Opinion
Docket No. 144728. COA No. 300825.
2012-09-26
FREMONT INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Michael IZENBAARD and Haley Izenbaard, Defendants–Appellees, and Nathan Kadau, Necessary Party Defendant–Appellant.
Prior report: Mich.App., 2011 WL 5965780.
Order
On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 29, 2011 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In ascertaining the meaning of a contract, we give the words used in the contract their plain and ordinary meaning that would be apparent to a reader of the instrument. Because the term “premises” is undefined in the insurance contract at issue in this case, reference to dictionary definitions is appropriate. Such definitions do not necessarily require a building to exist on a particular piece of land in order to fall under the common understanding of “premises,” which is a term that generally must be interpreted in light of its surrounding context. See, e.g., Random House Webster's College Dictionary (“a tract of land including its buildings”); Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.) (“Land with its appurtenances and structures thereon. Premises is an elastic and inclusive term, and it does not have one definite and fixed meaning; its meaning is to be determined by its context and is dependent on the circumstances in which used, and may mean a room, shop, building, or any definite area.”). The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the term “premises” as used in the insurance provision at issue in this case must be defined as property that has a building on it; nothing in the language or context of the insurance contract requires as much. We REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals to address the additional issue raised, but not decided, below: whether the location of the accident was used “in connection with” the insured residence.
We do not retain jurisdiction.