Opinion
CV174008808S
04-13-2018
Jamarr FOWLER (Inmate #405228) v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Kwak, J.
The petitioner, Jamarr Fowler, initiated this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief for alleged constitutional violations relating to disciplinary proceedings, conditions of confinement, medical treatment and security classifications as provided by the Department of Corrections (DOC). Specifically, the petitioner raises four claims in his petition: (1) the petitioner’s disciplinary hearings for three disciplinary tickets he received violated his due process rights; (2) the conditions at the prison are inhumane or dangerous because the petitioner is being oppressed, abused and psychologically tortured, and denied movement and exercise; (3) the prison medical staff willfully violated the petitioner’s rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and exhibited deliberate indifference to the petitioner’s needs; and (4) the petitioner was placed on high security status in retaliation for filing complaints and grievances against correctional staff without being afforded procedural due process of law.
A trial was held on October 4, 2017, October 18, 2017, and December 15, 2017. During the trial, the court heard the testimony of Dr. Joseph Breton, physician at Osborn Correctional Institution (Osborn), Devonia Long, ADA coordinator at Osborn, Mark Congelos, disciplinary hearing officer, Angel Quiros, district administrator, and Michael Grimaldi, DOC officer and investigator. Both parties submitted exhibits to the court, including copies of the petitioner’s disciplinary reports, clinical records, correspondence and DOC’s Code of Penal Discipline, Administrative Directive 9.5 (directive 9.5).
Having considered the credible evidence and the arguments of the parties, the court finds that the petitioner has failed to establish that his constitutional rights were violated and, therefore, the petition is denied.
I
FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds the following facts. On April 6, 2016, the petitioner received a disciplinary report for disobeying a direct order by using the TTY machine, a device used for telephone calls with the hearing impaired, beyond his designated time. The report was filed by Officer Ennaco, in which he indicated the following: " [T]his officer issued [inmate] Fowler a pass to use the TTY phone in Hosp-1. This officer told [inmate] Fowler he had to be off the TTY by 2:30 p.m. when rec[reation] ends. This officer walked [past] Hosp-1 at 2:50 p.m. and [inmate] Fowler was still at the TTY."
An investigation was subsequently conducted by Officer Grimaldi. The petitioner informed him that the disciplinary report was falsified. The petitioner further claimed that he was showing another inmate how to use the TTY machine as instructed by the health services administrator, Richard Furey. Officer Grimaldi’s investigation report indicates that he spoke with Furey who denied asking for the petitioner’s assistance. Following the completion of his investigation, Officer Grimaldi recommended that the petitioner be found guilty of disobeying a direct order.
On April 12, 2016, the petitioner received a second disciplinary report for security tampering due to alleged fraudulent use of the TTY machine. The report was filed by Officer Ocasio, in which he reported that a telephone-calls review was conducted and the review indicated that " Inmate Fowler is utilizing the TTY machine intended for inmates to conduct telephone calls with [h]earing [i]mpaired persons, to conduct telephone calls with hearing able persons. Inmate Fowler is utilizing the telephone system that is dedicated for TTY machine use in an unauthorized and fraudulent manner."
An investigation was subsequently conducted by Officer Grimaldi. The petitioner denied using the TTY machine in an unauthorized and fraudulent manner. Officer Grimaldi’s investigation report indicated that the petitioner had been " manipulating the system and completing phone calls with the TTY machine to hearing able persons," and recommended that the petitioner be found guilty of security tampering.
A hearing on both disciplinary reports was held on May 12, 2016. The petitioner declined the services of an advocate and submitted written statements in support of his defense. The reports indicate that the petitioner was removed from the formal hearing after becoming disruptive and argumentative. Witness statements by Colleen Gallagher, Furey and Officer McCullough were presented. Based on the evidence submitted, the petitioner was found guilty of disobeying a direct order and security tampering. He was sanctioned to twenty-five days punitive segregation, sixty days loss of visits, one hundred eighty days loss of commissary privileges and the forfeiture of twenty-five risk reduction earned credits. The petitioner appealed the rulings, which were affirmed.
On February 24, 2017, the petitioner received a third disciplinary report for security tampering due to alleged fraudulent use of the TTY machine. The report was filed by Lieutenant Jasmin, in which he indicated the following: " I unlocked the phone locker, turned on the TTY machine made sure the printer was ON and hit the " Return" key to ensure it was working. [Inmate] Fowler came to the Lieutenant’s Office and checked in. I told him the machine was ready and he went to use the TTY. I went to the TTY two minutes after his arrival and noticed the machine wasn’t printing. I asked Inmate Fowler why the printer was off and not recording numbers he was dialing. Inmate Fowler quickly pushed " CTRL-3" numerously to turn on the printer. I informed him that I had turned it on prior to him getting there. The fact that Inmate Fowler demonstrated in front of me that he could enable and disable the printer thus not allowing us to monitor his conversation ... [c]learly showed actions that are a fraudulent use of the phone system, meeting the criteria of Security Tampering."
