Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-1765 SECTION "N"
May 10, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by defendant, Lakeview Regional Medical Center ("Lakeview"). For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Laurie Flowers (individually and on behalf of her minor son, Joshua) brings this medical malpractice action against defendants, Lakeview, Scott Striplin, M.D., and Jacqueline Terrebonne, R.N. . Plaintiff alleges that defendants caused a brachial plexus injury to Joshua during the baby's delivery. Lakeview now moves to have the claims against it dismissed on summary judgment.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
"A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Roberts v. Cardinal Services. Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 1357 (2002). "An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Id. "A factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 762 (2001). In making this determination, "`the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.'" Id. at 764 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). It "must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe, and should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached." Roberts, 266 F.3d at 373.
Joshua's delivery was complicated by a shoulder dystocia (after the baby's head entered the birth canal, his shoulder became wedged and blocked the delivery of the rest of his body). Plaintiff's allegation of negligence against Lakeview is that Ms. Terrebonne applied fundal pressure (pressure to the uterine fundus — i.e., the uppermost portion of the uterus, generally above the umbilicus) after the baby's head had been delivered. Ms. Terrebonne, Dr. Striplin, and plaintiff's expert all agree that fundal pressure is inappropriate after the head is delivered, at least where presented with shoulder dystocia. (Opp. Memo, Exh. 1 at p. 113, Exh. 2 at p. 31, Exh. 6 at p. 32). According to plaintiffs expert, such pressure could have pressed the shoulder further into the symphysis pubis (joint of the pelvic bones), making it even harder for the shoulder to emerge with the rest of the body. (Opp. Memo, Exh.2 at p. 34). Fundal pressure before the baby's head was delivered, on the other hand, would have been neither harmful nor beneficial, according to plaintiff's expert. Id. at pp. 42, 44. And, suprapubic pressure (below the umbilicus, just above the bladder bone) would have been an appropriate response to the shoulder dystocia. Id. at pp. 40-41. Lakeview argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff can produce no evidence that Ms. Terrebonne applied fundal (as opposed to suprapubic) pressure after the head was delivered (as opposed to before). The Court disagrees.
Plaintiff also makes a more nebulous assertion regarding a chaotic environment and missing equipment in the delivery room. However, the purported causal connection between these alleged occurrences and the injury is unclear.
Plaintiff testified in her deposition: (1) that Dr. Striplin asked for a suction and then asked for forceps, (2) that Ms. Terrebonne left the delivery room to try to find forceps, and (3) that after she returned, Dr. Striplin told her to apply pressure, at which time she began pushing on plaintiff's ribs. (Opp.Memo, Exh. 3 at pp. 4045, 84-85. 91-92). Plaintiff testified that Ms. Terrebonne had also applied pressure before the search for missing equipment, but that she "really remembers" feeling it after that incident. Id. at pp. 110-111. Interpreting this testimony to mean that Ms. Terrebonne applied pressure only "during the time that Dr. Striplin was requesting the suction equipment," Lakeview argues that the pressure must have been applied before the head was delivered, since there would have been no need for a suction machine after the head had been delivered. Granted, plaintiffs deposition testimony is far from straightforward and even contains apparent contradictions. Based on this, a jury might reasonably discredit plaintiff's testimony. This Court, however, is required to give credence to plaintiff's testimony and draw from it all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in her favor. See Hunt, 277 F.3d at 764; Roberts, 266 F.3d at 373. The inference Lakeview draws from plaintiff's testimony is not the only reasonable one that may be drawn. Particularly when considered in conjunction with plaintiff's mother's testimony that the baby's head was visible even before Dr. Striplin arrived, plaintiff's testimony could support a jury finding that Ms. Terrebonne applied fundal pressure after the head was delivered and, thus, that Lakeview breached its duty of care.
See Lakeview's Memo (Rec.Doc.33) at p. 4.
Lakeview cites no evidence for this later assertion.
Opp.Memo, Exh. 4 at pp. 43-44. As in the case of plaintiff's testimony, this Court is constrained to give credence to plaintiffs mother's testimony and prohibited from making its own credibility determination. See Hunt, 277 F.3d at 764; Roberts, 266 F.3d at 373.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lakeview Regional Medical Center is DENIED.