Opinion
C. A. 1:20-3032-CMC-SVH
03-30-2021
Johnnie Frazier, #265586, Plaintiff, v. Warden James Blackwell and Warden Joseph McFadden, in their individual and official capacities Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge
Johnnie Frazier (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against James Blackwell (“Blackwell”) and Joseph McFadden (“McFadden”) (collectively “Defendants”), alleging violations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated at Lieber Correctional Institution (“Lieber”), a facility of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”).
This matter comes before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 26]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 27]. Plaintiff having filed evidence in response to the motion [see ECF Nos. 30, 32], the motion is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Because the court considers matters outside of the pleadings, the undersigned considers the motion as one for summary judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff was transferred to Perry Correctional Institution (“Perry”) from Lieber on December 3, 2019. [ECF No. 26-6 at 6]. All of Plaintiff's claims in this matter concern conditions of confinement issues he alleges occurred at Lieber, where he was housed from February 25, 2016, until his transfer to Perry. [See ECF No. 1, ECF No. 26-6 at 6].
McFadden was the warden at Lieber during a portion of the time that Plaintiff was housed there. [ECF No. 26-3 ¶ 1]. McFadden left his position as warden at Lieber in late July or early August 2017. [ECF No. 26-3 ¶ 1, ECF No. 26-4 ¶ 3]. Blackwell was the associate warden at Lieber, but never the warden, during the time that Plaintiff was housed there. [ECF No. 26-4 ¶ 1]. Plaintiff indicates he is suing Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. [ECF No. 1 at 2-3].
On August 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed his unverified complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants were grossly negligent and violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (1) by limiting his showers, recreation time, and cell cleaning/supplies, (2) by not providing a table and chair in his cell, and (3) due to the presence of poor drainage in the prison housing unit. [ECF No. 1 at 4-6]. Plaintiff alleges that the showers/recreation/cell cleaning were all reduced during two specific prison lockdowns following (1) the escape of an inmate on July 4, 2017 (“first lockdown”), that Plaintiff alleges lasted nine months, and (2) an inmate disturbance at Lee Correctional Institution on April 15, 2018 (“second lockdown”), that Plaintiff alleges lasted over a year. Id. at 5. As to the other items, Plaintiff does not specify a time or incident. Id.
Plaintiff filed a nearly identical case against these Defendants about a year prior to filing the instant action. See Frazier v. Blackwell, C/A No. 1:19-3585-CMC-SVH. Plaintiff's prior complaint was dismissed without prejudice for his failure to first exhaust his administrative remedies.
Plaintiff alleges he sustained the following injuries:
My health deteriorated from lack of showers, sunlight, recreation. Developed staphylococcus and was not able to file my federal habeas corpus from no table and chair and inability to access law library-No drains on the rock toilets flood over into other rooms.Id. at 6 (spelling and punctuation errors corrected). Plaintiff seeks $10 a day for showers/recreation/cell cleaning and “any punitive damages.” Id.
In response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has filed multiple declarations concerning his attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies. [See ECF No. 30-1]. Plaintiff has additionally filed a “supplement”-a declaration made by another inmate-declaring as follows:
These declarations were submitted as exhibits to Plaintiff's motion to alter or amend his complaint to add Warden Randall Williams to this suit, as he was the warden during one of the lockdowns at issue. [See ECF No. 30]. The undersigned denied the motion as untimely. [See ECF No. 33 at 4-5].
I, Robert Dukes #377251, declare that I'm a prisoner in the South Carolina Department of Corrections and was at Lieber Correctional Inst. from April 15th, 2018, until the lockdown was over from the riot at Lee Correctional Inst. During that time, I only received 1 shower a week and no outside recreation, fresh air, sunlight and no cell cleaning. The officers showed deliberate indifference to my circumstances with no drains on the rock and toilets flooding my cell and others and water mixed with feces and urine all in the cells. I declare under penalty of perjury the foregoing is true and correct.[ECF No. 32 (spelling and punctuation errors corrected)].
Plaintiff has submitted no further briefing or evidence to the court in response to Defendants' motion aside from these declarations.
II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. Further, while the federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, see, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a federal claim, nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a means to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, but the statute is not, itself, a source of substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). “Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under the color of state law, deprives another person ‘of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'” Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements to state a cause of action: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law.” Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Eleventh Amendment provides, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has long held the Eleventh Amendment also precludes suits against a state by one of its own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). This immunity extends not only to suits against a state per se, but also to suits against agents and instrumentalities of the state. Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 242 F.3d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 2001).
