However, "a district court, in exercising the discretionary power permitted by Rule 4(f)(3), may require the plaintiff to show that they have 'reasonably attempted to effectuate service on defendant and that the circumstances are such that the district court's intervention is necessary to obviate the need to undertake methods of service that are unduly burdensome or that are untried but likely futile.'" FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 534 (E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting Ryan v. Brunswick, 2002 WL 1628933, *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)). Plaintiff's efforts to find Defendant Pacheco and serve Defendant IntangibleSpring, as detailed supra and in the Court's prior memorandum opinion (Royaltystat, LLC v. IntangibleSpring Corp., No. CV PX 15-3940, 2017 WL 219372 (D. Md. Jan. 19, 2017), ECF No. 36), satisfy the Court's requirement.

Guthmiller, 2014 WL 2600362, at *4 (authorizing service on a domestic defendant where defendant had notice of the suit through his attorney); FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 536 (E.D. Va. 2005) (authorizing service on a defendant's attorney under Rule 4(f)(3) because his many motions evidenced that defendant had some form of notice of the action).

Thus, before permitting alternate service, "a district court, in exercising the discretionary power permitted by Rule 4(f)(3), may require the plaintiff to show that they have 'reasonably attempted to effectuate service on defendant and that the circumstances are such that the district court's intervention is necessary to obviate the need to undertake methods of service that are unduly burdensome or that are untried but likely futile.'" FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 534 (E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting Ryan v. Brunswick, No. 02-CV-0133E(F), 2002 WL 1628933, *2 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)).

See Calista Enterprises , 40 F.Supp.3d at 1376 ("Of Tenza's proposed methods of service, substituted service upon Mr. Zhukov's domestic attorneys is the least problematic. Such service would be complete within the United States and would therefore not trigger the Hague Service Convention"); FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra , 228 F.R.D. 531, 534 (E.D. Va. 2005) ("Since service is being requested on defense counsel, whose office is located in Richmond, Virginia, the Hague Convention does not apply"). The Court agrees with Phoenix and the above cited cases that service on an attorney located in the United States would not implicate the Hague Convention; thus, such a method of service does not run afoul of the Convention.

Following the reasoning of Volkswagenwerk, several federal courts have authorized service under Rule 4(f)(3) on domestic counsel as involuntary agents for their clients abroad. See, e.g., Richmond Techs., Inc. v. Aumtech Bus. Solutions, 2011 WL 2607158, at *13 (N.D.Cal. July 1, 2011) (authorizing service on domestic counsel for defendants located in India, a signatory to the Convention); FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 534–35 (E.D.Va.2005) (authorizing service on domestic counsel for defendant in Pakistan, a signatory to the Convention). See generally Richmond Techs.,2011 WL 2607158, at *13 (collecting more cases).

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. See also FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 533 (E.D. Va. 2005)("Under Rule 4(c)(3) the court has the power to approve any method of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice to [the defendant].").FMAC Loan Receivables, 228 F.R.D. at 534.

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. See also FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 533 (E.D. Va. 2005)("Under Rule 4(c)(3) the court has the power to approve any method of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice to [the defendant]."). FMAC Loan Receivables, 228 F.R.D. at 534.

For service under Rule 4(f)(3) to be proper, it need only be (1) directed by the court, and (2) not prohibited by international agreement, including the Hague Convention. FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 534 (E.D. Va. 2005). "`[T]he task of determining when the particularities and necessities of a given case require alternate service of process' is placed squarely within the sound discretion of the district court." See Studio A Entm't, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5883, at *6 (quoting Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, 231 F.R.D. 483, 486 (N.D. W. Va. 2005)).

In Rio Properties, the court held that service on the defendant's attorney was appropriate there because the attorney had been specifically consulted regarding the lawsuit and it "seemed clear" that the attorney was in contact with the client. Id. at 1017; see also FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 2005).

foreign defendant and the lawyer. See, e.g.,Kuklachev v. Gelfman, No. 08 Civ. 2214, 2008 WL 5068860, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2008) (prohibiting service on counsel where counsel did not represent defendants and plaintiffs failed to indicate that counsel had " any particular relationship to defendants that would make him likely to apprise defendants of the action" ); Ehrenfeld v. Salim a Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641, 2005 WL 696769, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.23, 2005) (authorizing service on foreign defendant's United States counsel where counsel was " in communication with Defendant in relation to the pending legal proceedings in the United States ... and will know how to locate Defendant" ); see alsoRio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017 (authorizing service on foreign defendant's United States counsel where the attorney " had been specifically consulted by [the defendant] regarding this lawsuit" ); FMAC Loan Receivables v. Dagra, 228 F.R.D. 531, 534 (E.D.Va.2005) (authorizing service on foreign defendant's United States lawyer where defendant had been " in constant communications with his attorney" ). Given the absence of communication between Steptoe & Johnson and Rwabwogo and Adabla, serving Steptoe & Johnson would not provide notice reasonably calculated to apprise Rwabwogo and Adabla of the pendency of this action.