Fourth Nat. Bank v. Grant

5 Citing cases

  1. National Bank c. Co. v. Grant

    227 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. 1976)

    The plaintiff below, administrator of the estate of Blanchard Anthony who died intestate on December 21, 1970, appeals from an order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This is the fourth appearance of these parties before the appellate courts of this state, previous decisions being reported in 229 Ga. 855 ( 194 S.E.2d 913) (1972), 231 Ga. 692 ( 203 S.E.2d 517) (1974), and 135 Ga. App. 798 ( 219 S.E.2d 12) (1975). In the present action, the plaintiff bank filed a complaint seeking judgment for a pro rata share of state and federal estate taxes paid by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's property being included in Anthony's estate for tax purposes.

  2. Fourth National Bank of Columbus v. Grant

    219 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 3 times
    In Fourth Nat. Bank v. Grant, 135 Ga. App. 798 (219 S.E.2d 12), this court reviewed a declaratory judgment entered in an action between competing claimants for a condemnation award.

    This is the third case involving these parties which has reached the appellate courts of this state. The prior decisions are reported at 229 Ga. 855 ( 194 S.E.2d 913) and 231 Ga. 692 ( 203 S.E.2d 517). In Fourth Nat. Bank v. Grant, 231 Ga. 692, supra, the Supreme Court held that, by operation of Code § 67-1301, Mrs. Grant had obtained, upon the execution of a deed to secure debt to her by Mr. Anthony in 1962, fee simple title to a tract of land, subject only to the grantor's right (created by a letter incorporated in the agreement) to reconveyance upon payment of the debt during his lifetime, which contingency never arose.

  3. Adkerson v. Georgia Power Company

    163 Ga. App. 8 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 2 times

    We noted that the Supreme Court had already established in the same action that the plaintiff, by virtue of the execution of the deed to secure debt and by the operation of Code Ann. § 67-1301, was the holder of fee simple title to the land involved. See Fourth Nat. Bank v. Grant, 231 Ga. 692 ( 203 S.E.2d 517). For that reason, we affirmed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff, as record owner of the land in question, was "entitled to that portion of the proceeds of a condemnation . . . (which condemnation proceedings were commenced after she had acquired fee simple title as grantee by the execution of the deed to secure debt) which applied to the property included in the security deed."

  4. Fourth National Bank v. Grant

    230 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 2 times
    In Fourth Nat. Bank of Columbus v. Grant, 140 Ga. App. 78 (230 S.E.2d 60) (1976), this court held that under the above-quoted code section, the trial judge is empowered to disburse condemnation proceeds to those "justly entitled" thereto, after hearing their respective claims.

    Thereupon the superior court judge signed a consent judgment, whereby the condemnor deposited $93,750 with the court and the appellant withdrew it as had been agreed. The appellee's title to the land was determined in Grant v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 229 Ga. 855 ( 194 S.E.2d 913) and Fourth Nat. Bank v. Grant, 231 Ga. 692 ( 203 S.E.2d 517). Having established her title to the land, the appellant made demand for her share of the condemnation proceeds and interest attributable to her property as described in the security deed; the appellant refused to pay any sum pursuant to the stipulation and agreement which had been predicated upon the determination of the rights of the various parties to the condemned property. Thereupon the appellee petitioned the court for the following: a decree declaring the rights of the parties to the condemnation proceeds held by the appellant; a decree and judgment for all sums due to her from the appellant pursuant to the stipulation and agreement; an accounting of all sums accruing in regard to her property since Mr. Anthony's death; such other and further relief as the court deemed equitable; and a rule nisi.

  5. Pitts v. Hopper

    402 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1974)   Cited 5 times
    In Pitts v. Hopper, 402 F. Supp. 119 (N.D.Ga. 1974), the court refused to find ineffective counsel who had not interviewed a state witness.

    As the Supreme Court of Georgia noted, the record reveals that petitioner's appointed trial counsel, Mr. Tucker, is a "graduate of an accredited law school, a general practitioner of 18 years experience at the Georgia Bar, whose practice consists, to the extent of 25-percent to 40-percent, of criminal law experience and that he enjoys broad public contact and service." 231 Ga. 639-40, 203 S.E.2d 517. After a close examination and analysis of the record herein, the Court concurs with the following findings and conclusions of the State habeas corpus court: ". . . That said petitioner was represented by competent counsel . . who is found to be a qualified attorney. . . . [and that T]he court further finds that none of the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated, that his conviction was lawful."