plaintiffs have otherwise failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted (Rule 12(b)(6)) — with reference to only the sufficiency of the non-conclusory, factual allegations of the Complaint.Relevant Factual Allegations and Inferences
The pro se Complaint, liberally construed, asserts the following relevant facts and reasonable inferences that are considered as true by the court in resolution of the pending motions:
1. The Plaintiffs contracted to purchase property in Prince George County, Virginia, from one Thelma Batts who had authorized a realtor, Ben S. Booth, to act on her behalf in the transaction (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 19);
2. Ms. Batts did not have sufficient legal authority to unilaterally sell the property and therefore the authorization given the realtor to act on her behalf was invalid (Am. Compl. ¶ 8);
3. The realtor altered the contract of sale, the "Purchase Agreement", in some material way after its execution by the Plaintiffs in July 1998 and without the prior knowledge or consent of the Plaintiffs (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 22);
4. The Plaintiffs initiated an action in the General District Court of Prince George County, Virginia, related to the disputed transaction, but the court made several rulings adverse to the Plaintiffs and ultimately dismissed their claim in November 1998 while assessing costs against them in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 35);
5. The Plaintiffs appealed de novo from the adverse decision of the General District Court to the Circuit Court of the same jurisdiction (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 10);
6. The Plaintiffs executed a lis pendens under protest (or otherwise acknowledged a defect or challenge to their ownership in the subject property) in order to pursue the matter before a jury that ultimately returned an adverse verdict (Am. Compl. ¶ 10);
7. The presiding circuit court jurist made several rulings against the Plaintiffs, including denying their motion to recuse himself from the case because of alleged biases, denying their motion for change of venue, ruling against them on various issues during the ensuing two-day jury trial (including the admissibility of certain evidence), denying a motion or motions for mistrial, and re-imposing the assessment of costs against them in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00) (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, 18, 21, 30-31, 37);
8. The Plaintiffs were evicted from the subject property with the knowledge and consent of the Defendant County even though it knew at the time that Plaintiff George W. Friday is fully disabled and that the Plaintiffs have minor children (Am. Compl. ¶ 16);
9. The Plaintiffs appealed the adverse judgment of the Circuit Court to the Virginia Supreme Court and the appeal remains pending (Friday v. Booth, Case No. 010524, pet. for reh'g. pending as of June 22, 2001);
10. The Plaintiff thereafter instituted the present action on December 28, 2000, and filed an Amended Complaint on February 26, 2001, before any service of the original complaint was accomplished; and
11. The matter is tentatively scheduled for trial by jury in the district court to commence on August 13, 2001, depending on the final resolution of this motion.
During oral argument, the court understood the material alteration was related to the total acreage to be conveyed, a factual allegation not clearly presented in the Complaint. See Am. Compl. ¶ 11.
During oral argument, the court understood the material alteration was related to the total acreage to be conveyed, a factual allegation not clearly presented in the Complaint. See Am. Compl. ¶ 11.
Analysis
Each of the Defendants' motions should be granted for one or more of the following reasons:
1. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that neither a state (Defendant Commonwealth of Virginia) nor political subdivision (Defendant Prince George County) can be sued without express statutory authorization or its prior consent and neither exception applies in this case. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
The Amendment prohibits suits by citizens of a state against their state of residence (unless an exception applies); it extends to political subdivisions of a state as well as state officials acting within the scope of their duties; and its immunity provisions are only waived upon express authorization by law or upon the state's consent. In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington. D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1144 (4th Cir. 1997); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 360-61 (1990); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 52 (1996). The pro se Complaint does not allege that the state officials involved (state judges) acted in a manner other than that of their official capacity at any time in relation to relevant events and the immunity provisions of the Eleventh Amendment have not otherwise been waived by consent or statutory mandate. The action is accordingly barred as a matter of law against both defendants.
2. Even if the Plaintiffs' allegations are liberally construed to be claims against the individual state judges involved for alleged violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights in potential violation of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related statutes for which sovereign immunity is considered waived, as opposed to § 1981 as alleged, there is no non-conclusory allegation to the effect that the judges acted in other than their official capacities at all relevant times such that they have absolute immunity from liability which also precludes any relief.
The doctrine of judicial immunity (to be distinguished from sovereign immunity) bars any possible relief against the state judges whose official actions are the basis for the Plaintiffs' claims. See e.g., Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 493, 339 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1986). Clearly, such actions as those allegedly undertaken by the two judges in this situation, whether correct or not, were in accordance with the lawful exercise of their authority; therefore the claims, as alleged, are rendered moot with no possibility of relief, thus justifying their dismissal. Id.
3. There are no non-conclusory allegations in the Complaint that the state or county instituted or participated in any discriminatory purpose, practice, or motive that can constitute a violation of the Plaintiffs' rights.
