Opinion
Civil Action 2:23-cv-4163-DCC-TER
06-24-2024
MICHAEL FRASIER, Plaintiff, v. DANIEL PRITCHARD, STEVEN HALL, and NORTH CHARLESTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments during a traffic stop that result in his arrest. Presently before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motion could result in the motion being granted and his claims dismissed. Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 22), and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 24). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(e), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff's complaint is short on facts but long on legal conclusions. He alleges that on August 13, 2013, Defendant Hall, a patrol officer with the North Charleston Police Department (NCPD), initiated a traffic stop on the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger after being directed to do so from Defendant Pritchard, also with the NCPD. Pritchard informed Hall that he observed Plaintiff scanning the bus station parking lot as he left and “something was funny about it.” During the traffic stop, Hall ran the driver's and Plaintiff's licenses and issued the driver a warning ticket for an inoperable brake light. Plaintiff alleges that Pritchard could be heard over the radio coaching Hall to “try and obtain consent to search.” Hall testified during Plaintiff's trial that he had no objectively reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity to justify the extension of the initial traffic stop. There are no further factual allegations regarding the traffic stop. Plaintiff alleges Defendants conspired to racially profile him and violate his constitutional rights on the basis of his appearance based on their training. He alleges that they unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity but only because of his race. Plaintiff also alleges that while he was wrongfully convicted and incarcerated he suffered several severe physical injuries, which resulted in hospitalization, though he provides no factual allegations regarding these physical injuries. He seeks seven million dollars in damages. Plaintiff brings this action against North Charleston Police Department and against Prtichard and Hall in their official and individual capacities. Compl. (ECF No. 1).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Section 1983 “ ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.' ” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To be successful on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
Defendants first argue that dismissal is proper as to the claims against Pritchard and Hall in their official capacities pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA). However, Plaintiff specifically asserts in his complaint that he brings this action for violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has not alleged any state law claims. Thus, the SCTCA is inapplicable here.
Further, Defendants have failed to show that Pritchard and Hall are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in their official capacities. As alleged, Pritchard and Hall are employees of the North Charleston Police Department, and Eleventh Amendment immunity “does not extend to counties or similar municipal corporations.” Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
Defendants next argue that North Charleston Police Department is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. Local governing bodies, including the North Charleston Police Department and Pritchard and Hall in their official capacities, “can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.” Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Prtichard and Hall racially profiled him and violated his constitutional rights on the basis of his appearance based on their training. Training policies for Monell purposes can include “express authorizations of unconstitutional conduct.” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient at this stage of the litigation to allege Monell liability against North Charleston Police Department and against Pritchard and Hall in their official capacities.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's claims against them are barred by the statute of limitations. Because “§ 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, ...§ 1983 claims are governed by ‘the statute of limitations from the most analogous state-law cause of action.'” Reid v. James Madison Univ., 90 F.4th 311, 318 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Owens v. Baltimore City State's Att'ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014)). South Carolina law allows three years for a plaintiff to bring a personal injury action. S.C. Code § 15-3-530(5). Therefore, the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims arising in South Carolina is three years. See Hamilton v. Middleton, Case No. 4:02-cv-01952-23, 2003 WL 23851098, at *4 (D.S.C. June 20, 2003). While the length of the statute of limitations is a matter of the state law, the question of when an action accrues and the statutory period begins to run is a matter of federal law. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007); see also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996). “A federal cause of action accrues when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.” Baldwin v. City of Greensboro, 714 F.3d 828, 839 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). “[I]dentifying when Plaintiffs' cause of action accrued requires that we first isolate the precise constitutional violation alleged.” Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 884 (4th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they extended the initial traffic stop based only on his race and without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. His factual allegations do not move beyond the extended traffic stop. A traffic stop that is prolonged beyond the point at which “tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed,” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), violates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizures unless the authorities either possess reasonable suspicion or receive the individual's consent. United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2015). The Fourth Circuit has plainly held that accrual of a § 1983 claim based on an allegedly improper search and seizure is the date of the search and seizure. Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 887 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Harding v. Shinseki, No. 5:12-CT-3095-F, 2012 WL 10242641, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 30, 2012) (claim of discriminatory stop and seizure accrued on the date of the stop and seizure), aff'd, 521 Fed.Appx. 205 (4th Cir. 2013). The Smith court explicitly rejected a “favorable-termination acrrual” rule for claims arising from an illegal search and seizure. Smith, 31 F.4th at 887 (affirming that claims under the Fourth Amendment accrue “when they are violated”); see also Carter v. Whitfield, No. 2:20-CV-4225-RMG, 2022 WL 2128609, at *2 (D.S.C. June 14, 2022) (citing Smith and rejecting Plaintiff's argument that because the charges stemming from the allegedly illegal search and seizure were the subject of a pending criminal case, the cause of action did not accrue until the date the allegedly wrongfully obtained evidence was suppressed); Miller v. Helms, No. 1:23-CV-26, 2023 WL 11053412, at *4 (N.D. W.Va. June 6, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-26, 2024 WL 1092538 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 13, 2024) (citing Smith and rejecting Plaintiff's argument that the claims did not arise until Plaintiff's charges were dismissed). Because the seizure at issue in this case-the continued traffic stop after a warning citation was issued for the traffic violation-occurred on August 13, 2013, the present action falls outside the three-year statute of limitations. Accordingly, dismissal is appropriate.
Even though Plaintiff also mentions the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff cannot “[d]ress[ ] a Fourth Amendment claim up in due process language [to] transform it into a Fourteenth Amendment claim.” See Smith v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 885 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017)).
Because Plaintiff's criminal case arising from this traffic stop reached the South Carolina Supreme Court, we do know additional facts regarding this stop. See State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 639, 879 S.E.2d 762, 769 (2022), reh'g denied (Nov. 17, 2022). However, because those facts are not included in the present case, they do not form the basis for Plaintiff's claims.
Plaintiff appears to argue that the cause of action accrued at the time Pritchard and Hall testified at his criminal trial on March 24, 2017. Even if this was the proper acrrual date, which it is not, the present action still falls outside the statute of limitations.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) be granted.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).