Opinion
Record No. 1794-93-4
Decided: October 4, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WARREN COUNTY, Dennis L. Hupp, Judge
Affirmed.
Ron Lewis Napier (Napier, Napier Silek, on briefs), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellees.
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Baker and Fitzpatrick
Pursuant to Code Sec. 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Theresa Ann Ford (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of drunk driving and driving after having been declared an habitual offender. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. We disagree and affirm the convictions.
BACKGROUND
On December 18, 1992, at approximately 1:25 a.m., Sergeant Howard Ryon of the Front Royal Police Department was travelling west on Route 55 when he noticed appellant driving in front of him. Within two-tenths of a mile, Sergeant Ryon twice saw the right-hand tires of appellant's car cross the white line on the right-hand side of the road in a "quick motion." During this time, the car was travelling within the speed limit, and it did not cross the double yellow lines marking the center of the road.
When the car crossed the white line for the second time, Sergeant Ryon, who is trained to recognize driving patterns characteristic of drunk drivers, became suspicious that appellant was intoxicated. He stopped her car, and upon approaching her, smelled alcohol. After further investigation, Sergeant Ryon arrested her for drunk driving and driving after having been declared an habitual offender.
DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
When a motion to suppress is reviewed on appeal, "the burden is on [appellant] to show that the trial court's denial of [her] suppression motion constituted reversible error." DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 583, 359 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985 (1988). A denial will not be disturbed on appeal unless the holding is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. See Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991).
Evidence obtained during a warrantless stop is admissible at trial if the investigating officer can articulate " 'a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual [was] involved in criminal activity.' " Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)). This standard is less stringent than the probable cause requirement for an arrest, because the officer must demonstrate only a reasonable suspicion that a crime may have been occurring. Leeth, 223 Va. at 340, 288 S.E.2d at 478; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,7 (1989).
To determine whether there was reasonable suspicion to make this investigatory stop, we must examine the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of a "reasonable police officer with the knowledge, training, and experience of the investigating officer." Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 144, 384 S.E.2d 125, 128 (1989). The evidence established that Sergeant Ryon stopped appellant only after her car swerved to the right twice within a short distance. His police training and experience taught him that drivers who weave in this manner may be driving drunk. We held previously that "a trained law enforcement officer may identify criminal behavior which would appear innocent to an untrained observer." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 384, 388, 369 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1988) (citation omitted). The record establishes a sufficient basis for the investigatory stop. See, e.g., Hoambrecker v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 511, 512, 412 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1992) (defendant stopped because he was "weaving badly"); Brooks v. Newport News, 224 Va. 311, 313, 295 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1982) (defendant stopped because he was "weaving back and forth across the broken white lines between lanes"). Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court's ruling was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.