Opinion
No. C 08-2222 MMC (PR)
06-08-2012
JERRY M. FREDERICK, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Defendant.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADING;
DIRECTION TO CLERK
(Docket No. 165)
On April 29, 2008, plaintiff, a California prisoner then incarcerated at the Correctional Training Facility at Soledad ("CTF") and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action, alleging he was denied the right to participate in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") firecamp program because of medical disability, specifically diabetes, and that the CDCR failed to accommodate his disability. The Court found plaintiff had stated cognizable claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA"), and ordered the complaint served on CDCR.
Plaintiff has been paroled and currently resides in Gardena, California.
On September 22, 2010, the Court denied defendant's first motion for summary judgment and referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas for settlement proceedings under the Northern District's Pro Se Prisoner Mediation Program. The parties were unable to reach a settlement agreement.
Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, and defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On March 30, 2012, the Court denied both motions, and on April 25, 2012, the Court again referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Vadas for settlement proceedings. A date has not yet been set for those proceedings.
Now before the Court is plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed his complaint on April 29, 2008. The sole issue presented by the complaint is whether plaintiff's rights under the ADA were violated when he was denied firecamp placement in September 2007 at a hearing before CTF's Unit Classification Committee. Plaintiff now seeks to amend his complaint to allege ongoing discrimination from May 20, 2009 to November 5, 2009. (Pl. Mot. to Amend at 1.)
On April 2, 2009, plaintiff was transferred from CTF to the California Men's Colony ("CMC"), which offered a single firecamp. (Decl. D. Ramirez Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. II Ex. A; Decl. J. Simmons Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. II ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was not moved to the firecamp at CMC, due primarily to limited openings. (Pl. Decl. Supp. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J. II Ex. F.) On November 5, 2009 plaintiff arrived at Sierra Conservation Center ("SCC"), and in May 2010, was transferred to a firecamp at SCC. (Decl. D. Ramirez Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. II Ex. A.)
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The Court first decides whether plaintiff's request is more appropriately considered a Rule 15(a) motion for leave to amend or a Rule 15(d) motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading. Amended pleadings under Rule 15(a) "relate to matters that occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading, and entirely replace the earlier pleading." 6A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1504 (3d. ed. 1998). In contrast, supplemental pleadings under Rule 15(d) "deal with events subsequent to the pleading to be altered and represent additions to or continuations of the earlier pleadings." Id. Rule 15(d) enables plaintiffs to "introduce[] a cause of action not alleged in the original complaint and not in existence when the original complaint was filed." Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted). As shown above, plaintiff seeks leave to allege discrimination occurring after the filing of the original complaint. Consequently, plaintiff's request will be construed as a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading pursuant to Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A. Legal Standard
Rule 15(d) allows a party to supplement pleadings "upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just" for the purpose of alleging"transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d); Planned Parenthood of So. Arizona v. Neely, 130 F.3d 400, 402 (9th Cir. 1997). "While a party may freely offer an amendment at any time before a responsive pleading is served, supplements always require leave of the court." United States v. Hicks, 283 F.3d 380, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2002). "Rule 15(d) is intended to give district courts broad discretion in allowing supplemental pleadings." Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988).
The standards for granting a motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading are the same as those for granting a motion to file an amended complaint under Rule 15(a). See Glatt v. Chicago Park Dist., 87 F.3d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1996). "[L]eave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue delay." Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). The court should also consider whether permitting the supplemental pleading will "serve to promote judicial efficiency." Neely, 130 F.3d at 402. B. Analysis
As noted above, on April 29, 2008, plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action, alleging discrimination occurring in September 2007. As also noted above, plaintiff, by way of the instant motion, seeks to allege later instances of discrimination occurring between May 20, 2009 and November 5, 2009. Plaintiff did not file the instant motion, however, until nearly three years after said later instances of discrimination are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff provides no justification for his failure to seek leave to supplement earlier, and the Court finds the proposed supplementation would result in undue delay. See Parker v. Joe Lujan Enters., Inc., 848 F.2d 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding undue delay where motion to amend was filed approximately 11 months after original complaint).
Further, the Court has already ruled on three dispositive motions in this action and has twice referred the case for settlement proceedings. Permitting plaintiff to file a supplemental pleading at this late stage of the litigation would not "serve to promote judicial efficiency, the goal of Rule 15(d)." Neely, 130 F.3d at 402.
Finally, granting leave to permit a supplemental pleading would result in prejudice to the opposing party. See Parker, 848 F.2d at 121. Specifically, defendant would have to respond to a new set of claims, likely requiring additional discovery, after having already completed plaintiff's depostion, prepared two dispositive motions and responded to a third, and participated in the above-referenced settlement proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a supplemental pleading is hereby DENIED.
The Clerk is directed to serve Magistrate Judge Vadas with a copy of this order so that Judge Vadas may coordinate a time and place for further settlement proceedings pursuant to the Court's April 25, 2012 referral order.
This order terminates Docket No. 165.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________
MAXINE M. CHESNEY
United States District Judge