Opinion
F075153
07-21-2017
In re DAVID K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID K., Defendant and Appellant.
Gregory M. Chappel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant David K. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 10CEJ300111-2)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Mary D. Dolas, Judge. Gregory M. Chappel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant David K. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Gomes, J. and Peña, J.
-ooOoo-
David K. (father) appealed from the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) as to his now six-year-old son, David. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father's court-appointed counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on father's behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Father filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders or set forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the section 366.26 hearing. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case was initiated in October 2014 when the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) took then three-year-old David into protective custody after his mother, Maria, who had a felony warrant, was arrested for shoplifting with David in her care. The department placed David in foster care with his half sister. At the time, father was living in Las Vegas but relocated to Fresno in March 2015.
The juvenile court exercised its dependency jurisdiction over David and provided father 18 months of reunification services. Father failed, however, to reunify with David and in May 2016, the court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. Father appealed the court's setting order by extraordinary writ petition, which we denied.
The juvenile court terminated Maria's reunification services at the six-month review hearing in August 2015.
David K. v. Superior Court (July 22, 2016, F073700) [nonpub. opn.]. --------
In October 2016, prior to the section 366.26 hearing, father filed a modification petition under section 388, asking the juvenile court to either return David to his custody and terminate its dependency jurisdiction, or return David to his custody under family maintenance services or reinstate family reunification services. Father alleged various grounds justified the modification, including lack of proper notice, lack of personal jurisdiction and denial of due process. He further alleged David was not a resident of Fresno County and that he (father), as the nonoffending parent, had a right to custody of David. The juvenile court denied the request without a hearing, finding the petition did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances.
In November 2016, father filed another section 388 modification petition, asking the court to terminate its jurisdiction. The court denied the request without a hearing, finding the petition failed to state new evidence or a change of circumstances and the proposed order did not promote David's best interest.
In February 2017, the juvenile court conducted a contested section 366.26 hearing. Father was represented by counsel but did not personally appear. His attorney objected to the recommendation to terminate parental rights but did not offer any evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that David was adoptable and that the exception to adoption raised by the parents—the beneficial parent-child exception—did not apply. The court noted that father had not offered any additional evidence to support the exception. The court terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
An appealed from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is appellant's burden to "raise claims of reversible error or other defect" and " 'present argument and authority on each point made.' " If appellant fails to do so, the appeal may be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)
At a termination hearing, the juvenile court's focus is on whether it is likely the child will be adopted and if so, order termination of parental rights. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, the juvenile court must terminate parental rights unless the parent proves there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child under any of the circumstances listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B).
Father does not argue in his letter that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights. Instead, he appears to challenge the juvenile court's exercise of its personal jurisdiction over him and its finding of detrimental return.
Though not required, we reviewed the reporter's transcript of the section 366.26 hearing conducted on February 1, 2017, and find no arguable issues that merit briefing. Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.