Frassetto v. Barry

5 Citing cases

  1. Keatts v. Robinson

    544 A.2d 716 (D.C. 1988)   Cited 10 times
    In Keatts, the Department mailed an "Income-Expense Form" to the owner's new address, and the property owner introduced into evidence a Department mailing list on which the property owner's former address was printed but which also contained a handwritten notation of his new address.

    If the owner fails to redeem, a tax deed is issued to the person who purchased the property at the public auction. D.C. Code § 47-1003 (1973); see Frassetto v. Barry, 497 A.2d 109, 111-112 (D.C. 1985). It is well settled that the District must satisfy every procedural requirement leading up to the issuance of a tax deed.

  2. Rose v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

    73 A.3d 1047 (D.C. 2013)   Cited 8 times
    Explaining history of the District’s recordation statute

    On these grounds, we can distinguish the mandatory recordation of a security interest from the mandatory recordation of a notice of a tax sale. See Frassetto v. Barry, 497 A.2d 109 (D.C.1985). The notice of the tax sale provides information, like “the amount of back taxes owed plus penalties, costs, and interest,” that directly relates to the process of foreclosing on a tax lien.

  3. Jones v. Thompson

    953 A.2d 1121 (D.C. 2008)   Cited 10 times
    Declining to infer that a certified mailing occurred for one tax sale property from the production of a certified mail green card relating to another property that was transferred at the same tax sale, because "any such inference is simply too weak to establish strict compliance" and "was not significantly probative of whether the District strictly complied with its obligations"

    This was sufficient to challenge the tax deed and to shift the burden of demonstrating validity to the appellants. See (Michael) Jones, 829 A.2d at 199 (affidavit that notice had not been given was corroborated by envelope returned as "unclaimed"); Frassetto v. Barry, 497 A.2d 109, 114-15 (D.C. 1985) (presumption that tax deed was valid was adequately rebutted). At this point, however, allocation of the burden is of little importance because the facts have been fully developed through discovery.

  4. Gore v. Newsome

    614 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1992)   Cited 7 times
    Taking care “to eschew overzealous application of the strict compliance rule” and holding notice of tax sale sufficient where abbreviation of homeowners' names did not “affect the accuracy of the notice or create a substantial risk that a record owner [would have] erroneously believe[d] the notice was intended for someone else”

    II. Neither side disputes the general principle that District of Columbia law requires strict compliance with the statutes and regulations governing tax sales of real property. Keatts v. Robinson, 544 A.2d 716, 719 (D.C. 1988); Frassetto v. Barry, 497 A.2d 109, 113-14 (D.C. 1985); Robinson v. Kerwin, 454 A.2d 1302, 1306 (D.C. 1983); Boddie v. Robinson, 430 A.2d 519, 522-23 (D.C. 1981); Shenandoah Corp. v. Pringle, 385 A.2d 748, 749-50 (D.C. 1978); Potomac Bldg. Corp. v. Karkenny, 364 A.2d 809, 812 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 921, 97 S.Ct. 2192, 53 L.Ed.2d 234 (1977). The issue here is whether that rule prohibits a deviation, in the form of an abbreviated first name, from the full name of the property owner listed in the District's tax records when the government publishes or mails the required notices during the tax sale process.

  5. Malone v. Robinson

    614 A.2d 33 (D.C. 1992)   Cited 24 times

    The power to convey property for nonpayment of taxes can be validly exercised only by strict compliance with the relevant statutes and regulations. Frassetto v. Barry, 497 A.2d 109, 113 (D.C. 1985); Boddie v. Robinson, 430 A.2d 519, 522 (D.C. 1981); Watson v. Scheve, 424 A.2d 1089, 1092 (D.C. 1980). Thus, if the District fails to comply with the statute and regulations, the sale is invalid and must be set aside.