Plaintiff's counsel objected on the ground that the question called for "improper opinion testimony." Counsel relied on French v. Barrett, 84 Or. App. 52, 733 P.2d 89 (1987). The trial court overruled the objection, and Hayes answered that the accident was consistent with those facts.
" (Emphasis supplied.) Plaintiff maintains that this case is controlled by French v. Barrett, 84 Or. App. 52, 733 P.2d 89 (1987). In French, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, brought an action to recover damages she sustained when she was struck by a car driven by the defendant.
¶ 40 Indeed, it appears that many jurisdictions do not limit the doctrine to parental relationships; rather, the doctrine applies when the persons are living in the same household and the person “furnishing” the vehicle has some control over the vehicle. See, e.g., R.E. Barber, Annot., Modern Status of Family Purpose Doctrine With Respect to Motor Vehicles, 8 A.L.R.3d 1191, §§ 8–9 (1966 & Cum.Supp.); Robinson v. Lunsford, 330 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Ky.1959) (stating doctrine would not apply to visiting son-in-law's use of car when parents-in-law had no moral or legal obligation to furnish support); Hermosillo v. Leadingham, 129 N.M. 721, 13 P.3d 79, 84–85 (App.2006) (holding doctrine did not apply to husband of estranged wife when they were not part of same household and husband had no control over vehicle); French v. Barrett, 84 Or.App. 52, 733 P.2d 89, 92 (1987) (jury question was presented whether doctrine could apply to daughter's fiancé who lived in household), rejected on other grounds, Madrid v. Robinson, 931 P.2d 791 (Or.1997); Wiebe v. Seely, 215 Or. 331, 335 P.2d 379, 387 (1959) (finding doctrine could apply to spouse). ¶ 41 In most cases involving adults living together as a couple, the doctrine would seemingly not apply because they are equal partners in using the family car.
1984); Hubbard v. Coates, 444 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1968); French v. Barrett, 84 Or.App. 52, 733 P.2d 89 (1987); Watkins v. Ebach, 291 N.W.2d 765 (S.D. 1980). See, generally, 38 A.L.R.2d 13 (Admissibility or opinion evidence as to cause of accident, §§ 22-24); see also, 69 A.L.R.2d 1148 (Admissibility of report of police or portions of report as to cause of or responsibility for accident).
He concedes that, under OEC 704, expert testimony may be admitted on an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury; however, he argues that the evidence exceeded the limits of OEC 704, because it only served to tell the jury who should prevail on a particular issue. See DeRosa v. Kolb, 90 Or. App. 548, 752 P.2d 1282, rev den 306 Or. 101 (1988); French v. Barrett, 84 Or. App. 52, 733 P.2d 89 (1987); Phomvongsa v. Phounsaveth, 72 Or. App. 518, 696 P.2d 567, rev den 299 Or. 203 (1985). He also argues that the issue was not a proper subject for expert opinion, because other direct testimony by defendant and other witnesses stated that the surgery was for plaintiff's pain; therefore, the expert opinions merely told the jury not to believe defendant's evidence.
The same reasoning applies to the testimonial evidence explaining the exhibits. In French v. Barrett, 84 Or. App. 52, 54, 733 P.2d 89 (1987), we held: "OEC 704 permits opinion testimony concerning an ultimate issue of fact if the testimony is `otherwise admissible.