An investigation was subsequently conducted by Officer Gonzalez. The petitioner claimed that the printer was off when he made the phone call, and denied using the TTY machine in a fraudulent manner. Officer Gonzalez’s investigation report indicated that Lieutenant Jasmin confirmed that the TTY machine was functioning properly prior to the petitioner’s arrival, and referenced the petitioner’s prior history of tampering with the machine. Officer Gonzalez recommended that the petitioner be found guilty of security tampering.
A disciplinary hearing was held on March 23, 2017. The petitioner declined the services of an advocate and to present witness testimony. He was given an opportunity to supplement and rebut the information presented. The TTY receipts were presented into evidence. Based on the evidence submitted, the petitioner was found guilty of disobeying and security tampering. He was sanctioned to fifteen days punitive segregation, thirty days loss of recreation, ninety days loss of telephone privileges and the forfeiture of fifteen risk reduction earned credits. The petitioner appealed the ruling, which was affirmed. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.
II
DISCUSSION
A
The petitioner claims that his disciplinary hearings violated his due process rights because he was denied the right to a fair and impartial hearing, and the right to prepare a defense with witnesses and documentary evidence. The petitioner further claims that his due process rights were violated by DOC’s failure to comply with its own regulations governing the disciplinary process, including the provision of an advocate to an inmate, the ability to present witnesses to support a defense and the requirement that a disciplinary hearing be held within seven business days of receiving the disciplinary report. These claims are denied.
As established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), minimal due process requirements attach to prison disciplinary proceedings when the forfeiture of statutory good time credits is a potential sanction, because the loss of such credits against an inmate’s sentence implicates a liberty interest. The petitioner claims that he was improperly deprived of earned risk reduction credits awarded to him as a result of the disciplinary proceedings in question. To this extent, he properly alleges that he was deprived of a liberty interest, thus triggering the " minimal due process requirements" identified in Wolff. See Jolley v. Commissioner of Correction, 60 Conn.App. 560, 760 A.2d 146 (2000), cert. denied, 274 Conn. 913, 879 A.2d 892 (2005). Due process requires that in such proceedings an inmate must receive: " (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).
In the present case, the petitioner’s minimal due process requirements as to the disciplinary hearings have been met. The disciplinary reports set forth the date, time and location of the events in question. The record reflects that the petitioner knew what conduct was at issue in connection with the charges and provided his version of the events to the investigators. He had the opportunity to use the information he received to prepare and present a defense. The record reveals that the petitioner was offered the services of an advocate in both disciplinary hearings, which he declined. Officer Grimaldi testified at the habeas trial that he interviewed and requested statements from witnesses identified by the petitioner. " Because of the unique requirements of prison security, the full panoply of rights due a defendant during a criminal trial are [sic] not available in a prison disciplinary hearing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Torres v. Commissioner of Correction, 84 Conn.App. 113, 118, 851 A.2d 1252, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 941, 861 A.2d 517 (2004). Therefore, this claim is denied.
The petitioner also failed to prove his claim that DOC violated his due process rights by failing to follow its own directives governing the disciplinary hearings. The record reveals that the petitioner was offered but refused an advocate. Additionally, the petitioner was given the ability to present his defense at the hearings. Further, the petitioner’s disciplinary hearings were held within the time frame set forth in DOC’s directives. Directive 9.5(31)(A) provides in relevant part: " A disciplinary hearing shall be convened as soon as possible but no later than seven (7) business days of the date of the disciplinary report ... These time frames may be reasonably extended which much be documented in writing." Directive 9.5(31)(C) then provides: " For good cause shown, a disciplinary hearing may be continued to a later hearing date not to exceed 10 business days. The Hearing Officer shall record the reason for any continuance on CN 9504, Disciplinary Process Summary Report. Not more than two (2) continuances may be granted to the Investigator or the accused for any disciplinary report." Therefore, pursuant to the DOC directives, a hearing must be held within twenty-seven business days after the disciplinary report is issued. The petitioner’s disciplinary process summary reports indicate that continuances were issued and his hearings occurred within the mandated time frame.
