Opinion
1:12-cv-01282 LJO MJS HC
12-13-2013
FEASTER FOSTER, Petitioner, v. JAMES D. HARTLEY, Warden, Respondent.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO
DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(Doc. 19)
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation following his October 14, 1994 conviction of second degree murder. (See Pet., ECF No. 1.) He currently is serving a sentence of fifteen years to life in prison. On that conviction (Id.)
Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on August 7, 2012. During a search on April 5, 2011, correctional officers found a cell phone in Petitioner's mattress and a cell phone charger under his bunk. At the disciplinary hearing on April 11, 2011, Petitioner was found guilty of possession of a cell phone, and assessed a 30-day forfeiture of credit and loss of other privileges. Petitioner alleges that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation issued the disciplinary violation without sufficient evidence of his guilt and that the hearing violated his constitutional right to equal protection as other inmates were not found guilty of similar offenses.
On November 17, 2011, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Kings County Superior Court. The petition was denied in a reasoned decision on January 9, 2012. (Answer, Exs. 1-2.)
On February 29, 2012, Petitioner filed a writ of habeas in the California Court of Appeal for the Fifth District. The appellate court summarily denied the petition on March 20, 2012. (Answer, Exs. 3-4.)
Petitioner filed a petition to the California Supreme Court on April 2, 2012. The petition was summarily denied on June 13, 2012. (Answer, Exs. 5-6.)
Respondent filed an answer to the petition on October 4, 2013. (Answer, ECF No. 9.) Petitioner did not file a traverse within thirty days of the service of the answer. Accordingly the matter stands ready for adjudication.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered a violation of his right to due process as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, Petitioner was custody in Kern County, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court, at the time of filing the present petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the action.
B. Legal Standard of Review
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.
Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law
A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The "clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a 'principle' or 'general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle (or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of "federal law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786).
2. Review of State Decisions
"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the "look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Id. (" This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 'adjudicated on the merits.").
Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put it yet another way:
As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id. (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error
The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002); Musalin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.
IV. REVIEW OF PETITION
A. Law Regarding Due Process at Disciplinary Hearings
The law concerning a prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in good time credit is set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). While the United States Constitution does not guarantee good time credit, an inmate has a liberty interest in good time credit when a state statute provides such a right and delineates that it is not to be taken away except for serious misconduct. See id. at 557 ("It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. But here the State itself has not only provided a statutory right to good time but also specifies that it is to be forfeited only for serious misbehavior."); id. ("[T]he State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance ...."); id. at 558 (holding that "[s]ince prisoners in Nebraska can only lose good-time credits if they are guilty of serious misconduct, the determination of whether such behavior has occurred becomes critical, and the minimum requirements of procedural due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed").
Prisoners cannot be entirely deprived of their constitutional rights, but their rights may be diminished by the needs and objectives of the institutional environment. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 539. Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, so a prisoner is not afforded the full panoply of rights in such proceedings. Id. at 556. Thus, a prisoner's due process rights are moderated by the "legitimate institutional needs" of a prison. Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Superintendent, etc. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-455 (1984)).
When a prison disciplinary proceeding may result in the loss of good time credits, due process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) advance written notice of at least 24 hours of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-567. Finally, in order to comport with the requirements of due process, the disciplinary decision must be supported by "some evidence." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.
B. Analysis
1. Due Process
In the facts and circumstances presented here, Petitioner was not denied due process. Petitioner was charged with possession of contraband, namely a cell phone, and was found guilty of the offense. The Kern County Superior Court described why Petitioner's due process rights were not denied in a reasoned decision, stating:
Petitioner, Feaster Foster ("Petitioner"), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 17, 2011 ("petition"). Petitioner complains about a finding of guilt reached in connection with Rules Violation Report, Log No. F6-11-04-005, dated April 5, 2011, for Possession of a Cell Phone. It appears from the record that Petitioner's cell-mate (Ferguson) claimed at the hearing of Log. No. F6-11-04-005 that the cellular phone belonged to him.(Answer, Ex. 2.)
A prisoner is entitled to due process at a disciplinary hearing, but not the same right as a defendant at a criminal trial. (In re Estrada (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1694.) Unlike a guilt finding at a criminal trial, a disciplinary finding requires only "some" supporting evidence to satisfy due process concerns. (Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 455-456, italics added; In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1498.) This standard "does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." (Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 455-456.)
