More recently we quoted the statement from a decision of the Tenth Circuit that "`although an order refusing or permitting the filing of an amended complaint joining an additional party is a discretionary action by the trial court and subject to appellate review as part of an ultimate final judgment, the order itself is not appealable in isolation.'" Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (quoted in Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 1993)). The Fowler court also stated that denial of an amendment does not "present[ ] a situation indicating allowable review under the exceptional doctrine of Cohen . . .," Fowler, 468 F.2d at 243, a view with which we also agreed.

An order denying a motion to amend the complaint is not a final order. See Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1972) (noting that an order denying leave to amend the complaint is not a final appealable order). Even assuming that the district court could certify the denial of a motion for leave to amend the complaint as final under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), that rule requires two express determinations, which the district court did not make.

The order denying his motion for leave to amend is not a final decision. See Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1972) ("Although an order refusing or permitting the filing of an amended complaint . . . is a discretionary action by the trial court and subject to appellate review as part of an ultimate final judgment, the order itself is not appealable as such in isolation." (citation omitted)).

We are not alone in reaching this conclusion in a setting like this one. See In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 376 (3d Cir.2005); Acevedo, 600 F.3d at 520; Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 744–45 (8th Cir.2008); Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir.1972) (per curiam); Hofmann, 642 F.3d at 998. Even if § 1291 does not empower us to review appeals from non-final orders, Kitchen argues that an exception for reviewing orders “dissolving an injunction” saves the appeal. R. 65 at 6; see28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

Similarly, an order permitting or denying joinder of parties is typically interlocutory. See United States v. Taylor, 632 F.2d 530, 531 (5th Cir. Unit A 1980) (citing Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1972) ("Although an order refusing or permitting the filing of an amended complaint joining an additional party is a discretionary action by the trial court and subject to appellate review as part of an ultimate final judgment, . . . the order itself is not appealable as such in isolation")). The novel question we must address is whether the district court's order is effectively unreviewable in light of the remand.

See Doleac v. Michalson, 264 F.3d 470, 477 93(5th Cir. 2001).See Michelson v. Citicorp Nat. Servs., Inc., 138 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that "although an order refusing or permitting the filing of an amended complaint joining an additional party is a discretionary action by the trial court and subject to appellate review as part of an ultimate final judgment, the order itself is not appealable in isolation.") (citing Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1972); Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 715 (2d Cir. 1973)) ("An order granting or denying consolidation, or granting or denying separate trials, is an ordinary, nonappealable interlocutory order. Severance orders are the same.

First, it cannot be contended that an order permitting (or denying) joinder of a party, standing alone, is appealable under the collateral order doctrine. As the court in Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), stated: Although an order refusing or permitting the filing of an amended complaint joining an additional party is a discretionary action by the trial court and subject to appellate review as part of an ultimate final judgment, the order itself is not appealable as such in isolation.

The DeMelos also seek to appeal the district court's order denying their motion to amend their complaint to name Aetna Insurance Company (which was Woolsey's liability insurer) as a defendant. The district court did not make, and was not requested to make, any section 1292(b) (nor any Rule 54(b)) certificate in this regard, and such order is not appealable. Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1972); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Herrald, 434 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970). See Martin Oil Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 605 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1979); Minnesota v. Pickands Mather Co., 636 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1980).

Unfortunately, the December 7, 1979, order is an interlocutory order rather than a final order. Johnson v. McDole, 526 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1976) (counterclaim); Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1972) (motion to join parties); Bush v. United Benefit Fire Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1963) (counterclaim). This Court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from such an order unless the district court judge certifies that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs entry of the limited judgment in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 54(b).

Because it is the nature of interlocutory orders that they create expenses, hypothetical or real, for one party or another and because the district court is in a much better position than us to evaluate the effects of joinder of parties to a lawsuit, we do not find that the interest of Pickands Mather affected by the order is so substantial as to compel review. The ordinary nonappealability of orders granting or denying joinder of parties, consolidation or severance suggests the nonappealability of the matter before us. See NAACP v. Michot, 480 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1973) (denial of consolidation was not an appealable order; alternative holding); Levine v. American Export Industries, Inc., 473 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir. 1973) (order granting consolidation was not appealable); Fowler v. Merry, 468 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1972) (order denying leave to file an amended complaint joining an additional party was nonappealable); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. LeMay, 448 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1001, 92 S.Ct. 565, 30 L.Ed.2d 553 (1971) (while implying that an order dismissing a third party complaint without prejudice was not an appealable collateral order, the court seems to have reached the merits of the appeal; id. at 1346); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Herrald, 434 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970) (order denying plaintiff's motion to join a party defendant was not an appealable collateral order); Nolfi v. Chrysler Corp., 324 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1963) (denial of consolidation was nonappealable). But see Katz v. Realty Equities Corp. of New York, 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975) and Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1973).