In opposing American Casualty's motion for summary judgment, Faulkner offered his affidavit, and that of his attorney, Howard Possick, in which they set forth their intentions in negotiating the settlement agreement with MDIF. Specifically, they claim that ¶ 3(c) was only intended to apply to contemporaneous actions by Faulkner against American Casualty and that it was never contemplated that the agreement would apply to claims filed after the resolution of MDIF's dispute with American Casualty. The affidavits, Faulkner argues, establish the existence of a genuine dispute concerning a material fact, thereby rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Foy v. Prudential Insurance Co., 316 Md. 418, 422, 559 A.2d 371 (1989); Sheets v. Chepko, 83 Md. App. 44, 46, 573 A.2d 413 (1990). The trial court, however, found the agreement clear and unambiguous.

288 Md. at 28-29, 415 A.2d at 583-84 (citation omitted) (quotations omitted). In Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 316 Md. 418, 559 A.2d 371 (1989), this Court stated: "Although a trial court is allowed discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment in favor of a full hearing on the merits, a court cannot draw upon discretionary power to grant summary judgment.

The summary judgment process is not intended to substitute for a trial but merely provides a mechanism for determination of whether there exist material facts in dispute requiring a trial. Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 316 Md. 418, 422, 559 A.2d 371 (1989). Under the summary judgment rule a trial court determines issues of law and resolves no disputed facts.

The summary judgment proceeding is not a substitute for a trial; rather, it is a proceeding to determine whether a trial is required to resolve a factual controversy. Foy v. Prudential Insurance Co., 316 Md. 418, 422, 559 A.2d 371 (1989). The trial court, in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, must determine whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(e).

We review the denials of Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions in Limine, under an abuse of discretion standard. See Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 165 (2006) (citing Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 316 Md. 418, 424 (1989)) ("on appeal, the standard of review for a denial of a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial judge abused his discretion and in the absence of such a showing, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed."). Similarly, "[t]he admissibility of evidence, including rulings on its relevance, is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent a showing of abuse of that discretion, the rulings will not be disturbed on appeal."

[W]e now hold that a denial (as distinguished from a grant) of a summary judgment motion . . . involves not only pure legal questions but also an exercise of discretion as to whether the decision should be postponed until it can be supported by a complete factual record; and we further hold that on appeal, absent clear abuse (not present in this case), the manner in which this discretion is exercised will not be disturbed. In Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 316 Md. 418, 424, 559 A.2d 371 (1989), the case reached the Court of Appeals in a procedural posture somewhat similar to the present case. The circuit court had granted summary judgment for the defendants on one theory, and had denied the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment.

" Id. at 29, 415 A.2d 582. See also Foy v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 316 Md. 418, 423-24, 559 A.2d 371 (1989). "It follows from our holdings in Fenwick [Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134, 265 A.2d 256 (1970)] and Basiliko, [supra], that ordinarily no party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. It is within the discretion of the judge hearing the motion, if he finds no uncontroverted material facts, to grant summary judgment or to require a trial on the merits.

LEGAL ANALYSIS It is well settled that summary judgment procedure is not a substitute for a trial but merely a preview to determine whether there exists a factual controversy requiring trial. Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 316 Md. 418, 422, 559 A.2d 371 (1989). Where the moving party has set forth sufficient grounds for summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must show with some precision that there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact.

It is within the discretion of the judge hearing the motion, if he finds no uncontroverted material facts, to grant summary judgment or to require a trial on the merits." Foy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America , 316 Md. 418, 424, 559 A.2d 371 (1989). "Thus, on appeal, the standard of review for a denial of a motion for summary judgment is whether the trial judge abused his discretion and in the absence of such a showing, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed.

The function of the trial court at the summary judgment stage is to determine whether there is a dispute as to a material fact sufficient to require an issue to be tried. Gross v. Sussex, Inc., 332 Md. 247, 255, 630 A.2d 1156, 1160 (1993); Foy v. Prudential Insurance Company of America et al., 316 Md. 418, 422, 559 A.2d 371, 373 (1989); Coffey v. Derby Steel Company, 291 Md. 241, 247, 434 A.2d 564, 568 (1981). Thus, an appellate court's review of the grant of summary judgment involves the determination whether a dispute of material fact exists, Gross, 332 Md. at 255, 630 A.2d at 1160; Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, 330 Md. 726, 737, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993), and `whether the trial court was legally correct.