Here, the Senior Hearing Officer based his finding of guilt upon the Reporting Employee's statement confirming that the relevant cell phone was found between the state issued mattress and an egg crate mattress located on bunk 610-2-41L. Bunk 610-2-41L is assigned to Petitioner. Similarly, an altered cell phone charger was found laying on the ground beneath the same bunk. Furthermore, this court notes that the Reporting Employee stated that in order to access the cell phone, he was required to untie the sheet of bed 610-2-41L. Such evidence provides "some" evidence sufficient to support the finding of guilt reached in connection [with] Rules Violation Report, Log No. F6-11-04-005. Although Petitioner has requested that it do so, this court declines to reweigh the credibility or weight of inmate Ferguson's testimony regarding his possession/ownership of the cell phone.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the petition is denied. The petition fails to state a prima facie claim for habeas corpus relief. (See, People v. Duvall (1995) 9 cal. 4th 464, 474.)
The reasoning of the state court in denying Petitioner's claims is not an unreasonable determination of Supreme Court law. Petitioner does not claim that he was denied procedural due process in the form of notice of the hearing, the right to present witnesses or evidence, or a written statement of the decision. Instead Petitioner contends that Respondent failed to show that "some evidence" supported the violation. Petitioner specifically contends that he was not asked about the cell phone at the time of the search, that the investigating employee testified at the hearing that he had to untie Petitioner's bed-sheet to access the phone even though the employee did not include those facts in his written report, and that the hearing officer incorrectly found that inmate Ferguson was unable to provide specific information regarding the phone when questioned. (See generally, Pet.) None of the contentions raised by Petitioner creates a colorable question whether there was some evidence that the cell phone was in Petitioner's possession. The phone was found in his bed. The location of the phone creates a strong inference that the phone was in his possession. While the investigating officer might not have included the detail regarding having to untie the bed-sheet to access the phone in his written report, the employee was interviewed by the hearing officer who was provided an opportunity to determine the employee's credibility. With regard to Ferguson, it is true that he did claim that the phone was his and provide some answers regarding the phone. However, Ferguson was not able to answer other questions about the phone, such as its phone number. (See ECF No. 1 at 23.)
As the cell phone was found in Petitioner's bunk, the hearing officer reasonably inferred that Petitioner possessed the cell phone. Accordingly, the "some evidence" standard has been met. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. Therefore, the state court reasonably concluded there was some evidence to uphold the decision of the hearing officer. To the extent Petitioner presents a due process challenge, the claim lacks merit, and the Court recommends the petition be denied.
2. Equal Protection
Petitioner claims, that he was denied the right to "equal protection of the law" in connection with his prison disciplinary conviction. (See Pet. at 14-16.) Specifically, he alleges that another inmate charged by the same disciplinary officials with possession of a cell phone was not found guilty of the disciplinary violation when, like in his case, another inmate admitted that the cell phone was his.
The Equal Protection Clause "embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly." Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799, (1997) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) and Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)). The Fourteenth Amendment "guarantees equal laws, not equal results." McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)). A habeas petitioner has the burden of alleging facts sufficient to establish "a prima facie case of uneven application." McQueary, 924 F.2d at 835. "[A] mere demonstration of inequality is not enough . . . There must be an allegation of invidiousness or illegitimacy in the statutory scheme before a cognizable claim arises." Id.
Petitioner attaches a copy of a rules violation report to his petition in which inmate Williamson was found guilty of possession of a cell phone when he admitted at a disciplinary hearing for inmate Nunn that he placed a cell phone on inmate Nunn's bed because it was close to a working outlet. (Pet, Ex. C.) Petitioner did not provide any information regarding whether inmate Nunn was not found guilty of the charge in light of inmate Williamson's confession.
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that any other inmate who was similarly situated to him was treated differently, either in terms of the conducting of a prison disciplinary hearing or in the disciplinary sentence he received. Both inmates were subject to the same inmate discipline rules, even if the results of the discipline hearings might have been different. See McQueary, 924 F.2d at 835. While the facts of each case are similar, the exact facts and determinations of witness credibility of each case are different, and therefore the application of the same rules do not necessarily require the same result. However, of greater importance, even if Petitioner has shown inequitable results, he has not alleged that there is "invidiousness or illegitimacy in the statutory scheme." Id.
Although silent, the state courts' rejection of Petitioner's equal protection claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on that claim.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for the writ of habeas corpus be DENIED.
This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(c). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). IT IS SO ORDERED.
Michael J. Seng
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE