Opinion
24-cv-00588 EJD (PR)
07-17-2024
MARTIN LEE FOSTER, Plaintiff, v. BILLIE GIBSON, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
EDWARD J. DAVILA United States District Judge.
Plaintiff, who is currently detained at Monterey County Jail, filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Billie Gibson. Dkt. No. 1. The Court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies in the pleading. Dkt. No. 5. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 7.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Plaintiff's Claims
In the original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that “defendant [Billie Gibson] prosecuted deficient evidence” and “illegal search and seizure [of] mail.” Dkt. No. 1 at 4. He also alleged defendant “submitted a very excessive sentencing offer considered grossly out of proportionate to the severity of no crime [sic],” which involved a “ten year deal with a bail set at sixty thousand dollars.” Id. It appeared that Defendant Gibson was the prosecuting attorney in a state criminal action against Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 5 at 2. The Court advised Plaintiff that a state prosecuting attorney enjoys absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for his conduct in “pursuing a criminal prosecution” insofar as he acts within his role as an “advocate for the State” and his actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id., citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). Accordingly, Plaintiff was advised that any claim against Defendant Gibson for her acts as an “advocate for the State” must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief. Id.
The amended complaint again contains allegations against Defendant Gibson for her conduct in connection with state criminal proceedings. Dkt. No. 7 at 2-3. Plaintiff claims Defendant should have recused herself from prosecuting him and challenges her conduct in the criminal proceedings during which Plaintiff was representing himself. Id. at 3. The challenged conduct includes the offer of a plea deal and the calling of witnesses during a suppression hearing. Id. at 3. However, such conduct was clearly within Defendant's role as an “advocate for the State” in pursuing a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff, which entitles Defendant to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983.
Because Plaintiff was already afforded an opportunity to amend, the Court finds no good cause to grant him another opportunity to amend to attempt to state a cognizable claim. Wagh v. Metris Direct, Inc., 363 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 2003) (district court's discretion to deny leave to amend particularly broad where plaintiff has previously filed an amended complaint); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, this action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the action is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim for relief. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.