Moreover, generally a claim by an inmate that the respondent failed to follow its own procedures does not implicate the inmate’s due process rights. " The requirements imposed by the [due process] [c]lause are, of course, flexible and variable [depending on] the particular situation being examined ... In determining what is due process in the prison context, [courts] are reminded that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society ... to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison ... Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vandever v. Commissioner of Correction, 315 Conn. 231, 244, 106 A.3d 266 (2014), quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, " lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system ... Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2301, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). " [I]t is also well-settled law that violation of the procedures by the prison authorities of the Code of Penal Discipline does not implicate or violate due process rights of the inmate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Arnone, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV135034503S (January 30, 2015, Wilson, J.). Thus, even if there were some merit to the petitioner’s claims that the respondent had violated its own regulations, the failure to do so does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court finds that the petitioner has not proven that his due process rights have been violated, and therefore these claims are denied.
B
Next, the petitioner claims that the prison conditions are inhumane because he is being oppressed, abused and psychologically tortured, and denied the opportunity to exercise. The petitioner further claims that prison medical staff has willfully violated his rights under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and exhibited deliberate indifference to the petitioner’s needs, specifically the need to be housed in a dormitory setting due to his seizure disorder and his need to exercise. These claims must also be denied.
" The [e]ighth [a]mendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This includes punishments that involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)." Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, 288 Conn. 326, 338, 952 A.2d 764 (2008). " The eighth amendment, which applies to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution; see, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-45, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); ‘prohibits detention in a manner that constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.’ Hunnicutt v. Commissioner of Correction, 67 Conn.App. 65, 66, 787 A.2d 22 (2001). ‘Cruel and unusual punishment refers to punishment that involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.’ Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, [ 39 Conn.App. 674, 683, 667 A.2d 304 (1995)]. Under the eighth amendment, ‘prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates ...’(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Farmer v. Brennan, [ 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)]." Fuller v. Commissioner of Correction, 75 Conn.App. 133, 136, 815 A.2d 208, cert. denied, 263 Conn.App. 65, 66, 787 A.2d 1217 (2003). " The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Farmer v. Brennan, supra, 511 U.S. 832.
To prevail on a habeas claim challenging the conditions of confinement, a petitioner must demonstrate by objective evidence that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference concerning his serious medical needs. See Hunnicutt v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 67 Conn.App. 69-70; Faraday v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 288 Conn. 326. " [S]ubjective deliberate indifference means that a prison official cannot be found liable under the [e]ighth [a]mendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fuller v. Commissioner, supra, 75 Conn.App. 137.
At the habeas trial, Dr. Breton testified that the petitioner has a seizure disorder but has not had a serious grand mal seizure since early 2016. He testified that the petitioner is prescribed medication for the condition but he refuses to consistently take it. Dr. Breton further testified that it is most beneficial for an inmate with a seizure disorder to have a cell mate in case a seizure occurred while the inmate was in the cell. Dr. Breton testified that the petitioner has a mild case of asthma and was on the appropriate medication to treat it. Dr. Breton also testified that the petitioner has hearing issues but refused to undergo a current evaluation to assess further available treatment. Dr. Breton opined that the petitioner’s medical treatment was appropriate and met the medical standard of care.
Pursuant to the foregoing, the court finds that the petitioner has not presented any objective evidence proving DOC is providing inhumane conditions or treating his medical needs with deliberate indifference. The record demonstrates that the petitioner has been provided humane conditions and consistent and appropriate medical care. There is no evidence that DOC knows of and disregards an excessive risk to the petitioner’s health or safety. Therefore, these claims are denied.
As to the petitioner’s claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, there is no evidence before the court indicating that the petitioner was discriminated based on a recognized disability. " [T]he central purpose of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is to assure that disabled individuals receive ‘evenhanded treatment’ in relation to the able-bodied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Champion, 139 Conn.App. 216, 233, 55 A.3d 772, 784 (2012). The prison ADA coordinator, Long, testified that she receives requests for accommodations from inmates, and she identifies appropriate services and provides them to the inmates. Long further testified that she has not received any requests from the petitioner. There was no testimony or evidence that the petitioner was denied services that are provided to able-bodied inmates due to an identified disability. Therefore, these claims must also be denied.
C
Finally, the petitioner alleges that his due process rights were violated because he was placed on high security status without a hearing in retaliation for filing complaints and grievances against prison staff, and his appeal was not determined within the time frame mandated by the DOC directive. " Prison classification ... wherein prison officials have full discretion to control those conditions of confinement, do not create a statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient to invoke due process." Wheway v. Warden, 215 Conn. 418, 431, 576 A.2d 494 (1990), citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976). A habeas corpus petition may not be used to challenge the alleged erroneous classification as a security risk group member. Santiago v. Commissioner of Correction, 39 Conn.App. 674, 680, 667 A.2d 304 (1995). Furthermore, the petitioner has not presented evidence to support his claim. As a result, the petitioner’s claim must be denied.
III
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the petitioner’s habeas petition is denied.