Opinion
No. 3:02-CV-1457-D
August 28, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b), and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, the subject cause has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: Type of Case: This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Parties: Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID) in Iowa Park, Texas. Respondent is the Director of the TDCJ-ID. No process has been issued in this case.
Statement of Case: In 1993, Petitioner pled nob contendere to the offense of delivery of a controlled substance in a Judicial District Court in Dallas County, Texas, Cause No. F-93-39503-KV. Punishment was assessed at ten years imprisonment. (Petition at ¶¶ 1-5).
In this action, Petitioner does not challenge his conviction. Instead, he challenges disciplinary sanction No. 20010049171, which he received at the Goree Unit of TDCJ-ID on October 26, 2000. (Petition ¶¶ 17-18). He received the following punishment as a result of the disciplinary action taken: (1) 42 hours of extra duty; (2) solitary confinement for fifteen days, and (3) reduction in his class status from L-1 to L-2. (Id. ¶ 18). Prior to filing this action, Petitioner exhausted his administrative remedies. (Id. ¶ 19).
Petitioner initially filed this habeas action on November 19, 2001, in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, where the Gore Unit is located. On June 21, 2002, the Southern District transferred the action to this court in accordance with the mandate in Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 962-63 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that Southern District of Texas lacked jurisdiction to hear a state prisoner's petition challenging constitutionality of prison disciplinary hearing, even though disciplinary proceeding occurred within that district, since TDCJ-ID was not a state court whose actions could be the basis for jurisdiction under federal habeas statute, and prisoner was not convicted, sentenced, or incarcerated within the Southern District).
Prior to and following the transfer of this action, Petitioner twice amended his petition to challenge only one of the three disciplinary proceedings which he received at the Gore Unit.
Liberally construed, the amended petition alleges that the decision of the disciplinary officer violates Petitioner's due process rights.
Findings and Conclusions: Rule 4, of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, provides that "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibit annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified."
"Federal habeas relief cannot be had `absent the allegation by a [petitioner] that he or she has been deprived of some right secured to him or her by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States.'" Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotingOrellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995)). The instant petition does not present any cognizable basis for habeas corpus relief.
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a habeas corpus petition is the sole remedy for a state prisoner challenging the forfeiture of accrued good-time credits as a result of a disciplinary charge. Id. at 500; see also In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1998) (relying on Preiser v. Rodriguez to hold that a prisoner may seek redress for the loss of good-time credits following a prison disciplinary proceeding only through a habeas petition). Specifically, the Court stated "[w]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) ("habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release").
Relying on the above holding, the Fifth Circuit has reiterated that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus permits a petitioner to seek immediate or earlier release from custody, whereas a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the proper avenue to challenge unconstitutional conditions of confinement and prison procedures. See Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1997); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (prisoner cannot in a § 1983 action challenge the fact or duration of his confinement or recover good time credits lost in prisoner disciplinary action); Spicer v. Collins, 9 F. Supp.2d 673, 685 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (civil rights action challenging disciplinary sanction which resulted only in cell and commissary restriction for ten days was properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Petitioner did not lose previously earned good-time credits because of the disciplinary sanction in this case. Nor is he seeking immediate or speedier release. While he complains that the change in his custodial status (from line-class one to line-class two) has affected the earning of good-time credits and, hence, his entitlement to speedier release, his contention is meritless. The Fifth Circuit has held that the effect of a change in a prisoner's good-time earning status on the timing of his release on mandatory supervision is too speculative to afford him a constitutionally cognizable "right" to a particular time-earning status.See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Petitioner's due process claims challenging the disciplinary proceeding are not cognizable in this habeas corpus action. Id. at 957-58 (a challenge to a disciplinary proceeding presents a cognizable constitutional violation only when a prisoner, eligible, for mandatory supervision release, has lost good-time credits). The District Court should summarily dismiss the petition with prejudice. RECOMMENDATION:
The same holds true with regard to any expectation of release on parole. See Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that because it is entirely speculative whether a prisoner will be released on parole, there is no constitutional expectancy to parole in Texas); see also Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957.
Even if Petitioner had properly brought this habeas corpus action, he would not be entitled to habeas relief. None of the sanctions which he received for the disciplinary conviction in this case deprived him of a protected liberty interest, and as such he was not entitled to due process protection in the course of the disciplinary proceedings. It is now well established that fifteen days of solitary confinement does not deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995), the Supreme Court concluded that "segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might conceivably create a liberty interest." On the basis ofSandin, the Fifth Circuit has found that "`administrative segregation, without more, simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.'" Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612, 613 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (1995)) (addressing claim that confinement in administrative segregation violated prisoner's due process rights). The Fifth Circuit has also rejected a state prisoner's claim that the additional restrictions imposed on those in administrative segregation violated his due process rights. Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). It stated "`absent extraordinary circumstances, administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life of a prisoner, will never be a ground for constitutional claim because it simply does not constitute a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest.'" Id. at 580 (quotation omitted).
Nor did the forty-two hours of extra duty deprive Petitioner of a protected liberty interest. Extra-duty hours are no different than commissary and recreation restrictions, which have been held not to impose a significant or atypical hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Madison, 104 F.3d at 768.
Additionally, as noted previously, the reduction in good-time earning status does not raise a due process issue. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 959;see also Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992) (a prisoner has no inherent constitutional right to any particular classification or custody levell).
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the District Court summarily dismiss the petition for habeas corpus relief. See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
A copy of this recommendation will be mailed to Petitioner.
NOTICE
In the event that you wish to object to this recommendation, you are hereby notified that you must file your written objections within ten days after being served with a copy of this recommendation. Pursuant toDouglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), a party's failure to file written objections to these proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within such ten-day period may bar a de novo determination by the district judge of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar such party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the district court.