Opinion
24A-CR-12
09-16-2024
Dakota Ford, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Steven J. Halbert Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theordore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Marc T. Rothenberg, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D19-2306-CM-16527
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Steven J. Halbert Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theordore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General, Kathy Bradley Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
KENWORTHY, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Dakota Ford appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. He raises two issues for our review: (1) Did the trial court err in excluding witness testimony Ford contends is related to his self-defense claim? and (2) Did the State present sufficient evidence to rebut Ford's claim of self-defense? We affirm.
Ind. Code §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1) (2020).
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In June 2023, Ford and his wife, Mikayla Knorr, had a "temporary arrangement" whereby they lived in a home owned by their friend, John Powell. Tr. Vol. 2 at 19. Powell; his mother, Susan; his grandmother; and another roommate also lived in the home. One evening, Ford heard Powell, Susan, and Powell's grandmother arguing. Ford told Powell to stop yelling at Susan and his grandmother "because it's disrespectful." Id. at 59. Angered by Ford's comment, Powell decided Ford and Knorr were no longer welcome in the home. Powell started to remove Ford and Knorr's personal property from the home and place it in the home's front yard. Ford called Knorr-who was driving home from work-to explain the situation.
[¶3] After Knorr arrived, she and Ford tried to enter the home. Susan let them in the front door, but Powell continued to take their property outside. As this was happening, Ford and Powell were "exchanging words, arguing." Id. at 30. Then Ford "sucker punched" Powell in the nose, knocking him to the ground. Id. Ford's punch caused Powell's nose to bleed and swell. Susan, who was about "[t]en feet, if that" from the incident, saw Ford punch Powell, yelled at the men to stop fighting, and called the police. Id. at 24. Ford and Knorr returned to their car where they waited for the police to arrive.
[¶4] Ford was arrested and charged with Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury. At his bench trial, Ford, Knorr, Powell, and Susan all testified about the incident. Ford and Knorr claimed Powell hit Ford in the back of the neck and grabbed his shirt. Ford's "fight or flight kicked in and because of [his] PTSD," he "hit [Powell] to get him to let go of [his] shirt." Id. at 61-62. Powell and Susan's recollection of the incident was different. They testified Powell did not hit Ford or grab his shirt. Rather, Ford punched Powell during what had been a verbal argument until then.
[¶5] During re-direct examination of Knorr, Ford's counsel asked: "[I]n the time you've known him . . . has [Powell] made a habit of screaming at other people[?]" Id. at 52. Before Knorr could answer, the State objected, claiming the question elicited inadmissible character evidence. After discussing the potentially relevant rules of evidence and hearing very brief argument from each of the parties, the trial court sustained the State's objection. Ford's counsel then began an unrelated line of questioning. The trial court found Ford guilty as charged.
1. Ford waived his evidentiary claim by failing to make an offer of proof.
[¶6] Ford first argues the trial court erred in excluding portions of Knorr's testimony about Powell's character. To preserve an error in the exclusion of a witness's testimony, a defendant must make an offer of proof. Heckard v. State, 118 N.E.3d 823, 828 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied; Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a)(2) (explaining to preserve a claim of error after a trial court's ruling to exclude evidence, a party must inform the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context). "The purpose of an offer of proof is to convey the point of the witness's testimony and provide the trial judge the opportunity to reconsider the evidentiary ruling." Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 642 (Ind. 2008). "A valid offer to prove must explain three points: (1) the testimony's substance; (2) the testimony's relevance; and (3) the grounds for admitting the testimony." Bedolla v. State, 123 N.E.3d 661, 666-67 (Ind. 2019). Failure to make a valid offer of proof results in waiver of the claim on appeal. See West v. State, 755 N.E.2d 173, 184 (Ind. 2001).
[¶7] Ford failed to make an offer of proof after the trial court sustained the State's objection to his question about Powell's alleged "habit of screaming at other people." Tr. Vol. 2 at 52. Ford argued, "I'm asking about specifically his habits, how he normally held himself out to the people around him, including someone who's known him for ten years," and, "I'm not asking about anything in particular . . . just simply, [h]ave you known him to be and do these things?" Id. at 53. Ford therefore did not make the substance of the proffered testimony clear, explain why it was relevant, or provide adequate grounds for the testimony's admissibility. The trial court thus had no opportunity to reconsider its ruling excluding the line of questioning and Ford has waived appellate review of this claim. See Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 754 (Ind. 2002) (concluding the defendant waived appellate review of a trial court ruling excluding evidence, in part because the defendant made no offer of proof).
2. The State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Ford's claim of self-defense.
[¶8] Ford next claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense.
A. Standard of Review
[¶9] "The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self-defense is the same as the standard for any sufficiency of the evidence claim." Wilson v. State, 770 N.E.2d 799, 801 (Ind. 2002). Under this "deferential standard of review . . . we 'neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]'" Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021).
B. The State Rebutted Ford's Self-Defense Claim
[¶10] Ford does not dispute he punched Powell in the nose, causing it to bleed and swell. Rather, Ford claims he acted in self-defense when doing so. A valid claim of self-defense is legal justification for an otherwise criminal act. See Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021). "A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force." I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c) (2019). To prevail on a claim of self-defense, a defendant must show: (1) he acted without fault; (2) he was in a place where he had a right to be; and (3) he had a reasonable fear or apprehension of bodily harm. Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003).
To find Ford guilty as charged, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he knowingly touched Powell in a rude, insolent, or angry manner by striking him in the face, which resulted in bodily injury-a bloody nose and/or swelling-to Powell. See I.C. §§ 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1).
[¶11] Once a defendant claims self-defense, the State bears the burden of disproving at least one of the three elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670. The State may meet this burden by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying on the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999). Whether the State has met its burden is a question of fact for the fact-finder. Id. "We will reverse a conviction only if no reasonable person could say the State overcame the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt." Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670.
[¶12] Here, the State met its burden by presenting evidence that allowed the factfinder to reject Ford's self-defense claim. For example, the fact-finder could have rejected Ford and Knorr's testimony that Powell hit Ford or pulled his shirt and determined Ford was the initial aggressor. See Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 700 (noting self-defense is generally not available to the initial aggressor). The fact-finder could have also found Ford's response if Powell did hit Ford or pull his shirt-punching Powell in the nose-was not a proportionate response to the situation. See Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 670 (noting the defendant's response must be "proportionate to the urgency of the situation") (quoting Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999)). Essentially, Ford asks we substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and accept his and Knorr's account of the incident over Powell's and Susan's. This is a request to reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility, which we cannot do. See Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1195 (observing that weighing conflicting evidence is the exclusive province of the fact-finder).
Conclusion
[¶13] Ford waived his evidentiary claim by failing to make an offer of proof, and the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Ford's claim of self-defense.
[¶14] Affirmed.
Felix, J., and Riley, Sr. J., concur.