. . ." Herron, supra at 202 (2), quoting Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980). Compare Mason et al. v. Dept. of Transp., 159 Ga. App. 471 ( 283 S.E.2d 690) (1981).

King v. Browning, 246 Ga. 46 ( 268 S.E.2d 653) (1980). See also Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 (3) ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980). Since Canaday verified the accuracy of the Veatch plat by other documents, its admission into evidence was not erroneous for the reasons asserted.

Hillman filed a motion in limine for a ruling on whether he would be allowed to introduce evidence at trial that the value of the remaining land not taken was diminished by the taking of the easements and the effect of using the temporary easement for its intended use, i.e., road construction. The trial court ruled any evidence of damage to the remaining inadmissible based on holdings of Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980) and other cases which rely on the language from State Hwy. Dept. v. Hollywood c. Church, 112 Ga. App. 857 ( 146 S.E.2d 570) (1965) that in showing consequential damages from construction "it must be shown, among other things, that such factors are a continuous and permanent incident of the improvement," Hollywood c. Church, supra at 860. This has evolved into what the parties in this case refer to as the "temporary inconvenience rule" which the appellee contends prevents recovering consequential damages in cases of temporary partial takings.

Rouse v. Fussell, 106 Ga. App. 259, 263 (5) ( 126 S.E.2d 830) (1962); Casteel v. Anderson, 89 Ga. App. 68, 71 (1) ( 78 S.E.2d 831) (1953). Cf. Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302, 304 (3) ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980) ("A trial court has discretion as to admissibility of a diagram or sketch. . . ."). Beckett contends that the officer's name, position, and badge number at the bottom of the diagram convert it from a diagram depicting Monroe's testimony to a document recounting the non-testifying officer's opinion.

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the alleged consequential damages do not arise out of the aerial easement at issue in the condemnation action and therefore must be brought in a separate inverse condemnation action. See Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980); Department of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807, 810-811 ( 261 S.E.2d 710), aff'd, 245 Ga. 478 ( 265 S.E.2d 777) (1980). In fact, such a separate action for inverse condemnation has been brought by the defendants and, at the time judgment was rendered in this condemnation case, the action was still pending in the trial court, alleging not only consequential damages for loss of access to the adjoining railroad line but also pre-condemnation damages for the denial of the building permit, which were dismissed earlier from this action.

Fountain was compensated for this taking in an amount not disclosed in the record of the case at bar. See Fountain v. DeKalb County, 238 Ga. 14 ( 231 S.E.2d 49) (1976); Fountain v. MARTA, 147 Ga. App. 465 ( 249 S.E.2d 296) (1978); Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980). There was considerable contention at the trial of the instant case as to how much, if any, testimony regarding the prior litigation was admissible.

Simon v. Dept. of Transp., 245 Ga. 478 ( 265 S.E.2d 777) (1980), affirming 151 Ga. App. 807 ( 261 S.E.2d 710) (1979). See also Riviera Assoc. v. Dept. of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 29, 30 ( 329 S.E.2d 221) (1985); Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980). As the cited cases make clear, any damages such as those appellant fears, "if compensable, must be sought in a separate action against the condemnor."

]" (Emphasis in original.) Fountain v. Dekalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302, 303 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980). See also Department of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807 ( 261 S.E.2d 710) (1979), aff'd 245 Ga. 478 ( 265 S.E.2d 777) (1980).

This appeal is from a judgment denying that additional recovery. This case is controlled by this court's decisions in Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 (1) ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980); and Dept. of Transp. v. Simon, 151 Ga. App. 807 (1) ( 261 S.E.2d 710) (1979), affd. sub nom., Simon v. Dept. of Transp., 245 Ga. 478 ( 265 S.E.2d 777) (1980). In Simon, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the "effect of the project" argument advanced by appellants and went on to agree with this court that damages resulting from some part of the project other than the taking of the condemnee's property, "if compensable, must be sought in a separate action against the condemnor."

In this context, consequential damages are those which are a continuous and permanent incident of the taking in the present action. Fountain v. DeKalb County, 154 Ga. App. 302 ( 267 S.E.2d 903) (1980); MARTA v. Datry, 235 Ga. 568 ( 220 S.E.2d 905) (1975). In the case at bar, the alleged damage upon which appellant's counterclaim is based was incurred as a result of corrosion and other problems relating to the pipeline already existing on appellant's land.