Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 14-0723
12-08-2015
FREEDOM PRO BASEBALL LEAGUE, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company; TIM GROSS, a married man; and JOSEPH SPERLE, a single man; Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants//Appellants, v. MICHAEL KING and FORCE SPORTS MANAGEMENT GROUP, LLC, an Arizona limited liability company, Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellees.
COUNSEL Davis, Miles, McGuire, Gardner, PLLC, Tempe By David W. Williams, Marshall R. Hunt Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Appellants Fredrickson, Mazeika & Grant, LLP, Phoenix By Ronald J. Lauter Counsel for Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellees
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2013-096437
The Honorable David M. Talamante, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Davis, Miles, McGuire, Gardner, PLLC, Tempe
By David W. Williams, Marshall R. Hunt
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants/Appellants Fredrickson, Mazeika & Grant, LLP, Phoenix
By Ronald J. Lauter
Counsel for Defendants/Counterclaimants/Appellees
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined. GOULD, Judge:
¶1 Appellants Freedom Pro Baseball League, LLC, Tim Gross, and Joseph Sperle (collectively, "League") appeal the trial court's judgment awarding attorneys' fees to Michael King and Force Sports Management Group, LLC (collectively, "Consultant"). For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 League is a semi-professional baseball league formed in 2012 by Tim Gross and Joseph Sperle. In September, 2012, League entered into a one-year consulting agreement (the "Agreement") with Consultant. Consultant is managed by Michael King who has experience owning, operating, and consulting for baseball teams in California.
¶3 After the Agreement expired, League filed a lawsuit alleging several causes of action against Consultant; in response, Consultant asserted several counterclaims against League. Consultant filed a motion to dismiss the action and compel arbitration based upon an arbitration provision in the Agreement. The trial court granted the motion and ordered arbitration.
In their briefs the parties incorrectly cite to the Uniform Arbitration Act, Arizona Revised Statute ("A.R.S.") § 12-1501, et. seq. However, because the Agreement was made on or after January 11, 2011, the subject arbitration provision is governed by the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, A.R.S. § 12-3001, et. seq. See A.R.S. 12-3003(A) (2015). Because the relevant provisions at issue here are nearly identical under both the Uniform and Revised Arbitration Acts, the parties' incorrect citation does not change the result.
¶4 The court subsequently granted Consultant's request for attorneys' fees related to the motion to compel arbitration, and entered a judgment against League for attorneys' fees in the amount of $15,555 pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c). League timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶5 We review the judgment awarding attorneys' fees for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb it if it is supported by any reasonable basis. Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551, 561, ¶ 39 (App. 2014).
¶6 Here, the attorneys' fee award was based on the court's determination that Consultant was the prevailing party under the terms of the Agreement and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. League argues that Consultant was not a "prevailing" or "successful" party, as required by A.R.S. § 12-341.01 or the Agreement, because Consultant merely obtained an order compelling arbitration, not a final determination on the merits of the parties' claims.
The attorneys' fees provision, which is contained in the parties' guarantee and incorporated by reference in the Agreement, states: "In the event of any litigation between [the Parties]...the prevailing party shall recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs." --------
¶7 The trial court determined, in part, that Consultant was the prevailing party because it successfully moved for the dismissal of League's case. The trial court erred in making this finding. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-3007(F), in ordering arbitration the trial court was required to stay the case; it did not have the authority to dismiss it. See also A.R.S. § 12-1502(D) (requiring a court ordering arbitration to stay, not dismiss, a proceeding).
¶8 However, Consultant may be considered a prevailing party on the grounds it successfully compelled arbitration. Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co, Inc., 177 Ariz. 526, 530 (1994); see also City of Cottonwood v. James L. Fann Contracting, Inc., 179 Ariz. 185, 195 (App. 1994). Accordingly, on this basis we affirm the trial court's determination that Consultant was the prevailing party under the Agreement and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.
¶9 League also appeals the amount of attorneys' fees awarded as unreasonable. We disagree.
¶10 We review the amount of attorneys' fees awarded by a trial court for an abuse of discretion, and "will not disturb the trial court's judgment on appeal if there is any reasonable basis for the amount awarded." ABC Supply, Inc. v. Edwards, 191 Ariz. 48, 52 (App. 1996). Here, there is no evidence the court abused its discretion. In reaching its determination, the court considered Consultant's motion for attorneys' fees and the affidavit of counsel. The total amount of fees sought by Consultant was $19,865, but only $15,555 was awarded by the court, a reduction of approximately 22%. In addition, the fees awarded were reasonably related to the motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, we find no error.
CONCLUSION
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment. In the exercise of our discretion, we deny Consultant's request for attorneys' fees on appeal. However, we will award Consultant's taxable costs on appeal upon timely compliance with ARCAP 21.