Opinion
2020-953 N C
03-03-2022
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Respondent, v. Christopher HOOKER, Appellant.
Christopher Hooker, appellant pro se. Rubin & Rothman, LLC (Michael K. Johnson of counsel), for respondent.
Christopher Hooker, appellant pro se.
Rubin & Rothman, LLC (Michael K. Johnson of counsel), for respondent.
PRESENT: JERRY GARGUILO, P.J., TIMOTHY S. DRISCOLL, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.
ORDERED that so much of the appeal as is from so much of the order as denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking leave to reargue its prior motion to vacate a judgment of that court entered July 12, 2004 is dismissed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order, insofar as reviewed, is affirmed, without costs.
In this action to recover for breach of an automobile lease agreement, a judgment was entered on July 12, 2004 awarding plaintiff the sum of $14,828.13 upon defendant's failure to appear or answer the complaint. On March 16, 2017, defendant moved to vacate the 2004 default judgment on the ground that he had never been personally served with process. By order entered August 18, 2017, the District Court denied the motion. This court affirmed that order by decision and order dated December 13, 2018 ( Ford Motor Credit Co. v Hooker , 62 Misc 3d 129[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51877[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018]) and denied defendant's motion to reargue the appeal or in the alternative, for leave to appeal to the Appellate Division, by decision and order on motion dated May 7, 2019 ( Ford Motor Credit Co. v Hooker , 2019 NY Slip Op 70524[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2019]).
Defendant subsequently moved to vacate the 2004 default judgment on the ground that he had never been personally served with process or, in the alternative, on the ground that more than 10 years had elapsed before plaintiff attempted to collect on the judgment. The District Court denied the motion by order entered October 22, 2020.
The branch of defendant's motion seeking to vacate the default judgment based upon lack of personal jurisdiction sought, in effect, leave to reargue defendant's original motion. So much of the appeal as is from so much of the October 22, 2020 order as denied that branch of the order is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument (see D'Alessandro v Carro , 123 AD3d 1 [2014] ; CPLR 2221 [e] [2] ).
The court properly denied the branch of defendant's motion seeking to vacate the judgment on the ground that more than 10 years had elapsed before plaintiff sought to enforce the judgment. A plaintiff has 20 years to collect a money judgment (see CPLR 211 [b] ; First NY Bank for Bus. v Alexander , 106 AD3d 138 [2013] ).
Accordingly, the order, insofar as reviewed, is affirmed.
GARGUILO, P.J., DRISCOLL and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.