Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mutual Insurance Company

9 Citing cases

  1. Cornell, Howland, Hayes & Merryfield, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.

    465 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1972)   Cited 21 times
    Applying California law

    The court, therefore, determined that American was obligated to defend CH2M against the M S action, and awarded CH2M judgment for the costs it had incurred during the M S litigation and attorney's fees in the present action against Continental and American. Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 235 F. Supp. 540 (D.Or. 1964). In order to waive an insurance policy provision, the insurer must have knowledge of that provision, and must intend that it not apply. Fred Meyer, Inc., v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., supra; Grau v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 221 Or. 240, 350 P.2d 1082 (1960).

  2. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Newbern Fabricating, Inc.

    Case No. 14-CV-0610-CVE-TLW (N.D. Okla. Nov. 2, 2016)

    Although a clear definition of "extended coverage perils" does not appear to exist under Oklahoma law, the phrase is not uncommon in insurance agreements. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. E. Elec. Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 n.4 (D. Me. 2002); Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 540, 545-46 (D. Or. 1964); Anderson v. Council of the Unit Owners of the Gables on Tuckerman Condominium, 948 A.2d 11, 26 (Md. 2008); Unif. Condominium Act ยง 3-113(a)(1). Moreover, although the phrase is usually left undefined, when a definition (or at least more context) is provided, the meaning of "extended coverage perils" comports with the Court's interpretation of the phrase in the original contract.

  3. Prudential Property Casualty Ins. Co. v. Lillard-Roberts

    CV-01-1362-ST (D. Or. Jun. 14, 2002)

    Instead, the concept of proximate cause ordinarily determines if a loss is "direct." See, eg, Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Mutual Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 540 (D Or 1964) (finding food spoilage caused by failure of refrigeration when windstorm destroyed electric power lines is a "direct loss by windstorm"); see also 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE ยง 101:53 (3rd ed 1997). As support, she reminds the court of factually similar cases that she previously cited and submits recently discovered new evidence consisting of an article published by the American Association of Insurance Services ("AAIS"), an association of property and casualty insurers of which Prudential is a member.

  4. Florists' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tatterson

    802 F. Supp. 1426 (E.D. Va. 1992)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that implied covenant does not impose obligation on insurer to "advance" benefits due under policy

    There are several cases, some of which are cited in Tatterson's brief, that implicitly note that they are declining to follow the reasoning employed in Abady in favor of a proximate cause standard. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 540, 543-44 (D.Or. 1964); Federal Ins. Co. v. Bock, 382 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.Civ.App. 1964) (if Abady did not adopt a proximate cause standard, it is "contrary to the weight of authority"), writ ref nre (Dec. 9, 1964), and rehg of writ of error overr (Jan. 13, 1965); see also St. Paul Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Central Park Mobile Homes, 22 Ariz. App. 557, 561 n. 1, 529 P.2d 711, 715 n. 1 (1974) (characterizing Abady as holding that direct loss is limited to "immediate physical damage caused by the strength or force of the wind"). However, Abady is to be followed in this circuit.

  5. Transnational Insurance Company v. Rosenlund

    261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Or. 1966)   Cited 27 times

    The office of the Court is to ascertain the meaning of the language used and then enforce it in accordance with its legal effect. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 540 (D.Or. 1964); Lake County Pine Lbr. Co. v. Underwood Lbr. Co., 140 Or. 19, 26, 12 P.2d 324 (1932). The word "similar," when used in its present context, is not ambiguous.

  6. Marwell Const., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's

    465 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1970)   Cited 47 times
    In Marwell Constr. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 465 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1970), this court quoted with approval from Johnson, Drake Piper v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 258 F. Supp. 603, 610 (D.Minn. 1966): "`[T]he parties most likely intended to cover, under the "loading-unloading" clause, all hazards from the initial loading until the goods were unloaded including all incidental and necessary parts of the loading process....'" Marwell Constr., 465 P.2d at 304.

    This argument may be logical, but the authorities cited by General Insurance deal with an entirely different problem โ€” the interpretation of ambiguous language in insurance policies. Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 540 (D.C.Or. 1964); United States Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Western Cas. Sur. Co., 195 Kan. 603, 408 P.2d 596 (1965); Eastcoast Equip. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 207 Pa. Super. 383, 218 A.2d 91 (1966). The more cogent argument is that even if Theodore v. Zurich applies to bind the parties to the alleged facts in the original personal injury claim, further factual determinations are necessary to a decision on General Accident's claim for indemnity or contribution. Woods' claim contained allegations that Windle and Marwell were each negligent. If Marwell was directly liable for the injury, rather than under the theory of respondeat superior, the rules regarding indemnity or contribution among joint tort-feasors might have applied.

  7. Fisher v. Interested Underwriters

    930 So. 2d 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 10 times
    Disagreeing that payment was a confession of judgment where the insurer indicated in its cover letter forwarding the payment "that payment was made because of a recent decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida"

    Id. at 739 (quoting Inter-Active Servs., Inc. v. Heathrow Master Ass'n, 721 So.2d 433, 435 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)). In Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 235 F.Supp. 540 (D.Or. 1964), the United States District Court for the District of Oregon concluded that perishable food spoiled after hurricane force winds knocked out the power to refrigerators was a "direct loss." It considered opinions from the Minnesota and Oregon courts that had interpreted the words "proximate," "immediate," and "direct" as synonymous. The court held "that the loss before [it] was a `Direct Loss by Windstorm' within the meaning of the Direct Damage Insurers' policies" because the power loss was the direct result of the storm thereby making the food spoilage "a direct and natural consequence of the loss of the power.

  8. Granchelli v. Travelers Insurance Company

    167 A.D.2d 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)   Cited 17 times

    We disagree. Direct loss is equivalent to proximate cause (see, 18 Couch, Insurance 2d ยง 74:712, at 1022; Annot, What Constitutes "Direct Loss" Under Windstorm Insurance Coverage, 65 ALR3d 1128), and we find that the burst water pipe could have been proximately caused by the windstorm (see, Lipshultz v. General Ins. Co., 256 Minn. 7, 96 N.W.2d 880; see also, Federal Ins. Co. v. Bock, 382 S.W.2d 305 [Tex]; Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 235 F. Supp. 540 [D Ore]). Furthermore, the policy exclusion of loss by the bursting of water pipes applies only to explosions (see, Lipshultz v. General Ins. Co., supra; cf., Williams v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 334 Mass. 499, 135 N.E.2d 910; Abady v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 266 F.2d 362).

  9. Progressive Mut. Ins. v. Taylor

    35 Mich. App. 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 9 times

    The cases based on an insurer's request for reformation go each way and involve varied fact situations. The cases of Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Central Mutual Insurance Co. (D Or, 1964), 235 F. Supp. 540, and Royal Insurance Co. v. Morgantown (ND W Va, 1951), 98 F. Supp. 609, are particularly helpful. Fred Meyer, Inc. dealt with exclusions in special risk policies.