Opinion
April 5, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Orange County (Murphy, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
A separation agreement in a divorce proceeding may be vacated if it is manifestly unfair to one party because of the other's overreaching, or where its terms are unconscionable, or there exists fraud, collusion, mistake, or accident ( see, Matter of Dillon v. Dillon, 257 A.D.2d 621; Harragan v. Harragan, 204 A.D.2d 686). The courts will closely scrutinize a separation agreement ( see, Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 47), and "may look at the terms of the agreement to see if there is an inference, or even a negative inference, of overreaching in its execution" ( Christian v. Christian, 42 N.Y.2d 63, 73). In the instant case, the Supreme Court properly set aside the separation agreement as being manifestly unfair due to the husband's overreaching ( see, Weinstock v. Weinstock, 167 A.D.2d 394; Terio v. Terio, 150 A.D.2d 675; Battista v. Battista, 105 A.D.2d 898).
It is equally well settled that pendente lite awards of maintenance and child support should rarely be modified by an appellate court, and even then only under exigent circumstances, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations or when justice otherwise so requires ( see, Albanese v. Albanese, 234 A.D.2d 489; Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 209 A.D.2d 613; Bagner v. Bagner, 207 A.D.2d 367). The proper remedy for any perceived inequity in a pendente lite award is a speedy trial ( see, Podwal v. Podwal, 234 A.D.2d 530; Gianni v. Gianni, 172 A.D.2d 487). The pendente lite award made by the Supreme Court was not an improvident exercise of discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal ( see, Stravitz v. Stravitz, 255 A.D.2d 503).
S. Miller, J. P., Ritter, Thompson and Joy, JJ., concur.