[A] landlord's breach of his covenant to repair generally the demised premises (as distinguished from an agreement to make specific repairs) does not render him liable for damages for personal injuries to the tenant or one in privity with him, unless it appears that at the time of the demise the premises contained, to the landlord's knowledge, dangerous hidden defects unknown to or concealed from the tenant, which the tenant could not have discovered by a voluntary inspection.Ford v. Pythian Bondholders Protective Committee, 1955, 223 Miss. 630, 78 So.2d 743, 749; Wilbourn v. Hardin, Miss. 1970, 234 So.2d 606; Floyd v. Lusk, Miss. 1966, 190 So.2d 451; Rich v. Swalm, 1931, 161 Miss. 505, 137 So. 325. Where, as here, there is no evidence of concealment or fraud, a landlord can be held liable only for actual repairs that are negligently performed, Kassis v. Perronne, Miss. 1968, 209 So.2d 444; Green v. Long, 1928, 152 Miss. 117, 118 So. 705, or for failure to perform an agreement, supported by consideration to effect specific repairs, Hodges v. Hilton, 1935, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686. In Ford v. Pythian Bondholders Protective Committee, supra, the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically declined to adopt Restatement 2d, Torts, § 357 as a statement of Mississippi law.
Loflin v. Thornton, 394 So. 2d 905, 907 (Miss. 1981); Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So. 2d 451 (Miss. 1966); Weldon v. Lehmann, 84 So. 2d 796 (1956). As Plaintiff has failed to meet the threshold requirement to establish a claim under the ADA, Plaintiff's negligence claims related to that statute are dismissed.
A landlord does not ordinarily bear liability for injury to a third party resulting from defects in the demised premises. Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So.2d 451, 452-53 (Miss. 1966). See, generally, 49 Am.Jur.2d §§ 55, 56, Landlord and Tenant (a party's residence may arise from landlord-tenant relationship or employer-employee relationship).
1981). Only where there is an agreement for specific repairs will a breach of that agreement impose liability for personal injury. Loflin, 394 So.2d at 906 (citing Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1966); Weldon v. Lehmann, 226 Miss. 600, 84 So.2d 796 (1956); Ford v. Pythian Bondholders Protective Comm., 223 Miss. 630, 78 So.2d 743 (1955); Hodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935)). A landlord/lessor has no obligation to make repairs to leased premises at all, even if they are necessary, in the absence of a contract to do so.
Hiller v. Wiley, Miss., 5 So.2d 489 (1942); McDonald v. Wilmut Gas Oil Co., 180 Miss. 350, 176 So. 395 (1937); Rich v. Swalm, 161 Miss. 505, 137 So. 325 (1931). In the absence of an express agreement between the landlord and tenant to make repairs, there is no obligation or duty upon the landlord to do so, and only where there is an agreement for specific repairs will a breach of that agreement impose liability for personal injury. Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1966); Waldon v. Lehmann, 224 Miss. 600, 80 So.2d 796 (1956); Ford v. Pythian Bond Holders ProtectiveComm., 223 Miss. 630, 78 So.2d 743 (1955); Hodges v. Hilton, 173 Miss. 343, 161 So. 686 (1935). The proof, without contradiction, shows the following:
The real issue is whether Hurst, lessor, is liable to a third party invitee for injuries received on premises leased to another wherein he, the lessor, had covenanted to keep the premises in "good condition" for the term of the lease. Appellant relies on Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1966), in which this Court held a landlord not liable for injuries to a third person from defects in the premises absent evidence that the landlord created a nuisance calculated to cause damage or injury, or was guilty of a willful, wrong, culpable negligence, or concealment or fraud as to some defect on the premises. He contends this principle applies to the present facts.
A motion for a directed verdict encompasses testimony of the plaintiff and its favorable inferences, whereas, the evidence considered on a request for a peremptory instruction or a judgment n.o.v. embraces the testimony on behalf of the plaintiff as well as that of the defendant, there being no difference between that considered for a peremptory instruction and a judgment n.o.v. since the latter is entertained only to correct the court's error in refusing a requested peremptory instruction. Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1966); and Palmer v. Gardner, 226 Miss. 123, 83 So.2d 800 (1955). An incongruity, however, arises from our decisions since we have held the test for a directed verdict is the same as that for a peremptory instruction or a judgment n.o.v.
A motion for a directed verdict encompasses testimony of the plaintiff and its favorable inferences, whereas, the evidence considered on a request for a peremptory instruction or a judgment n.o.v. embraces the testimony on behalf of the plaintiff as well as that of the defendant, there being no difference between that considered for a peremptory instruction and a judgment n.o.v. since the latter is entertained only to correct the court's error in refusing a requested peremptory instruction. Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1966); and Palmer v. Gardner, 226 Miss. 123, 83 So.2d 800 (1955). An incongruity, however, arises from our decisions since we have held the test for a directed verdict is the same as that for a peremptory instruction or a judgment n.o.v. This has been compounded by our language indicating that the consideration of a peremptory instruction or judgment n. o.v. is restricted to the "sole" evidence of the plaintiff when in fact there is other evidence.
No question is raised as to procedure, which in substance and effect, amounted to a renewal of appellee's motion for a directed verdict. Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1966); Palmer v. Gardner, 226 Miss. 123, 83 So.2d 800 (1955). The inquiry on appeal, therefore, must be addressed to the sufficiency of the evidence, viewed most favorably to appellant, to create a factual issue for the jury as to whether or not publication of the photograph by appellee was an actionable libel of Perkins for which he is entitled to recover damages.
The case was affirmed as the law of this State. Floyd v. Lusk, 190 So.2d 451 (Miss. 1966) followed Ford. The heading of this case is: Action against landlord for personal injuries.