A plaintiff “is not entitled to monetary damages under § 1983 against Defendants in their official capacities.” Moneyhan v. Keller, 563 Fed.Appx. 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits against non-consenting state, its agencies, and its officers acting in their official capacities)). However, suits for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacity are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liability' on state officials under § 1983.”) (citation omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that at the time of the matters alleged in the complaint, Defendants were SCDC employees. To the extent Plaintiff sues Defendants in their official capacities, they are not subject to suit under § 1983, and the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding federal claims brought against them in their official capacities.
2. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Section 1997e(a) provides “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of every level of available administrative review. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Those remedies neither need to meet federal standards, nor are they required to be plain, speedy, and effective. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524.
Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the [PLRA], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Defendants have the burden of establishing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2005). However, “an administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Ross v. Blake, 136 S.
Ct. 1850 (2018).
SCDC provides inmates with a procedure through which they may file grievances on issues related to conditions that directly affect an inmate. [See ECF No. 26-5]. SCDC has an established inmate grievance procedure that allows inmates to grieve issues related to their confinement such as those enumerated in Plaintiff's complaint. Id. Defendants have submitted an affidavit by SCDC branch chief of inmate grievances, Sherman Anderson (“Anderson”) that specifically explains the grievance process:
The SCDC inmate grievance procedure is basically a three-step process. First, an inmate must attempt to resolve his/her issue through an Informal Resolution by submitting a Request to Staff Member Form (RTSM) or Automated Request to Staff Member (ARTSM using the Kiosk) to the appropriate supervisor/staff within eight (8) working days of the incident. This attempt at an Informal Resolution is a prerequisite for filing most Step 1 Grievances. An Informal Resolution is not necessary when appealing a disciplinary conviction or a custody reduction.
The Informal Resolution can be followed by completing a Request to Staff Member Form (RTSM) at the local correctional institution and placing the same in the Grievance Box. If the inmate is not in restrictive housing of the subject matter is not related of a medical nature, etc., the inmate must file his/her Informal Resolution through the Kiosk (submitting the RTSM form electronically which is referred to as ARTSM).
After receiving an unsatisfactory response to the RSTM or ARTSM, the inmate would then file a Step 1 Grievance by filling out an Inmate Grievance Form 10-5. The Step 1 Grievance Form 10-5 requires the inmate to include a copy of the RTSM that was submitted or a Kiosk reference number where he/she shall have filed an ARTSM (Kiosk).
After the Step 1 Grievance 10-5 Form is turned in by the inmate, it is picked up on a daily basis by staff. The Step 1 Grievance 10-5 Form will then be routed to the institution's Inmate Grievance Coordinator (IGC). If the IGC determines that the grievance will not be processed, the IGC will note this on the Step 1 Grievance 10-5 Form and return the Step 1 Grievance 10-5 Form to the inmate with instructions on what must be accomplished to cure the grievance of any defects.
If an inmate's Step 1 Grievance is returned unprocessed, the inmate will have the opportunity to either re-file a new grievance after correcting any deficiencies, or the inmate can appeal the unprocessed grievance to the Branch Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch within ten (10) days of the grievance being returned to the inmate.
If the inmate is not satisfied with the response to his/her Step 1 Grievance, the inmate must appeal that response by submitting a Step 2 Grievance 10-5A Form to the IGC within five (5) calendar days of receipt of the response to the Step 1 Grievance. The inmate's Step 2 Grievance 10-5A Form is also placed in the institutional Grievance Box.
The response to the Step 2 Grievance, or appeal, is considered to be SCDC's final agency decision on the issue.Id. ¶¶ 5-11.
The parties agree that Plaintiff submitted one grievance in the relevant time period, which he also submitted to the court in conjunction with his complaint. [See ECF No. 1-1 at 3; see also ECF No. 26-1 at 11]. As to this grievance, Anderson attests as follows:
According to Plaintiff, his claims began on or about July 4, 2017 and presumably ended, at the latest, in December 2019 when he was transferred to Perry. [See ECF No. 1, ECF No. 27-1].
Grievance LCI-0349-18 (not dated by Plaintiff): Plaintiff/Inmate grieves that he has legal work to do and has no table or chair in his cell. He requests a table and chair in his cell “for legal purposes.” The grievance (attached) appears to have been received by the IGC on May 9, 2018 and returned to Inmate Frazier that same day as he had failed to attach the answered Request to Staff/Automated Request to Staff form regarding his informal resolution attempt on this issue with appropriate staff prior to filing the grievance. The IGC advised Inmate Frazier to contact Associate Warden Sheppard via RTSM/ARTSM regarding this issue and that he could re-file his Step 1 with the answered RTSM/ARTSM form within eight days of receiving a response. There is no indication this grievance or response specifically addressed or even mentioned Warden McFadden or Associate Warden Blackwell. There is no record of Inmate Frazier following the IGC's suggestion as he apparently did not re-file this Step 1 with the proper paperwork nor does it appear that he attempted any informal resolution whatsoever. There is no Step 2 appeal filed by Inmate Frazier related to this grievance.[ECF No. 26-5 ¶ 12; see also id.¶ 14 (attesting that based on his review of Plaintiff's grievance history since January 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed no grievances concerning showers, recreation, cell cleaning, and drainage)].
Plaintiff has not responded to the above information concerning his grievance for the lack of tables and chairs in his cell. However, Plaintiff has submitted to the court six declarations, made under penalty of perjury, stating that he sent a request to staff member form (“RTSM”) on July 20, 2017, and then again on April 29, 2018, to “the warden's office” concerning showers, recreation, cell cleaning, and drainage. [ECF No. 30-1]. In both instances, Plaintiff declares he never received a reply and, after 45 days, he “sent a grievance to the grievance office and never got a return on the grievance.” See id. These declarations are consistent with the representations he made in his unverified complaint concerning his efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies. [See ECF No. 1 at 8-9].
Plaintiff's previous case against Defendants was dismissed without prejudice for his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Frazier, C/A No. 1:19-3585-CMC-SVH, ECF No. 37. More specifically, the district court held that because Plaintiff failed to allege he submitted a RTSM on the specific issues raised in his complaint, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, although he had stated, generally, that his RTSMs had gone unanswered. See Id. at 3. In that case, defendants represented to the court that if a RTSM went unanswered, after 45 days, the inmate may file a Step 1 grievance and attach the unanswered RTSM. Id.
Plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies concerning his claims prior to filing his complaint. See Peoples v. Burtt, C/A No. 8:07-2702-CMC-BHH, 2008 WL 2315865, at *3 (D.S.C. May 30, 2008) (citing Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Services, 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005); Malik v. Ward, C/A No. 8:08-1886-RBH-BHH, 2010 WL 1010023, at *6 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2010) (“Only after completing both Steps 1 and 2 in the SCDC grievance process has an inmate properly exhausted a claim under § 1983”).
However, a plaintiff is not required to exhaust unavailable administrative remedies. The Supreme Court has stated:
. . . . an administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates. Suppose, for example, that a prison handbook directs inmates to submit their grievances to a particular administrative office-but in practice that office disclaims the capacity to consider those petitions. The procedure is not then “capable of use” for the pertinent purpose . . . . So too if administrative officials have apparent authority, but decline ever to exercise it. Once again: “[T]he modifier ‘available' requires the possibility of some relief.” When the facts on the ground demonstrate that no such potential exists, the inmate has no obligation to exhaust the remedy.Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1859 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies concerning the table and chairs issue. As to the remaining issues, the undersigned declines to recommend dismissal based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, where Plaintiff has declared under penalty of perjury that he followed the process he was informed he must follow, but to no avail. However, as discussed more below, the undersigned recommends Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted, notwithstanding, because there is no evidence that Defendants, in their individual capacities, violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
Even if Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies regarding this claim, he has failed to submit any evidence in support of the claim and has only asserted, without elaboration, that due to not having a table or chair in his cell he “was not able to file my federal habeas corpus . . . . and inability to access law library.” [ECF No. 1 at 6]. The court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's habeas case. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”). Plaintiff's habeas case was thoroughly litigated, including his having submitted multiple filings and having advised the court that he needed more time due to the lockdown in prison, but with no mention of a lack of table or chairs. See Frazier v. Warden, C/A No. 1:18-01511-CMC-SVH, ECF No. 33; see also, e.g., Pronin v. Johnson, 628 Fed.Appx. 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Prisoners have a constitutional right to ‘adequate, effective, and meaningful' access to the courts. To prevail on a claim that he was denied access to the courts, a prisoner must demonstrate that he suffered an actual injury, such as missing a court-imposed deadline or being unable to file a complaint because of the Defendants' actions.”) (citations omitted).
3. Conditions of Confinement
To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, “a plaintiff must show both (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate that the conditions deprived him of a basic human need, a plaintiff must allege that officials failed to provide him with humane conditions of confinement, such as “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [taking] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). As to the second prong, a prison official is deliberately indifferent if he has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner and disregards that substantial risk. Id. at 847; see also Parrish v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 302 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating the standard of deliberate indifference requires actual knowledge and disregard of a substantial risk of serious injury).
Plaintiff complains of restrictions to showers, recreations, and cell cleaning due to lockdowns at Lieber. Plaintiff also complains of a lack of proper drainage, causing toilets to overflow. Plaintiff's claim concerning these alleged conditions fails for multiple reasons.
