Opinion
Civil Action 1:22-cv-00919 (UNA)
05-16-2022
FERNANDO FONTANEZ, Plaintiffs, v. BOEING CORPORATION, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TREVOR N. MCFADDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff's pro se complaint, ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The court will grant the in forma pauperis application and dismiss the case for the reasons explained herein.
Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, attempts to bring this action as a “shareholder derivative action on behalf of Boeing Corporation against it[]s CEO Dave Calhoun and Board of Directors for breach of fiduciary duty and violation of civil securities laws.” The prolix complaint totals 169 pages and is quite difficult to follow. He broadly alleges that Boeing officials have violated various antifraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts.
First, pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). “A confused and rambling narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F.Supp.3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The instant complaint satisfies this standard. Plaintiff alleges that, through his own “analytical research, ” he has discovered that Boeing has “squandered intentionally” “multibillions” of dollars and has ignored “100 billion dollars from plaintiff Fernando Fontanez.” He further contends that Boeing has been “false[ly] misleading in [its] annual reports [, ] failing to disclose the guaranteed monies to the corporation [and] enhancing Boeing Corporation[']s financial position drastically while aiding the U.S. government, all American corporations, all Americans, the global stock market[, ] and global business ventures.” He demands unspecified damages and seeks “a meeting between plaintiff and Boeing Corporation to appropriate the monies to Boeing Corporation and the U.S. Government et al.” These ambiguous and disordered allegations fail to meet the minimal pleading requirements of Federal Rule 8(a). And because plaintiff has alleged fraud, his claims must not only meet this minimum standard, but must also meet the heightened pleading standard prescribed by Fed. Ri. Civ. P. 9, which the complaint patently fails to do. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9; United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
Second, pro se litigants can represent only themselves in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . ”); Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual “not a member of the bar of any court . . . may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in [federal] court as counsel for others”) (citation and footnote omitted); see also U.S. ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F.Supp.2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[A] class member cannot represent the class without counsel, because a class action suit affects the rights of the other members of the class”) (citing Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir.1975)), affd sub nom. Rockefeller ex rel. U.S. v. Washington TRU Solutions LLC, No. 037120, 2004 WL 180264 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2004); DeBrew v. Atwood, 792 F.3d 118, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (same) (citing Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff is a Boeing shareholder, as a pro se litigant, he is nonetheless prohibited from bringing a shareholder derivative suit. See, e.g., United States v. High Country Broad. Co., 3 F.3d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding a shareholder's request to intervene pro se was just a means to avoid the requirement that a corporation be represented by counsel and thus impermissible); Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411-15 (2d Cir. 1976) (“Since a corporation may not appear except through an attorney, likewise the representative shareholder cannot appear without an attorney.”); Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1997) (same). And even if plaintiff could bring this type of suit pro se, he has neither satisfied the prerequisites to filing this kind of suit, nor the specific pleading requirements. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.1(a)-(b).
In his in forma pauperis application plaintiff does not list any Boeing stock. See generally, ECF No. 2.
For all of these reasons, the complaint will be dismissed. Plaintiff's motion for CM/ECF password, ECF No. 5, will be denied as moot.
A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.