Foote v. Spiegel

795 Citing cases

  1. Archuleta v. Wagner

    523 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2008)   Cited 366 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that, in the motion to dismiss posture, a court must "accept as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations"

    Tenth Circuit law is far more nuanced, however, and makes clear that the circumstances alleged in this case do not provide justification for a strip search. See Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1425 (10th Cir. 1997); Cottrell v. Kaysville City, Utah, 994 F.2d 730, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1993); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984). The Fourth Amendment "requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails."

  2. Robbins v. Wilkie

    433 F.3d 755 (10th Cir. 2006)   Cited 51 times
    Noting difference in qualified immunity between motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment

    Therefore, a portion of a district court order denying qualified immunity is not immediately appealable insofar as the order determines plaintiff's claims are supported by sufficient evidence in the record or disputed issues of material fact exist which preclude summary judgment. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313, 115 S.Ct. 2151; Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997). The district court's denial of qualified immunity in the present case turned on both issues of abstract law and evidentiary sufficiency.

  3. Westover v. Hindman

    Civil Action Nos. 97-3163-GTV, 97-3195-GTV (D. Kan. Aug. 29, 2002)   Cited 1 times

    "Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the constitutional violation." Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). A plaintiff must allege facts that establish an affirmative link between a particular defendant's conduct and the alleged constitutional violation.

  4. Benshoof v. Layton

    351 F. App'x 274 (10th Cir. 2009)   Cited 25 times
    Finding objective element satisfied where plaintiff was forced to remain in cell with stinging fire ants for six days

    See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-30, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Thus we may review both whether a constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2008), and whether, taking the plaintiffs allegations as true, the defendant violated clearly established law, see Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d at 1214; Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997). However, a defendant denied qualified immunity "may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a `genuine' issue of fact for trial."

  5. Johnson v. Martin

    195 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 1999)   Cited 116 times
    Holding that defendants' argument regarding supervisory liability was reviewable on interlocutory appeal

    In particular, the Court held, "a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a `genuine' issue of fact for trial." Id. at 319-320; see also Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining Johnson). The Johnson Court explained that when the district court's summary judgment ruling merely determines the sufficiency of the evidence offered by the plaintiff in response to the defendant's factual assertions, the appeal is unlikely to involve the kind of abstract legal issues separate from the fact-related issues that will arise at trial.

  6. Clanton v. Cooper

    129 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 1997)   Cited 216 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding promise of leniency coupled with misrepresentations about the evidence against the suspect were coercive enough to render statements involuntary

    "Orders denying qualified immunity before trial are appealable to the extent they resolve abstract issues of law." Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S.Ct. 834, 842 (1996), and Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 312-14 (1995)). More specifically:

  7. McGinnes v. Rothrock

    No. 23-CV-0120-TCK-SH (N.D. Okla. Dec. 7, 2023)

    Personal liability “under § 1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997).

  8. Green v. Layden

    Case No. CIV-18-0025-R (W.D. Okla. Dec. 6, 2018)

    Moreover, when Plaintiff awoke, the officers testified that "[his] taste buds were raised and [he] had a green tint to [his] tongue"—indicia of recent marijuana usage, in light of the officers' experience. Id. at 3; see also Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for officer in action regarding a drug-related arrest premised, in part, on officer's observation of green tint to defendant's tongue). Upon these specific and articulable facts, the officers would have had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for violating state law and to search Plaintiff's vehicle under the plain view and automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement.

  9. Chavez v. City of Albuquerque

    No. 13cv00557 WJ/SMV (D.N.M. Apr. 14, 2014)

    The law is clear in the Tenth Circuit that "[i]ndividual liability under §1983 must be based on personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation." Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997); Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). "Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."

  10. Pieri v. Corr. Med. Servs.

    No. CV 11-1054 RB/CG (D.N.M. Oct. 24, 2012)   Cited 1 times
    Adopting a magistrate judge's conclusion that a claim raised for the first time in response to a Martinez Report should be denied as an untimely, prejudicial request to amend a complaint

    (Doc. 46 at 11-14). See Poolaw v. Marcantel, 565 F.3d 721, 732 (10th Cir. 2009); Foote v.Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff acknowledges that it was a nurse practitioner, not one of the Defendant doctors, who resumed the Valproic Acid prescription, thus, Plaintiff has not shown that any of the Defendants had any personal involvement in the harmful behavior.