Opinion
No. 2:13-cv-00790 JAM-AC
12-06-2013
BONNY FRANKLIN, GAIL GRIEGO, MICHAEL MARCOS, AND WILLIAM PEREIRA, individually and on behalf of the general public, Plaintiffs, v. PROSPECT MORTGAGE, LLC, Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO STAY
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Prospect Mortgage, LLC's ("Defendant") Motion to Stay This Action Pending Decision on Transfer (Doc. #12). Plaintiffs Bonny Franklin, Gail Griego, Michael Marcos, and William Pereira (collectively "Plaintiffs") oppose the motion (Doc. #19) and Defendant replied (Doc. #20). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for October 9, 2013.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed this action on April 23, 2013, against Defendant (Doc. #1). In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege two causes of action: the first for failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and the second for violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. Comp. ¶¶ 12-24.
Plaintiffs were opt-in plaintiffs in a collective action in the Eastern District of California, Sliger, et al. v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC, et al., No. 2:11-CV-00465 (E.D. Cal.) ("Sliger action"). Id. ¶¶ 7-12. The Sliger action was conditionally certified, but subsequently decertified by stipulation of the parties on January 23, 2013. Id. ¶ 12.
On August 16, 2013, Defendant filed a Motion for Transfer of Actions Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings before the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML"). Declaration of Timothy B. Nelson, Doc. #12-1, at ¶ 16. Defendants seek to have this matter, as well as 36 other similar matters filed in different district courts across the country, transferred to the Northern District of Illinois for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Id. Defendant now seeks to stay this action in its entirety pending a determination by the JPML of its motion to consolidate ("MDL Motion"). Mot. at 3.
II. OPINION
A. Legal Standard
A district court has discretionary power to stay proceedings in its own court. Landis v. N.A. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936). "This is best accomplished by the 'exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.'" Rivers v. Walt Disney Co., 980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55). The decision to grant or deny a stay of proceedings pending a ruling on the transfer of a matter to the JPML lies within the court's discretion. Conner v. AT&T, CV F 06-0632 AWI DLB, 2006 WL 1817094, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2006) (citing Good v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 5 F. Supp. 2d 804, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1998)). "To determine whether a stay is appropriate, the court should balance the competing interests of the moving and non-moving parties." Id. (citing Rivers, 980 F. Supp. at 1360). In addition, "[t]he Court should consider both the interest of judicial economy and the potential prejudice or hardship to the parties." Id.
In the context of a motion to stay proceedings pending a decision from the JPML, Rule 2.1(d) of the Rules of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation provides as follows:
The pendency of a motion, order to show cause, conditional transfer order or conditional remand order before the Panel concerning transfer or remand of an action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 does not affect or suspend orders and pretrial proceedings in the district court in which the action is pending and does not in any way limit the pretrial jurisdiction of that court.J.P.M.L. R. 2.1(d). Therefore, the Court "should not automatically stay discovery, postpone rulings on pending motions, or generally suspend further rulings upon a parties' motion to the MDL Panel for transfer and consolidation." Perry v. Luu, 1:13-CV-00729-AWI, 2013 WL 3354446, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 3, 2013) (citing Rivers, 980 F. Supp. 1358, 1360, and J.P.M.L. R. 2.1(d)).
B. Judicial Notice
Defendant requests judicial notice of four court documents. See Defendant's Request for Judicial Notice, Doc. #22, at 2. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), courts may take judicial notice of the existence of pleadings and court orders that are matters of public record, but may not take notice of the truth of the facts asserted within them. Burnham v. Ruan Transp., SACV 12-0688 AG ANX, 2013 WL 4564496, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013) (citing MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant's request.
C. Discussion
Defendant argues that (1) a stay would conserve judicial resources, (2) a temporary stay would not prejudice Plaintiffs, and (3) Defendant would be prejudiced if a stay is not granted.
1. Judicial Economy
Plaintiffs argue that a stay would not conserve judicial resources because they do not ask Defendant to engage in duplicative discovery, they are willing to arrive at a reasonable solution if the issue arises, and individualized discovery will still be necessary in this case. Opp. at 6. In the Reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have served Defendant 21 nearly identical and duplicative discovery requests without presenting any workable plan. Reply at 3 n.1. Consequently, duplication has already occurred. Therefore, as Defendants argue, a stay would promote judicial economy because the same judge should hear all discovery issues, case management and scheduling, and motions once the transfer has taken place. Mot. at 7. Because a temporary stay would promote judicial economy and efficiency by preventing any possible duplicative efforts by this Court, the judicial economy factor weighs in favor of granting the stay.
2. Prejudice to Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs argue that a stay would prejudice them because it delays their suit. Opp. at 5. Defendant argues that a delay would be minimal and not burden Plaintiffs because they have not diligently pursued their claims, indicating that Plaintiffs did not file this action until six months after the Sliger decertification and they took another month to serve Defendant the complaint. Mot. at 8. In addition, there has not been a significant amount of activity in this case. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by the delay.
3. Prejudice to Defendant
Defendant argues that it would be prejudiced by being forced to proceed in duplicative and costly discovery and motion practice in multiple courts, with a possibility of being subject to inconsistent rulings, if a stay is not entered. If a stay is not granted, Defendant would be subject to hardship because it would be faced with duplicative depositions of witnesses that may have relevant information in all of the actions, such as Defendant's corporate witnesses. Although individual discovery will still have to be conducted in this case, a stay would allow Defendant to limit duplication. Therefore, the Court finds that all the factors weigh in favor of granting a stay.
4. Other District Courts
Both parties have presented to the Court decisions from district courts across the nation either denying or granting a stay. Opp. at 2; Reply 9-10; Notices of Supplemental Authority, Doc. ##24-28. By granting a stay, the Court agrees with all the courts that have granted a stay under similar circumstances. See e.g., Avants v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC, No. 13-cv-0376 WJ-KBM (D.N.M. Oct. 9, 2013)(Ex. A to Def.'s Supplemental Authority, Doc. #26); Bauer, et al. v. Prospect Mortgage, LLC, No. 13-cv-00190 EJL (D. Idaho Oct. 23, 2013)(Ex. E to Def.'s Supplemental Authority, Doc. #27).
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for a Stay.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________
JOHN A. MENDEZ,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE