Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 114605
Mihara, J.
Plaintiff Ray Byron Ford appeals from a judgment of dismissal for failure to bring his personal injury action against defendants California Department of Corrections (CDC), J. L. Fletes, and R. C. Hernandez to trial within the time prescribed by law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310.) We find no error and affirm.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
I. Statement of Facts
On September 26, 1996, plaintiff was an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison when he was transported in a golf cart from the prison clinic to his housing unit. The golf cart did not have doors or seat belts, but it did have a warning sign that informed passengers to “hold onto seat handle or handrail at all times.” Plaintiff, who was handcuffed, was seated behind the inmate driver. Correctional Officers Hernandez and Fletes were seated behind plaintiff. When the driver made a left turn, plaintiff fell from the vehicle onto the pavement. Medical staff then escorted plaintiff back to the clinic for evaluation. After several X-rays were taken, the radiologist found that there was no evidence of abnormality to plaintiff’s skull, shoulder, and mandibles.
On March 3, 1997, plaintiff submitted a tort claim to the State Board of Control.
On March 4, 1997, plaintiff was involved in a confrontation between inmates and correctional officers. Plaintiff was injured when he was struck on the back and shoulder with a baton. He was transported by ambulance to the clinic for treatment. Plaintiff was later prosecuted and sentenced to an additional six years.
On April 14, 1998, plaintiff filed a complaint nunc pro tunc as of September 24, 1997. In his complaint against the CDC, plaintiff sought general and punitive damages for negligent operation of a vehicle, premises liability, and negligence. On August 3, 1998, the CDC filed an answer. On August 11, 1998, the trial court ordered that Hernandez, Fletes, Lindsey, and Maldonado be served with a copy of the complaint. On August 12, 1998, the trial court denied plaintiff’s request that he be brought to court for a hearing
In October 1998, the parties filed case management reports.
Hernandez and Fletes filed their answers to the complaint. On November 5, 1998, Hernandez and Fletes filed for judgment on the pleadings. On November 30, 1998, plaintiff filed opposition to the motion. The trial court granted the motion as to the motor vehicle cause of action and denied it as to the negligence cause of action.
On December 21, 1998, plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction to remain at Salinas Valley State Prison during the pendency of the action. The trial court denied the motion on January 8, 1999.
On December 28, 1998, Maldonado filed a demurrer to the complaint. After the trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, plaintiff filed an amended complaint.
In February 1999, the parties filed case management reports. Plaintiff stated that not all defendants had been served, discovery was incomplete, and he intended to file a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff did not know when the case would be ready for trial and he requested that the court schedule a settlement conference.
On June 25, 1999, the trial court overruled Maldonado’s demurrer to the amended complaint. On July 13, 1999, Maldonado filed his answer to the amended complaint.
In July and August 1999, the parties filed supplemental case management reports. Plaintiff stated that discovery had not been completed, he intended to file pre-trial motions, and he would be ready for trial in December 1999. Plaintiff also requested that the trial court schedule a settlement conference. Plaintiff then informed the trial court that he would be incarcerated until 2010 and that he sought compensatory damages of $250,000, punitive damages of $450,000, attorney’s fees and costs. In December 1999, the parties filed supplemental case management reports. Plaintiff indicated that discovery had not yet been completed, the case would be ready for trial at the completion of discovery, and a settlement was possible. Plaintiff also requested a settlement conference.
On January 7, 2000, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery as to “the owner’s manual, the operator’s instructions & records of any other accidents.”
On May 30, 2000, defendants made an offer of $400 to settle the case. Plaintiff rejected the offer.
In May, July, and August 2000, the parties filed supplemental case management reports. Plaintiff again indicated that discovery had not been completed, he would be ready for trial when discovery was completed, he requested a settlement conference, and a settlement was possible.
On September 6, 2000, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On October 23, 2000, the trial court denied the motion, finding that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the CDC was negligent, whether the CDC had a duty to plaintiff, and the amount of damages.
Meanwhile, in September 2000, the trial court ordered that supplemental case management reports be filed. These reports were “to include whether the matter should be stayed pending release or specific recommendations and authorities on how the trial shall be conducted while plaintiff is incarcerated.” In December 2000, the parties filed supplemental case management reports. Plaintiff indicated that he did not want the action stayed until he was released from prison. He provided the trial court with alternatives, including the appointment of counsel, transferring him to court, and holding the trial in prison. Defendants indicated that the case would be ready for trial when plaintiff was released from prison.
On March 27, 2001, the trial court ordered the parties to “submit detailed declarations and authorities as to the status of the case and appropriate method of resolution under Payne vs. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d [__] and Yarbrough vs. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 197.”
On May 9, 2001, defendants filed their response to the trial court’s order, arguing that plaintiff was not entitled to the appointment of counsel. On June 4, 2001, plaintiff filed his response in which he claimed that he was entitled to the appointment of counsel.
On April 8, 2002, plaintiff filed a request for partial judgment, claiming that defendants had conceded damages in May 2001. On April 12, 2002, defendants filed opposition to the request. Defendants pointed out that plaintiff had misunderstood and misrepresented their arguments. They pointed out that plaintiff could not state a claim for special damages, because his alleged medical costs were provided by defendants and plaintiff had not suffered any wage loss. Defendants conceded that plaintiff might be able to state a claim for general damages, but the issue of whether he could do so and the amount of any such damages was still to be determined by a jury. On April 15, 2002, the trial court denied plaintiff’s request.
Plaintiff continues to claim in his briefs that defendants conceded damages and that they requested that judgment be entered against them. The record does not support his claim.
On August 13, 2002, plaintiff rejected defendants’ offer of $501 pursuant to section 998.
On August 8, 2003, plaintiff filed a request for conference.
On December 29, 2003, plaintiff filed a request for an appointment of counsel. On January 12, 2004, defendants filed opposition to the request for counsel.
On December 6, 2004, plaintiff filed a request on the status of the case.
On July 21, 2005, plaintiff notified the trial court that his status as a state prisoner had not changed.
On January 17, 2006, the trial court informed the parties that it would dismiss the case pursuant to section 583.360 unless the parties filed a motion with the court.
On February 22, 2006, plaintiff filed his motion in which he stated that he was still an inmate and his scheduled release date was in 2010. Plaintiff continued to maintain that defendants had conceded liability and indicated that he was waiting for the trial court to respond to documents that he had filed. After defendants filed opposition to the motion, the trial court dismissed the case.
II. Discussion
“An action shall be brought to trial within five years after the action is commenced against the defendant.” (§ 583.310.) Section 583.360 states: “(a) An action shall be dismissed by the court on its own motion or on motion of the defendant, after notice to the parties, if the action is not brought to trial within the time prescribed in this article. [¶] (b) The requirements of this article are mandatory and are not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.”
Here, plaintiff filed his complaint effective September 24, 1997. Absent application of a statutory exception, the five-year mandatory deadline expired on September 24, 2002.
Plaintiff contends that his incarceration hindered his ability to prosecute his case.
In computing the five-year period, the trial court excludes the time during which bringing the action to trial was “impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340, subd. (c).) “The determination whether it was ‘impossible, impracticable, or futile’ to bring a case to trial within a given time period is generally fact specific, depending on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.” (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438.) It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that “every reasonable effort [was made] to bring a case to trial within five years, even during the last month of its statutory life.” (Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1532.) “[T]here must be a causal connection between the circumstance upon which plaintiff relies and the failure to satisfy the five-year requirement.” (Sierra Nevada Memorial-Miners Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 464, 473.) This court reviews the trial court’s ruling on whether the impossibility exception applies under the abuse of discretion standard. (Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1271.)
Here the record establishes that plaintiff’s incarceration had no effect on his ability to prosecute the action. Plaintiff successfully filed numerous court documents, including opposition to motions brought by the CDC, a motion for preliminary injunction, a motion to compel discovery, a motion for summary judgment, and several case management reports. His documents demonstrated familiarity with legal principles and the facts of his claims. However, plaintiff did not request that the trial court stay his action until he was paroled. He also did not request a trial date. Had he done so, the trial court would then have been required to determine the manner in which the case would proceed. Since plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in prosecuting his claim, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action.
Plaintiff also asserts that he was waiting for the trial court to rule on various matters. He points out that the trial court did not rule on his August 8, 2003, request for a conference and his December 29, 2003, request for counsel. Any error was harmless, because these requests occurred after the five-year deadline. He also refers to the March 27, 2001 order requesting briefing on the status of the case and the manner of proceeding. However, as previously noted, the trial court was not required to make this determination until plaintiff requested a trial date. Plaintiff next refers to his requests for settlement conferences. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to schedule settlement conferences when discovery had not yet been completed.
Plaintiff’s reliance on Brown v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 197 is misplaced. In Brown, the court did not consider whether the plaintiff’s incarceration made it impractical or futile to pursue her action, because it found that she did not act diligently after her release. (Id. at p. 199.) Here, plaintiff demonstrated that he was capable of pursuing his action despite his incarceration. The case of Grasso v. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 597 is also inapposite. At issue in Grasso was the interpretation of former section 352, which tolled the statute of limitations when a party was incarcerated. (Id. at pp. 598-599.) No such statutory language is present in this case.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court dropped the case from the calendar on August 14, 1998, thus tolling the five-year rule of section 583.310. Plaintiff refers to a minute order that dropped defendants’ demurrer from the law and motion calendar. Since there is no evidence that the complaint was removed from the trial court’s active calendar, we reject plaintiff’s argument.
Plaintiff next contends that he has been deprived of his federal constitutional rights to pursue his claim in court. (U.S. Const., 1st & 14th Amends.) We find no merit in this contention. As the record amply demonstrated, plaintiff had the opportunity to, and did, exercise his constitutional rights to pursue legal redress for his claims during the early stages of the proceedings. The fact that he then failed to bring his action to trial did not constitute a deprivation of his constitutional rights.
III. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Duffy, J.