Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-2625-BF
February 11, 2002
ORDER
The above-captioned matter is a consent case proceeding before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 3, 2001. Having reviewed the motion, the Court has determined that it has merit and should be GRANTED.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Flowers-Hughes, an African-American woman, alleges discriminatory discharge and discriminatory transfer relating to her employment at Rock-Tenn Mill. On June 6, 2000, Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge of discrimination in which she alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of her race, discharged, and replaced by a white woman. The EEOC dismissed the charge and issued a right to sue letter on August 18, 2000. Plaintiff then initiated this lawsuit.
Plaintiff was first employed by Defendant Rock-Tenn Mill as a temporary accounts-payable clerk, and was later hired as a frill-time employee in that position at a salary of $22,050 per year. Defendant subsequently promoted Plaintiff to the position of lab clerk, which carried a salary of $25,249 per year. The promotion was mandatory. The position of lab clerk required greater proficiency in clerical skills and word processing than did the accounts-payable position. Plaintiff argues that she did not possess these skills, and that Defendant did not properly train her in the position, effectively "setting her up to fail" by forcibly promoting her to a position for which she was not qualified, and then terminating her only weeks later. Defendant maintains that the individual who promoted Plaintiff to the lab clerk position legitimately believed that she would be capable of performing the duties of the lab clerk position, and that Plaintiff was provided adequate training by the former lab clerk. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was discharged not because of her race, but due to poor job performance, as she was unable to carry out job requirements despite the training that was provided to her.
II. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the evidence on file, along with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Assoc. of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997); Crescent Towing Salvage Co., Inc. v. M/V Anax, 40 F.3d 741, 743 (5th Cir. 1994). The court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). As long as some support exists for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 213 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274 (1986); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994). Once the moving party has satisfied the burden, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; Elliot v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 514 U.S. 117, 115 S.Ct. 1976, 131 L.Ed. 865 (1995). There is a genuine issue of material fact if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Society of Fin. Examiners v. Nat'l Assn. of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 515 U.S. 1103, 115 S.Ct. 2247, 132 L.Ed.2d 255 (1995). The non-moving party cannot avoid summary judgment with only conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated assertions. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 871-73, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3180, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1986); Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a substantial showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d at 273.
B. Title VII
Direct evidence of discrimination is rare. For this reason, courts use an evidentiary procedure devised by the Supreme Court that allocates the burden of production and establishes an orderly presentation of proof in discrimination cases. Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under this burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997). If she succeeds, the defendant must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. Id. This burden is one of production, not of proof. If the defendant meets its production burden, the plaintiff must adduce evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that the articulated reason is a pretext for intentional discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502, 506-11 (1993), 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407; Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 992-93 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). To survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present evidence which, considered as a whole, creates (1) a fact issue regarding whether the employer was actually motivated by each of its stated reasons and (2) a reasonable inference that race was a determinative factor with respect to the complained-of actions. Walton, 119 F.3d at 370; St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515 (holding that to prove that a reason is a pretext for discrimination, a plaintiff must show both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason). For a jury to reasonably infer discriminatory intent, the plaintiffs rebuttal evidence must be substantial. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 994.
1. Discriminatory Discharge
Under the McDonnell-Douglass burden-shifting framework, in order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, the plaintiff must show (1)that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the position she formerly held; (3) that despite her qualifications she was terminated; and (4) that she was replaced by someone outside of the protected class. Meinecke v. HR Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792 at 802.
As an African-American, the plaintiff clearly satisfies the first requirement of the prima facie test. However, the second prong of the test, a determination of whether the plaintiff was "qualified" for the position of lab clerk, presents some difficulty. The defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to establish her prima facie case because she admits that she was not qualified for the position of lab clerk. The plaintiff has indeed made such an admission. However, it should be noted that in addition to admitting she was not qualified, the plaintiff also argues that the reason for her lack of qualification is that Defendant failed to provide training necessary for the successful completion of many job responsibilities.
