No. 05-10-00090-CR
Opinion Filed July 30, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 5, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. MA09-54214-F.
Before Justices RICHTER, LANG-MIERS, MYERS.
Opinion By Justice MYERS.
James Melton Frazier waived a jury and pleaded not guilty to criminal trespass. After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at 210 days' confinement in the county jail, probated for twelve months. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the finding of guilt. We affirm.
Background
Claudia Frazier, the complainant, is appellant's sister. At trial, Claudia testified she has lived in a house at 6225 Silvery Moon Drive (the house) since 1992, and she has lived alone in the house except for a one-year period when her sister Belinda lived with her, from 2001 to 2002. Claudia and her five siblings are the record owners of the house, but she is the only person who actually lives at the house. None of the other siblings have lived in the house with her. On March 28, 2009, appellant came into the house at about 10:00 p.m. He used the bathroom, went to the kitchen and ate some food, then went into a back bedroom and shut the door. Claudia called a neighbor to come and stay with her in the house because appellant had come in. The neighbor knew Claudia was afraid of appellant. Claudia testified she was afraid of appellant because on previous occasions appellant "ran me once with a knife. And he tried to put me out of the house once." After the neighbor arrived, Claudia asked appellant to leave, but he refused. Claudia called the police after appellant began to "get loud." When two officers arrived, Claudia asked them to remove appellant from the house because he would get violent with her. Claudia explained that she and her siblings owned the house, but only she lived in the house. The officers said appellant had just as much right to live in the house as she did, and she would need to "take it up in civil court." When Claudia begged the officers to remove appellant, they said she would need to talk to their sergeant, who was sitting in a patrol car outside the house. Claudia went outside and talked with the sergeant. The sergeant went in the house and asked appellant to step outside to talk with him. When appellant went outside, he told the officers that Claudia "took the house from everybody and won't let nobody stay there." Appellant said he used to have an apartment, but he had to leave. He had been staying with friends for the last few weeks. Appellant gave the officer his identification that listed a different address from the house. Claudia testified the sergeant asked appellant to leave the premises three times, but appellant refused. When appellant became more agitated and continued to refuse to leave, the officers arrested him. Officer Chien testified he was dispatched on a disturbance call to the house. When he arrived, he and his partner talked with Claudia, who stated her brother showed up "out of the blue," she did not want him there, and he did not live there. Claudia said she was the owner of the house, and she had lived there since 1998. Chien testified he verified that Claudia actually lived in the house either from her identification or "some type bill with her name and address" that matched the address of the house. Appellant said he lived at the house and he was not going to leave. According to Chien, appellant was unable to show any proof that he lived at the house. Sergeant Reginald Franklin testified he sat outside the house in his patrol car while the other officers talked with Claudia. After a short time, Claudia came to his vehicle and said appellant would not leave the house, he did not live in the house, and she was afraid of him. Franklin went inside the house and asked appellant to come outside to talk with him. Once outside, appellant said he lived in the house and it was his house, too. Appellant said the house belonged to his mother and when she died, he owned the house along with other family members. Franklin testified he told appellant he had to leave because his sister was afraid of him and wanted him to leave. Appellant became agitated and refused to leave. When Franklin asked appellant for his identification, appellant gave him either a Texas identification card or a Texas driver license that showed he lived at an address different from the house. Appellant admitted to Franklin that he lived at the address on his identification. Franklin explained to appellant that he had to leave the house because his sister asked him to leave. When appellant became more agitated, Franklin warned him that he either had to leave the premises or go to jail for trespassing. Appellant refused to leave. The other officers arrested appellant and transported him to the jail. Appellant testified he was aware that Claudia did not want him on the property, but he went to the house because he had been homeless for about a week and had no place else to go. Appellant said his mother purchased the house in 1965, he grew up there, and he had last lived in the house in 2006. On March 28, 2009, a friend dropped appellant off at the house. Appellant went inside, watched television with Claudia and a neighbor who was there, then ate the dinner Claudia had prepared. After eating, he went to a back bedroom and went to sleep. After a short time, Claudia came into the room and told him he had to leave. Then, two police officers came in and questioned him. After finding out that several family members owned the house, the officers told Claudia they could not put appellant out, and that she needed to see a civil attorney about the situation. The officers asked Claudia for proof that it was her house. When she left the room to get "some papers," the officers left. Claudia came back into the bedroom and tried to make appellant get "violent with her" by cursing appellant. Then, a third officer came into the room and told appellant to get up and come outside. When appellant went outside, the officer told him he had to leave the house. Appellant testified he refused to leave, telling the officer that he had just as much right to be there as did his sister. The officer said appellant could leave or go to jail. According to appellant, the officer never asked him for identification, and never told appellant why he was being arrested. He did not find out why he was arrested until he was booked into the jail. An "Heirship Affidavit" offered by appellant was admitted into evidence. The affidavit shows the "Roylean Frazier estate" passed to her six children after her death in June 1999. The affidavit recites Claudia's address as "6225 Silvery Moon Drive," and appellant's address as "8004 West Virginia, Apt. 1407." The affidavit also recites a "no" answer to question fourteen, "Did decedent own any real estate in this State." After closing arguments, the trial court announced that because the affidavit states appellant's mother owned no real estate in the State of Texas at the time of her death, neither Claudia nor appellant owned the house. However, Claudia had resided in the house for a long period of time and had a greater right to possession of the house. The trial court found appellant guilty of criminal trespass. Applicable Law
In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In a factual sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether (1) the evidence supporting the conviction is too weak to support the fact-finder's verdict or, (2) considering conflicting evidence, the fact-finder's verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We may only find the evidence factually insufficient when necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Id. Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to give to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally and knowingly entered and remained in the habitation of another without effective consent, and appellant received notice to depart but failed to do so. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.05(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2009). Because the information alleged that appellant remained on the property "of another" rather than the property "owned by" another, the State was not required to show the complainant's ownership of that property. See Thompson v. State, 12 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, pet. ref'd). Discussion
Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient because he was a legal heir of his mother's house, and all of the siblings inherited the house as tenants in common. Appellant argues the State failed to establish that he entered onto the property of another, which is an essential element of the offense, because he owns the property as a co-tenant, and thus, he cannot be liable in trespass. The State responds that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for criminal trespass. In a criminal trespass case, ownership may be established by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant had a greater right to possession of the property than did the defendant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(35)(A); Thompson, 12 S.W.3d at 920. "Possession" means actual care, custody, control, or management. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39). In this case, Claudia established that she had lived in the house continuously since 1992, and that although her other siblings inherited the house along with her, she was the only person who lived in the house. On the date of the offense, Claudia asked appellant to leave the house both before she called the police and after the officers arrived. Claudia verified her address to the officers, and told them appellant had a history of being violent, and that she called them because she was afraid of him. On the other hand, the officers said appellant's identification showed he lived at a different address. While appellant acknowledged he had not lived in the house since 2006, he said he owned the house along with his siblings and had a right to be there. Appellant said he was homeless at the time of the offense, and denied showing any identification to the officers. As the fact finder in this case, it was the trial judge's role to reconcile the conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); McCray v. State, 861 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). Based upon the evidence presented, the trial court could rationally conclude that Claudia was in actual "care, custody, control, or management" of the house and had a greater right to possession of the house than did appellant. Viewing all of the evidence under the proper standard, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings and appellant's conviction. Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 518; Vodochodsky, 158 S.W.3d at 509. We resolve appellant's two issues against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment.