Opinion
No. 32,487.
May 24, 1940.
Fair trade — regulation of prices in retail trade — validity of statute.
1. The fair trade act (L. 1937, c. 116, as amended by L. 1939, c. 403) does not discriminate unfairly between retailers ( e. g., between those who do business on a "cash-and-carry" basis, with low overhead cost, and others with higher overhead) because, by its own terms, it expressly permits sales below cost "in an endeavor made in good faith to meet the local prices of a competitor."
Statute — subject and title of act.
2. Apparent omissions from the title of the act as printed in L. 1939 have no importance because the title of the act as passed and approved included the repealed laws not mentioned in the act as published.
Action in the district court for St. Louis county under the declaratory judgments act for a construction of the so-called fair trade practices act and a determination of the rights and status of plaintiffs thereunder. From a judgment of dismissal on the pleadings, C.R. Magney, Judge, plaintiffs appealed. Affirmed, following McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414.
M.J. McKeon, for appellants.
J.A.A. Burnquist, Attorney General, Matthias N. Orfield and George W. Markham, Special Attorneys, and Thomas J. Naylor, County Attorney, for respondents J.A.A. Burnquist, Thomas J. Naylor, and Sam Owens.
Whipple Atmore, for respondent Duluth Retail Grocers Meat Dealers Association.
On the pleadings there was judgment of dismissal. Plaintiffs appeal.
This case is companion to McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414, No. 32,443, the opinion in which is filed herewith. That decision is decisive also of most of this case, which differs from the other only in form, this being one for a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs pray for one denouncing the statute as unconstitutional.
1. There is no basis for plaintiffs' argument that the law is unconstitutional because it discriminates unfairly, or fails properly to note the distinction between "services rendered by a cash-and-carry establishment and those furnishing delivery and other services." See Florida D.C. L. Board v. Everglades Laundry, Inc. 137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380.
The point is that the cost of doing business for the cash-and-carry store is necessarily lower than that of one selling on credit and making delivery. Sufficient answer is furnished by the act itself in the exemption (L. 1939, c. 403, § 3[d], 3 Mason Minn. St. 1940 Supp. § 3976-45[d]) of sales made by any merchant "in an endeavor made in good faith to meet the local prices of a competitor * * * in the same locality or trade area."
2. There is argument that the statute must fall because 3 Mason Minn. St. 1938 Supp. § 3976-46, is amended thereby but is not listed in the title as one of the sections to be amended. See "Editorial note" following § 3976-41 of 3 Mason Minn. St. 1940 Supp. wherein the same alleged defect is noticed. We find this position unsound because, though omitted from the 1939 law as published, § 3976-46 was among the sections listed in the title of the act as passed and approved.
There is argument also that, although the title of the 1939 law purports to repeal L. 1937, c. 116, as amended by L. 1937, c. 456, "the body of the act does not respond to that declared intent." This point is not well taken in view of L. 1939, c. 403, § 6, 3 Mason Minn. St. 1940 Supp. § 3976-48.
Judgment affirmed.