Poor job performance should not be confused with job "qualification," as it is intended in the prima facie case formulation. Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1505-1506 (5th Cir. 1988). Placing a plaintiffs "qualifications" in issue at both the prima facie case and pretext stages of a termination case is an unnecessary redundancy. Id. Therefore, because it is clear that Plaintiff meets the first, third and fourth requirements of the prima facie test (in that she was terminated by Rock-Tenn and subsequently replaced by an individual outside of the protected class), and that consideration of Plaintiffs "qualification" or job performance should be reserved for discussion at the pretext stage, the Court will proceed as though the plaintiff has established her prima facie case.
According to Bienkowski, 851 F2d at 1506 n. 2, most courts have avoided the redundancy of considering the plaintiff's "qualifications" at both the prima facie and pretext stages by analyzing the issues in tandem, See Huhn v. Koehring, 718 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1983), or by assuming a prima facie case in order to base a decision purely on pretext. See e.g., Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 244 (4th Cir. 1982). Here, the plaintiff's admitted lack of qualification for the position at issue appears to be an attempt to discredit the defendant's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff, instead of an admission that she cannot carve out a prima facie case. The plaintiff admits to lacking the requisite qualifications in order to illustrate the discrepancy in her training for the lab clerk position, in an attempt to demonstrate that she was "set up to fail" by the defendant. As such, the Court has determined that the issue of "qualification" would best be considered at the pretext stage of analysis.
In light of the Court's determination that the plaintiff has met the threshold prima facie requirements, the burden now shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's termination is attributable not to race discrimination, but instead to her poor job performance and lack of skill in carrying out work assignments. Defendant argues that it did indeed make a concerted effort to train the plaintiff by assigning Ms. Ollison to provide such training, but that despite that effort, Plaintiff's performance failed to improve over time, warranting her termination. This assertion satisfies the defendant's burden of production, and the focus now shifts to the plaintiffs ability to refute the legitimacy of the defendant's proffered reason for terminating her employment. In short, the plaintiff must adduce evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that the articulated reason is a pretext for intentional discrimination. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506-11; Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 992-93.
Ms Ollison has stated that Plaintiff's "performance did not improve after weeks" of training. (Ollison Aff. ¶ 5).
As mentioned, Plaintiff admits that her performance was unsatisfactory, but maintains that she was unable to meet her employer's expectations due to the lack of training provided subsequent to her promotion to the lab clerk position. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant knew at the time of her promotion that she did not possess the skills required to perform many job functions, such as proficiency in word processing and the production of spreadsheets. Plaintiff states that Defendant "provided adequate assistance to Ms. Ollison, a white female, when she required assistance but failed to aid the plaintiff," in support of her allegations of discrimination. Plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Ollison was often too busy and overworked to provide Plaintiff with any meaningful training. Further, the plaintiff cites the mandatory nature of her promotion, together with the defendant's refusal to reinstate her as accounts payable clerk upon the discovery that she was not well suited for the lab clerk position, as evidence of discrimination. Plaintiff also contends that there were several white employees of Rock-Tenn that could have been offered the lab clerk position instead of Plaintiff, but that Defendant chose Plaintiff for the position as part of a plan to intentionally set her up to fail, thereby facilitating her termination.
Plaintiff erroneously classifies Ms. Ollison as a white female, when in fact, she is an African-American woman, as evidenced by her deposition testimony. (Pl. Dep. at 75). Therefore, Plaintiff's argument that the defendant treated her in a discriminatory manner is in no way buttressed such an assertion. If anything, Plaintiff's statement would appear to be counterproductive in demonstrating that racial discrimination was the underlying reason for her termination.