Most importantly, Plaintiff has failed to submit sufficient evidence in support of his claim. Although Plaintiff submitted a declaration from another inmate describing similar circumstances he described in his complaint, Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence that due the alleged conditions, Plaintiff has suffered any harm.
In his declaration, Dukes declares he was at Lieber “from April 15th, 2018, until the lockdown was over from the riot at Lee Correctional Inst.” [ECF No. 32]. However, the inmate search detail report indicates Dukes was not incarcerated at Lieber until August 7, 2018, and was not incarcerated with the SCDC prior to that time. See SCDC Inmate Search Detail Report for Robert Dukes, #377251, available at https://public.doc.state.sc.us/scdc-public/ (last visited March 25, 2021); Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding court may “properly take judicial notice of matters of public record, ” such as postings on government websites). Therefore, Dukes could not have been incarcerated at Lieber at the inception of the second lockdown, although he may have been incarcerated during it.
Defendants have represented to the court that they have produced Plaintiff's medical records to him during discovery. [See ECF No. 20-1 at 2]. Plaintiff has not submitted these records to the court.
The Fourth Circuit
We reaffirm today . . . that in order to withstand summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions a plaintiff must produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions. The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit cruel and unusual prison conditions; it prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. If a prisoner has not suffered serious or significant physical or mental injury as a result of the challenged condition, he simply has not been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Amendment.Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1380-81; see also Id. at 1381 n.9 (“The mere incantation of ‘physical and mental injury,' of course, is inadequate to survive a motion for summary judgment.”); Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (reciting the Strickler standard and explaining that “[c]ompelling a showing of significant physical or emotional harm, or a grave risk of such harm, infuses an element of objectivity into the analysis, lest resolution of the seriousness of a deprivation devolve into an application of the subjective views of the judges deciding the question”); see also, e.g., Rucker v. Stirling, C/A No. 1:19-310-MGL-SVH, 2020 WL 5984435, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 1:19-00310-MGL, 2020 WL 4381975 (D.S.C. July 31, 2020) (denying motion for summary judgment where the plaintiff put forth evidence he had gone 10 months without recreation, was unable to exercise meaningfully in his cell, and was deprived of direct sunlight, causing “extreme back pain, hip pain, knee pain, joint pain, muscle cramps, chest pain, skin discoloration, lack of vitamin D, stress, depression, anxiety, sadness, and madness, ” due to prison staffing shortages).
Additionally, the record indicates Defendants were not responsible for the conditions Plaintiff alleges. McFadden left his position as warden at Lieber in late July or early August 2017. Thus, as to the first lockdown, McFadden was only at Lieber for, at most, a month; McFadden was not the warden, nor at Lieber, for the second lockdown. Blackwell was never the warden at Lieber and attests he did not have the authority to either place or lift a prison lockdown. [ECF No. 26-4 ⁋ 3]. Additionally, regarding both lockdowns, Defendants have put forth evidence that the lockdowns occurred at the direction of the SCDC administration. [ECF No. 26-3 ¶ 4, ECF No. 26-4 ¶ 3]. Specifically concerning the first lockdown, McFadden declares:
[I]t is my recollection that this was a directive from South Carolina Department of Corrections Headquarters that I was to place the prison on lockdown in order to maintain the safety and security of the entire institution. During this lockdown, inmate “out of cell” movement was reduced compared to normal “non-lockdown” operations. This would include inmate showers, cell cleaning, and recreation time.[ECF No. 26-3 ¶ 4].
To the extent Plaintiff brings a claim based on supervisory liability, he has failed to submit any argument or evidence showing that Defendants (1) had actual or constructive knowledge that their subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that their response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices[ ]”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between Defendants' inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claim.
4. Equal Protection
“[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (citations omitted). “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2001). To the extent that Plaintiff brings an equal protection claim, here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any membership in a protected class. Id. (explaining that “[w]hen the state classifies by race, alienage, or national origin, [ ] special concerns are implicated”). Thus, the alleged restrictions are presumed valid and will be upheld if “reasonably related to any legitimate penological interests.” Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 732 (4th Cir. 2002).
Defendants have submitted evidence that the directive from SCDC to lock down Lieber was “in order to maintain the safety and security of the entire institution.” [ECF No. 26-3 ¶ 4]. On the other hand, Plaintiff has made no showing that the lockdown decision was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests or that it was discriminatory or otherwise specific to him. Therefore, any equal protection or disparate treatment claims fail, and summary judgment is appropriate to those claims, if they exist.
Given the recommendation above, the undersigned need not address Defendants' qualified immunity argument. To the extent Plaintiff brings any claims based on state law [see ECF No. 1 at 4 (Plaintiff alleging Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as “gross negligence”)], the undersigned recommends the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 26].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).