Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3244, Section: "J" (4).
August 4, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants. Rec. Doc. 13. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on August 4, 2004, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument. For the reasons which follow, the Court finds that the motion has merit and should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The instant case involves a § 1983 claim brought by plaintiff who claims he did not receive adequate medical care while incarcerated at St. John Parish Correctional Center, and that the inadequacy of the care was so egregious that it amounted to "deliberate indifference" to his serious medical needs, thereby violating rights secured to him by the Constitution.
In connection with their motion, defendants have included the voluminous records of the treatment provided to plaintiff for his medical condition, which appears to have been cellulitis/staph infection, while he was in custody. The Statement of Uncontested Facts filed therewith details the dates and nature of treatment, and to the extent those facts are uncontroverted, the Court accepts them as true.
In an effort to create a fact issue precluding summary judgment, plaintiff has filed an affidavit in which he avers that despite the orders of his treating physician that following his discharge from Charity Hospital he was to have a neosporin dressing applied to the problem area twice a day, and despite the medical records indicating that triple antibiotic (presumably including neosporin) was applied, no neosporin or other ointment was applied. Instead, plaintiff argues, the medical staff of the jail wrongfully substituted saline solution irrigations for application of neosporin. Plaintiff also charges that on many occasions, the dressing was changed only once a day. According to plaintiff, these lapses constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.
In his affidavit, plaintiff acknowledges that the decision to substitute saline solution for antibiotic ointment was based on the medical staff's determination that the antibiotic ointment would keep his feet moist, and his feet needed to be dry. Pltf's Aff., ¶ 7.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, pleadings, admissions and answers to interrogatories demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[a]ll inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . ." Hawking v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 210 F.3d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 2000). However, if "the evidence submitted by the nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted because where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted.)
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
"[P]retrial detainees have a constitutional right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining officials." Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Wagner v. Bay City, Texas, 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir. 2000). In the context of an episodic failure to provide reasonable medical care to an inmate, deliberate indifference requires that an inmate demonstrate that an individual acting under color of state law "knew of and disregarded an excessive risk towards the inmate's health or safety." Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2001). More specifically, deliberate indifference requires that: "(1) the official was aware of facts from which an inference of substantial risk of serious harm could be drawn; (2) the official actually drew that inference; and (3) the official's response indicates that the official subjectively intended that harm occur." Thompson, 245 F.3d at 458-59. Further, "deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm." Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459. "Deliberate indifference encompasses only unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind." McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 1999).
It is unclear to the Court exactly what plaintiff's status was during his incarceration — i.e., whether he was a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner. However, the standard for inadequate medical care for pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as for convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. There is "no constitutionally significant distinction between the rights of pretrial detainees and convicted inmates to basic human needs, including medical care."Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
In the case at bar, accepting as true all the uncontested facts, and crediting the plaintiff's traverse to those facts and the relevant portions of the record, the Court finds there is no fact issue as to whether plaintiff can demonstrate deliberate indifference — he cannot. The record taken as a whole could not lead a rational fact-finder to conclude that a state official intended harm to occur to the plaintiff. To the contrary, it appears that plaintiff received comprehensive and appropriate medical care on a timely basis. Even assuming that prison officials negligently substituted saline irrigations for the application of neosporin, and that on the days enumerated by plaintiff changed his dressing only once rather than twice, at the most, these are allegations of negligence, and in no way amount to "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain repugnant to the conscience of mankind." See McCormick, supra. As such, they cannot form the basis for a § 1983 claim. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1993) ("It is clear that negligent medical treatment is not a cognizable basis upon which to predicate a section 1983 action."). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Rec. Doc. 13, should be and is hereby GRANTED, and plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Court cautions plaintiff's counsel that filing of the initial complaint, and maintaining an opposition to the instant motion, borders on violation of that portion of Federal Rule 11 which defines as sanctionable conduct presenting a pleading containing "claims, defense, and other legal contentions" which are not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law." This is especially true given that plaintiff's own affidavit reflects that the complained of conduct was apparently based upon a medical judgment which could no way be considered "deliberate indifference." See supra, note 1.