State entities can only be held liable for a violation of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 upon proof of an official policy or custom of discrimination. Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). The Complaint, even when construed in the most liberal way, does not assert more than imputed knowledge on the part of either state entity of the actions of the state actors involved. Dismissal is therefore required.
4. Any claim alleging a violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights occurring earlier than two years before the filing of this action, including any issues related to the lower state court proceedings, are barred by the applicable state two-year statute of limitations.
The applicable state statute of limitations applies to all actions brought pursuant to Title 42 provisions. Demuren v. Old Dominion Univ., 33 F. Supp.2d 469 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff'd 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999). The applicable limitation period for the various claims alleged in this action is two years under Virginia law and therefore all claims related to the events that occurred in the lower state court, the General District Court of Prince George County, that were concluded before the filing of the original complaint on December 26, 1998, are barred as a matter of law. Id. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243 (Michie 1998); see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-36.
5. The Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege, other than in purely conclusory terms, the necessary facts to even potentially establish: (a) that the Plaintiffs were intentionally misled by the state actors (the judges), that they did not know of the supposed underlying fraud, and that any alleged misrepresentations resulted in quantifiable damages to them; (b) what Virginia law they seek to have declared unconstitutional and why; (c) what acts of intentional discrimination were committed by any state actor to constitute a potential violation of the Plaintiffs' civil rights; (d) what identifiable rights have been abridged to implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution; and (e) how their individual or collective rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act were violated.
The Plaintiffs make numerous allegations concerning the trial process and trial issues, broadly asserting that the presiding state jurists made numerous rulings that were motivated by illegal racial animus. Without addressing each contention, it is sufficient to note that the allegations of racial discrimination, as set forth in the original and amended complaints, are purely conclusory and without even an alleged basis in fact. Simply asserting a result, e.g., a ruling on an evidentiary issue, and claiming that it must have been based on discrimination without also asserting a factual basis for a permissible inference for that conclusion, is insufficient as a matter of law. Likewise, it is insufficient to allege that one has been denied equal protection of the law without asserting what law is involved, how one's prescribed rights were denied, and where a factual nexus exists to support a request for potential relief.
These allegations range from the judge's refusal (within his authority) to recuse himself from the case because of some unspecified altercation with one of the Plaintiffs (Am. Compl. ¶ 14) to the court's refusal (also within its authority) to admit into evidence at trial proof of some related state licensing action against one or more of the interested parties (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-20).
6. At most, the Plaintiffs have alleged an action in common law fraud which is a purely state cause of action for which there is no potential federal jurisdiction in the absence of pendent jurisdiction and such jurisdiction does not exist here because no other federal claims survive dismissal.
To the extent that the Plaintiffs have alleged fraud, it is a creature of state law (at least under the circumstances of this case) and it can only survive as a federal claim if it is related to other federal claims that also survive, and if the essential elements of fraud are sufficiently alleged. Not only is it recommended that all claims for which there might be federal jurisdiction be dismissed, but the Complaint, both in original and amended forms, asserts facts that necessitate the conclusion that the Plaintiffs were not intentionally misled (or defrauded) by any of the subject actions. This is so, if for no other reason than they had knowledge of the alleged misrepresentations and they have not sufficiently asserted that they were damaged, as required, in a quantifiable way. See Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt St. Bovis. Inc., 256 Va. 553, 507 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1998).
7. The most liberal reading of the Plaintiffs' pro se Complaint requires the conclusion that the Plaintiffs are simply unhappy with the state court adjudication of their claims and that they want this court to act as an appellate court of review (rather than the appropriate state appellate court where an appeal is pending) which is strictly prohibited.
The thrust of the Plaintiffs' complaints is that they were defrauded by the parties involved in the subject real estate transaction, not the courts involved — other than feeling they were denied justice.
It is clear from the allegations of the Complaint, both in its original and amended forms, that the Plaintiffs seek to have this court review the adverse state result simply because they are unsatisfied with the result, even though an appeal remains pending in the state system. As stated at oral argument, the Plaintiffs do not think they can get a fair hearing or review in the state system. For what are presumably obvious reasons, a federal court does not have jurisdiction to act in direct review of a state court decision. D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Stated another way, a litigant cannot pick and choose a court in a different judicial system (federal) to directly review a case that was initiated in another system (a state system). The choice for appellate review is mandated by law and in this case the only court of review is the Virginia Supreme Court where an appeal remains pending.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that both motions to dismiss by the Defendants, the Commonwealth of Virginia and Prince George County, be GRANTED.
Let the clerk forward a copy of this report and recommendation to the Honorable Judge Robert L. Payne and counsel of record.
It is so ordered.
Notice to Parties
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations of the magistrate judge contained in the foregoing report within ten (10) days after being served with a copy of this report shall bar you from attacking on appeal the findings and conclusions accepted and adopted by the District Judge except upon grounds of plain error.