Plaintiffs own subjective belief that she has been a victim of discrimination is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff here has adduced no real evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons for terminating her are false, or that the real reason for the employment action was related to her race. Walton, 119 F.3d at 370. Instead, Plaintiff has, at best, created a very weak issue of fact as to whether Rock-Tenn was motivated to terminate her solely because of her poor job performance. Without evidence that would permit a reasonable inference that race was a determinative factor in the decision to terminate her, such a weak issue of fact will not allow the plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. The only attempt Plaintiff makes to demonstrate that race played a role in her termination is by alleging that Ms. Ollison, the former lab clerk, was provided adequate training and assistance with her workload while the plaintiff was denied any such training or assistance. Plaintiff erroneously characterizes Ms. Ollison as being a white female, when she is in fact African-American, therefore rendering Plaintiff's allegations insufficient to allow an inference of pretext. Furthermore, even if the Court accepts Plaintiff's theory relating to her inadequate training, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing that her race had any bearing on Defendant's actions. Again, Plaintiff relies on a comparison between herself and Ms. Ollison in asserting that Defendant acted in a discriminatory manner. Any such argument is wholly invalid for the reasons previously explained. Defendant's decision to promote the plaintiff may have been wrought with error and poor judgment. However, Defendant's decision is not actionable unless it was motivated by some form of racial discrimination. Deines v. Texas Dep't of Protective and Regulatory Services, 164 F.3d 277, 281 (5th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has not shown to the satisfaction of the Court that any such discrimination was present. Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to the discriminatory discharge claim.
II. Discriminatory Transfer
The Court now turns to Plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory transfer. Based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies, the Court has determined that the transfer claim should be dismissed.
Filing a charge with the EEOC is a condition precedent to a Title VII suit. Young v. City of Houston, Tex., 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990). In the Fifth Circuit, a Title VII action is limited in scope to the EEOC investigation that can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Id. (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)). In other words, a complaint filed pursuant to Title VII may encompass any kind of discrimination "like or related to" allegations contained in the EEOC charge. Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466.
Plaintiff offers a cursory and somewhat confusing explanation as to why she is entitled to pursue a claim of discriminatory transfer despite the fact that she listed no such claim in her EEOC charge. In her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff states that she "did include this claim in the EEOC Charge, which identifies her termination on June 2, 2000 as discriminatory." (Pl. Resp. at 12). However, a review of the charge indicates that only allegations of discriminatory discharge are included therein. Plaintiff checked the "race" box under the title "cause of discrimination," and stated only that "on June 2, 2000, [she] was discharged from [her] position as a lab clerk" and that she believed she had been "discriminated against because of [her] race, black, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by being discharged and replaced by a white woman." There is no indication that Plaintiff intended to allege discriminatory transfer; a claim that is not "like or related to" one of discriminatory discharge, and is not a logical outgrowth of an EEOC investigation of discriminatory discharge. The fact that Plaintiff asserted a simple allegation of race discrimination does not broaden the scope of the EEOC charge to include discriminatory transfer.
Although the Fifth Circuit has not addressed this specific issue, this Court's conclusion is supported by the finding in Chester v. American Tel. Tel. Co., 907 F. Supp. 982 (N.D.Tex. 1994) (Sanders, C.J.), that a decision not to transfer an employee and a decision to discharge an employee are "separate and distinct events." Id. at 987 (holding that "a failure to transfer charge . . . is beyond the scope of an EEOC charge that alleges only a discriminatory discharge"). Judge Sanders concluded that the "separate and distinct" reasoning was applicable in that case because it was "impossible to glean from [the] EEOC charge that [the plaintiff] intended to allege discrimination based on [the defendant's] failure to transfer him to other positions." Id. The instant case is obviously distinguishable in that Plaintiff is complaining of an involuntary transfer rather than failure to transfer. However, Chester is still persuasive because the present case involves "separate and distinct events" that are strikingly similar to those in Chester: a transfer and a discharge. Therefore, the Court is convinced that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claim of discriminatory transfer. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on that claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Defendant's asserted legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination are pretext. Plaintiff has also failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her discriminatory transfer claim. Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against the defendant are DISMISSED.
JUDGMENT
The Court has entered its Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 3, 2001, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant are DISMISSED.