Opinion
May 30, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gerard, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the contention of the defendant doctor, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could rationally conclude that he departed from good and accepted medical practice by failing to properly read a January 1987 mammogram and by failing to identify a suspicious lesion. These failures precluded the plaintiff Mary Flowers from opting for a lumpectomy with radiation therapy when the cancer was a stage one lesion, and required that she undergo a modified radical mastectomy in December 1987 because the cancer had progressed to a stage two lesion (see, Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 495; Dunleavy v Samuel, 177 A.D.2d 540; Nordhauser v New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 176 A.D.2d 787; Nicastro v Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 135; see also, McMahon v Badia, 195 A.D.2d 445; compare, Bossio v Fiorillo, 210 A.D.2d 836). To the extent that the expert medical testimony conflicted or was in dispute, the jury determined the weight to be accorded the testimony of each expert witness and could reasonably conclude that the defendant's departure from good and accepted medical practice was a substantial factor in producing the injury (see, Forte v Weiner, 200 A.D.2d 421; Walsh v Staten Is. Obstetrics Gynecology Assocs., 193 A.D.2d 672). We conclude that the verdict is amply supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence.
We find that the damage awards did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation.
We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find that they do not require reversal. Sullivan, J.P., Miller, Santucci and Altman, JJ., concur.